KAHL APPEAL FOR RELEASE FAILS Kansas Denies Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Challenging Federal Jurisdiction and Original Warrant http://www.patshannan.com/yorieappealdenied.html by Pat Shannan In a surprise pro se petition to the Kansas Supreme Court, Yorie Kahl, demanded that the court issue an order for the prison warden to bring Kahl forward to the court to present evidence of his wrongful incarceration. Although convicted in federal court in North Dakota in 1983, Kahl is currently serving a life sentence at the federal penitentiary in Leavenworth, and, therefore, the Kansas judges hold the key to his cell - that is if the challenge against federal jurisdiction had succeeded. However, the Petition was filed on September 30th and was denied by the court - without comment and without signature - before the week was out. Kahl noticed the court with its jurisdiction to proceed: Because Petitioner alleges, supported by positive proof below, that he is a person detained, confined or restrained within the State of Kansas without any lawful authority whatsoever, this Court has jurisdiction to inquire into the lawfulness of such imprisonment and, if such imprisonment is "found to be wrongful" to release Petitioner and "make such other orders as justice and equity…may require." Kansas Civil Procedure, Article 15, § 60-1505(d). In the lengthy petition of more than 50,000 words on 116 pages, plus his evidentiary attachments, Kahl asserts that: ". . . the want of such jurisdiction is clear upon the face of the records, which are attached hereto, and that, therefore, said writ of habeas corpus must issue as a matter of right, and release from said unlawful imprisonment is mandatory as a matter of law." His epistle, which took years in preparation from behind the prison walls, tells the court of the duplicity of the U. S. Marshals, the FBI, the judge, the prosecutors, and the cooperative news media, which led to his conviction; and many previously unknown and exculpatory facts about his case. Kahl maintains that most of the eight counts in his indictment actually pertained to his father and not to himself, and that the circumstances were such that only the State of North Dakota, not the federal court, had the proper jurisdiction to try him for murder. With numerous supreme court cites, Kahl shows that the federal government was granted "exclusive" authority only in very limited areas, e.g., the federal city and military forts, etc., and have no "general criminal jurisdiction" within the states. He further fortifies this with the founders' admonition that "Congress had no general right to punish murder committed within any of the States" and that it was clear that "Congress had no general right to punish felonies generally." Congress could only enact such laws for places where it enjoyed plenary powers - for instance, over the District of Columbia… 'a [federal] regulation of police,'… could have constitutional application only where Congress had exclusive authority, such as the territories." Marshals Wanted Shoot-out At dusk on February 13, 1983, a Sunday evening, a team of U. S. Marshals and local county and state deputies set up a roadblock ambuscade outside of Medina, North Dakota. They claimed they had an arrest warrant for Yorie's father, Gordon, but the events soon showed it was actually a "legalized murder" plot planned and executed by Kenneth W. Muir, the marshal in charge. Yorie has presented evidence to the court that on at least two separate occasions in the days prior to the ambush, Muir spoke to informants about eliminating Gordon "from this (blanking) planet." Yorie contends that he has the proof that this federal informant, Mike Phillips, was paid $10,000 to go to Canada prior to the trial, where he would be outside of the reach of a subpoena by the defense. Yorie states, "No outstanding warrant for the arrest of Gordon Wendell Kahl was ever produced, does not exist in the record, and does not and never has existed either as a matter of fact or law." The purported warrant related to an alleged breach of federal probation by Gordon Kahl but apparently had been withdrawn on September 22, 1980 and was no longer in effect. Attorney Andy Melechinsky wrote in 1986, "It must be emphasized that under law, Gordon Kahl protected himself fully, to whatever extent protection was possible by his Affidavit, Notice of Designation of Counsel, and Special Appearance. The court refused to act on any of these defenses. This is the real crime in the matter. If U. S. District Judge D. W. Suttle had considered and acted properly upon any of these writs, all parties would be alive today. The docket sheet shows clearly that Judge Suttle ignored all of Kahl's defenses and continued to grind out his own form of 'justice.' It was Judge Suttle who effectively sentenced four people to death at this time. D. W. Suttle is the real criminal. He will have to live with his conscience, until a Grand Jury is convened to look into his criminal acts. The record alone is enough to indict the 'judge' at this point." The 1983 attack plan backfired. Muir and fellow Marshal Robert Cheshire were killed and three other lawmen were wounded. All were likely shot by Gordon Kahl, and there was no evidence that his son Yorie, who was knocked down by the first shot fired in the melee, ever returned fire. When the smoke cleared, Gordon had disappeared and Yorie found himself, his mother Joan, and his friend Scott Faul charged with murder and conspiracy. Joan was acquitted but the two young men were convicted and received life sentences in early June -- the same week that Gordon was hunted down and killed in another ambush by some 40 FBI agents and local lawmen in northern Arkansas. Yorie, now 43, was federally indicted for first degree murder (of officers engaged in the performance of official duties), assault on officers of the law, conspiracy to assault, and harboring a fugitive - all of which he exposes in his petition for their flimsy foundation. First-degree murder is that which is premeditated. Since Yorie and his dad were surprised in ambush, even the intimidated jurors could see that this charge was ridiculous and came back with an acquittal. However, following the judge's instructions, they returned with a conviction for 2nd degree murder, a charge for which he was not indicted. Says Yorie, "The jury was left only with the power to determine the degree of guilt as to counts One and Two. Federal Jurisdiction Lacking Yorie raises a titillating legal premise which, should he be successful, might be called a "loophole" by his detractors. Nevertheless, after nearly twenty years behind bars for an unlawful conviction, most would argue that he deserves a legal loophole. Here is what he points out to the Kansas court (and we wonder how many lawyers would have discovered it): On counts One and Two the jury returned general verdicts of acquittal of first degree murder of Kenneth B. Muir and Robert S. Cheshire, Jr. (respectively), as United States and deputy United States Marshals, (respectively), while engaged in the performance of their official duties, "as charged in the indictment. "Thereupon, the jury returned additional special verdicts on counts One and Two of guilty for the second degree murder of Kenneth B. Muir and Robert S. Cheshire, Jr., (respectively), omitting their status as United States and deputy United States Marshals "engaged in the performance of their official duties." "Notwithstanding the acquittals of the charges of counts One and Two of the indictment and the rendering of special guilty verdicts in those counts of second degree murder only - an offense not chargeable nor triable in a federal court and exclusively within the jurisdiction of the State of North Dakota - the trial judge, nevertheless, sentenced Petitioner to life imprisonment on counts One and Two to run concurrently with each other. . ." Yorie contends that because no outstanding warrant was produced at the trial and no arrest warrant existed, it was therefore impossible for the marshals to have been "engaged in the performance of their official duties," and the alleged federal jurisdiction goes out the window. The ensuing trial then became a political "star chamber" destined for conviction from the outset. The other charges for which he was indicted should have been rejected by the grand jury prior to the indictment and surely would have been by a more sober-minded petit jury outside of the local hysteria of the moment. For instance, how could a man have: 1. conspired to assault law officers when it was they that surprised him at ambush? 2. assaulted law officers when he was flat on his back with multiple shotgun wounds and near death? 3. harbored a fugitive (his father) with supposed knowledge of a bench warrant when no warrant existed? The charge of "harboring" Gordon by Yorie was a stretch - even if there had been a lawful warrant. At the time of the marshal's ambush, Gordon and Joan were living in the town of Carrington. Their son Yorie was living with his wife, Janice, and two daughters on the family farm outside of Heaton, some 22 miles to the west. The indictment claimed that Yorie was guilty of harboring because he had knowledge of the alleged warrant. However, such knowledge by a citizen is insufficient to support such a charge, as it is not the citizen's job or duty to report this information to authorities. However, the obligation to answer honestly does exist if authorities should question one as to whether or not the fugitive is present on the premises. This, of course, never happened, and even Joan faced the flimsy "harboring a fugitive" charge (of her husband) but was also acquitted of that. Outrageous Prosecutorial Duplicity Kahl further accuses the Department of Justice, Assistant U. S. Attorneys Lynn Crooks and Dennis Fisher, and Federal District Judge Paul Benson with prohibiting him from "contesting false assertions of the jurisdictional fact and from establishing that the jurisdictional and essential elements for each asserted claim did not exist." He further asserts that he was effectively "black-balled" (after his conviction) from judicial relief from violations against his personal rights protected under the Constitution and laws of the United States, as well as those of his sovereign State of North Dakota. Also, prosecutor Lynn Crooks apparently "stacked" the jury. Crooks had grown up in the small town of Hankinson, N.D. with August Pankow, one of the 12 trial jurors. Both Crooks and Pankow have admitted that they knew each other all their lives, and other jurors have revealed that Pankow told them off the record that he was a "friend" of Crooks. Crooks admitted in filmed interviews that the juror, August Pankow, knew him and his family, and Pankow made the same admissions on film. The record shows that these matters were not revealed during voir dire, and the defendants never knew these details or that Pankow had lied to the Court at trial. When Yorie raised this issue before the federal courts, the 8th Circuit ignored the voir dire record and stated they couldn't tell where this information had come from, so it decided against the record that it must have been during voir dire. In a video-taped interview in 1990, AUSA Lynn Crooks revealed that by the morning following the attack, The Department of Justice had taken an extraordinary interest in the case from Washington, D.C., and immediately thereafter had sent very high-ranking officials to North Dakota both to intimidate the local officials and to ensure the case proceeded to the intended politically- correct conclusion. Crooks also admitted that "We did everything in our power" to ensure the defendants had attorneys to the government's satisfaction. This would seem to substantiate Kahl's claim that his original attorney was intimidated into dropping the case and leaving the state. According to North Dakota State Investigator Milt Lennick, (in his official report) the NDBCI hastily closed its investigation of this most extraordinary case in North Dakota's history at the behest of the FBI and/or the U.S. Marshals Service. Kahl maintains that this was to ensure that unbiased state investigators did not taint the official version of the case. Yorie's co-defendant Scott Faul has discovered witnesses that would testify that in November of 1982 (three months prior to the ambush), U. S. Marshal Ken Muir attempted to solicit one of his informants to burglarize Gordon Kahl's home. Mike Phillips, who had been a federal snitch since the previous July or longer and attended the citizen's meeting with Gordon, refused to commit the crime. On February 7th, the week prior to the attempted murder, Muir called Phillips again to try to learn when Gordon, Yorie, and Scott would be going to their next meeting in Medina, some fifty miles south of the Kahl farm. Phillips told him that it would be Sunday, February 13th. Muir asked if the three were always armed, and when Phillips replied that they were, Muir said, "Good!" and then boasted that he would kill the three after the meeting and make it look like a shootout. This was a separate conversation from the one when Phillips also quoted Muir as saying that he would remove them from the planet. From the feds perspective, one can readily see why it suddenly became necessary to fund Mike Phillips' extended vacation to Canada. His testimony alone would have destroyed the government's whole case and would have proven that federal officers deliberately staged the ambush in order to murder Gordon Kahl and the others. Says Yorie Kahl: "THIS PRINCIPLE IS OF THE HIGHEST OF IMPORTANCE TO THIS PROCEEDING AND IS NOT RAISED BY PETITIONER AS A MERE EXERCISE OF SEMANTICS - PETITIONER WAS CHARGED, TRIED, CONVICTED AND IS SUFFERING IMPRISONMENT FOR AN ALLEGED MURDER COMMITTED ON A NORTH DAKOTA STATE HIGHWAY ON NORTH DAKOTA STATE PROPERTY AND OUTSIDE THE CRIMINAL JURISDICTION OF THE UNITED STATES OR ANY OF ITS COURTS!" Kahl asserts that the total sentences issued upon the remaining counts was fifteen years and were served by him in toto no later than February 12, 1998, and all imprisonment served by him since that date is entirely unlawful. "Prisoner must be released, as a matter of law and justice, instanter." His mother, Joan Kahl, is now 75 and still lives in North Dakota. Concerning her disappointment regarding the recent court rejection, she said, "I never get my hopes too high because I don't trust them [the courts, lawyers and judges], and I guess I should not be surprised that they denied it so quickly. But this shows me that probably only a few phone calls were made in arriving at their decision and that the petition was never even read by the Kansas judges." Indeed, with the aforementioned 116-page petition, plus exhibits that equal nearly three times that in size and volume, it does not seem humanly possible that the evidence was in any way considered. Certainly, the court could not have rendered a decision in such a short period of time, even if the judges had dropped everything and concentrated solely on the Kahl case, which is absurd to assume. The full text of Yorie Kahl's petition may be found in "Pat Shannan's Investigative Reports." See www.patshannan.com YORIE KAHL APPEAL http://www.patshannan.com/yorieappeal.html Case Number_____________________ IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS Ex parte: Yorie Von Kahl, Petitioner Upon Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus ad Subjiciendum Instanter to: THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AD SUBJICIENDUM INSTANTER Comes now, Yorie Von Kahl, Petitioner, pro se and in propia persona, and petitions this Honorable Court for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, instanter, to N.L. Conner, Warden of the United States Penitentiary at Leavenworth, Kansas, to bring before this Court the body of Petitioner along with his essential documents and evidence necessary to the issues presented herein, and to bring before this Court the requisite proofs essential to establish said N.L. Conner's lawful custody over Petitioner subject to the claims raised below. Your Petitioner is a citizen of the State of North Dakota. Your Petitioner is imprisoned unlawfully at the United States Penitentiary at Leavenworth, Kansas within the sovereign jurisdiction of the State of Kansas. Your Petitioner is in the direct custody of N.L. Conner, who is the warden of such penitentiary. Your Petitioner's imprisonment is against his will and consent and is wholly without authority of law and neither N.L. Conner, his employer, the United States and/or the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, nor his superiors have, nor have they ever had, jurisdiction over the person of Petitioner, the subject-matter relating to the immediate claims or jurisdiction over the territory for which Petitioner's person in relation to the subject-matter of the immediate claims depend. Your Petitioner asserts the want of such jurisdiction is clear upon the face of the records, which are attached hereto, and that, therefore, said writ of habeas corpus must issue as a matter of right, and release from said unlawful imprisonment is mandatory as a matter of law. HISTORICAL SUMMARY OF PROCEDURAL FACTS WHICH RESULTED IN PETITIONER'S UNLAWFUL IMPRISONMENT Your Petitioner was charged by a federal grand jury in eight counts of an eleven-count indictment on March 11, 1983, as follows: Count One: First degree murder of United States Marshal Kenneth M. Muir, while said marshal was engaged in the performance of his official duties. In violation of Title 18 United States Code, Sections 1111, 1114 and 2. (The indictment was amended later to read Kenneth B. Muir upon motion of federal prosecutor.) Count Two: First degree murder of deputy United States Marshal Robert S. Cheshire, Jr., while said deputy marshal was engaged in the performance of his official duties. In violation of Title 18 United States Code, Sections 111, 1114 and 2. Count Five: Assault of deputy United States Marshal Carl Wigglesworth, while said deputy marshal was engaged in the performance of his official duties. In violation of Title 18 United States Code, Sections 111, 1114 and 2. Count Six: Assault of deputy United States Marshal James Hopson, while said deputy marshal was engaged in the performance of his official duties. In violation of Title 18 United States Code, Sections 111, 1114 and 2. Count Seven: Assault of Stutsman County deputy Sheriff Bradley Kapp employed to assist said marshals, while engaged in the performance of their official duties. In violation of Title 18 United States Code, Sections 111, 1114 and 2. Count Eight: Assault of Medina, North Dakota city policeman Steven Schnabel employed to assist said marshals, while engaged in the performance of their official duties. In violation of Title 18 United States Code, Sections 111, 1114 and 2. Count Nine: Harboring a fugitive, i.e., his father, Gordon Wendell Kahl, from arrest [and attempt to arrest] upon an outstanding warrant with knowledge of such warrant by said marshals. In violation of Title 18 United States Code, Sections 1071 and 2. Count Eleven: Conspiracy to assault marshals to prevent arrest of Gordon Wendell Kahl with knowledge that marshals were attempting to arrest Gordon Wendell Kahl and with knowledge that an outstanding warrant for Gordon Wendell Kahl had issued. In violation of Title 18 United States Code, Section 371. The alleged execution of the alleged outstanding warrant was the jurisdictional basis of all counts of the indictment encompassed within the general terms "while engaged in the performance of [the alleged officer's] official duties," alleged generally in counts One, Two, Four, Five, Six, Seven and Eight, and defined specifically in count Eleven. Knowledge of the issuance and outstanding nature of the alleged warrant was charged in count Eleven, as was knowledge of the officer's identity. Count Nine alleged knowledge of the allegedly outstanding warrant and that such warrant was "issued under United States Law." No outstanding warrant for the arrest of Gordon Wendell Kahl was ever produced, does not exist in the record and does not and never has existed either as a matter of fact or law. The jury, as pertains to Petitioner, returned general verdicts of guilty - directed by the trial judge* -- on counts Five, Six, Seven, Eight, Nine and Eleven. * All facts were declared to the jury in the trial judge's instructions. The essential jury instructions relative to the claims herein are commented upon, infra, and copies thereof attached herewith. The jury was left only with the power to determine the degree of guilt as to counts One and Two. Juror interviews and affidavits supporting their verdicts are available and reveal that they merely did as the judge directed and believed the trial was an attempt to cover-up crimes committed by federal officers, but not knowing the rights and duties of jurors, rubber-stamped the verdicts. On counts One and Two the jury returned general verdicts of acquittal of first degree murder of Kenneth B. Muir and Robert S. Cheshire, Jr. (respectively), as United States and deputy United States Marshals, (respectively), while engaged in the performance of their official duties, "as charged in the indictment." Thereupon, the jury returned additional special verdicts on counts One and Two of guilty for the second degree murder of Kenneth B. Muir and Robert S. Cheshire, Jr., (respectively), omitting their status as United States and deputy United States Marshals "engaged in the performance of their official duties." Notwithstanding the acquittals of the charges of counts One and Two of the indictment and the rendering of special guilty verdicts in those counts of second degree murder only - an offense not chargeable nor triable in a federal court and exclusively within the jurisdiction of the State of North Dakota - the trial judge, nevertheless, sentenced Petitioner to life imprisonment on counts One and Two to run concurrently with each other, ten years each on counts Five, Six, Seven and Eight to run concurrently with each other but consecutive with the life on counts One and Two, and five years each on counts Nine and Eleven to run concurrently to each other but consecutive to the ten years on counts Five, Six, Seven and Eight. GROUNDS FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT AND FOR RELEASE INSTANTER I. FEDERAL JURISDICTION FOR EVERY COUNT OF THE INDICTMENT WAS PREMISED SOLELY AND EXCLUSIVELY UPON THE ALLEGATION OF AN OUTSTANDING WARRANT FOR THE ARREST OF GORDON WENDELL KAHL, PETITIONER'S FATHER, FOR AN ALLEGED VIOLATION OF PROBATION, AND NO OUTSTANDING WARRANT WAS PRODUCED AT THE TRIAL OR AT ANY OTHER TIME AND DOES NOT AND HAS NEVER EXISTED AS A MATTER OF FACT AND/OR LAW, THEREFORE, NO JURISDICTION EXISTS AND HAS NEVER EXISTED IN THE UNITED STATES, IT'S COURTS, THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, NOR IN ANY OTHER DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY OF THE UNITED STATES, AND SUCH JURISDICTION BEING NULL AND VOID AB INITIO AND THE CAUSE OF PETITIONER'S IMPRISONMENT, SAID IMPRISONMENT IS AND HAS ALWAYS BEEN WHOLLY UNLAWFUL AND HIS RELEASE THEREFROM IS MANDATORY INSTANTER; II. IRRESPECTIVE OF THE JURISDICTIONAL DEFECT RAISED IN GROUND ONE, PETITIONER WAS CHARGED, TRIED, INDICTED, CONVICTED, SENTENCED AND IS PRESENTLY IMPRISONED FOR THE OFFENSE OF MURDER, AN OFFENSE NOT WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF CONGRESS AND NOT COGNIZABLE IN ANY FEDERAL COURT, AS THE ACT WAS ALLEGED TO HAVE OCCURRED ON A NORTH DAKOTA STATE HIGHWAY ON STATE PROPERTY AND THERE IS NO ALLEGATION THAT THE OFFENSE OCCURRED IN ANY OF THE PLACES OR UPON ANY OF THE THINGS DEFINED IN TITLE 18, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTIONS 1111(b) AND 7(1)-(7) -- I.E., THE SPECIAL MARITIME AND TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF THE UNITED STATES - THE ONLY PLACES AND THINGS UPON WHICH THE UNITED STATES HAS JURISDICTION OVER MURDER UNDER THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, AND SUCH OFFENSE UNDER THE ALLEGATIONS CHARGED AND DISCLOSED BY THE JURY VERDICT ESTABLISH THE OFFENSE TO BE COGNIZABLE SOLELY BY THE STATE OF NORTH DAKOTA. IMPRISONMENT UPON SUCH VERDICT IS CORAM NON JUDICE AND WHOLLY UNLAWFUL. JURISDICTION AND DUTY OF THIS COURT TO AWARD WRIT AND ORDER RELEASE OF PETITIONER The Constitution of the United States commands that "[t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the Public Safety may require it." Article I, Section 9, Clause 2, U.S. Constitution. The Supreme Court of the State of Kansas has original jurisdiction over habeas corpus proceedings and such jurisdiction is co-extensive with the State. Kansas Constitution, Article 3 § 3. ("Jurisdiction and terms. The supreme court shall have original jurisdiction in proceedings in …habeas corpus…[And] its jurisdiction shall be co-extensive with the state."). The Kansas State Bill of Rights commands that "[t]he right to the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless the public safety requires it in case of invasion or rebellion." Kansas Bill of Rights, § 8. Pursuant to the Kansas State Constitution and Bill of Rights, Kansas Law of Civil Procedure provides that "any person in this state who is detained, confined, or restrained of liberty on any pretense whatsoever…may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus in the supreme court, court of appeals or the district court of the county in which such restraint is taking place." Kansas Civil Procedure, Article 15, § 60-1507. Because Petitioner alleges, supported by positive proof below, that he is a person detained, confined or restrained within the State of Kansas without any lawful authority whatsoever, this Court has jurisdiction to inquire into the lawfulness of such imprisonment and, if such imprisonment is "found to be wrongful" to release Petitioner and "make such other orders as justice and equity…may require." Kansas Civil Procedure, Article 15, § 60-1505(d). Petitioner, declares, as part of this Jurisdictional Statement, that review of the grounds advanced for relief herein are not available to Petitioner in the federal courts. As will be demonstrated in the fact section, below, Petitioner has raised numerous jurisdictional and constitutional questions in the federal courts at every level, including GROUND I herein, but the federal courts refuse to address them and afford relief. In other matters, the federal courts have created purely fictitious facts and records to avoid their constitutional duties, and Petitioner has been effectively "black-balled" from judicial protection in the federal courts. Therefore, to support this Court's jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus and release Petitioner from wholly unlawful imprisonment within the sovereign territory of the State of Kansas, as well as its constitutional duties to do so under both the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution and laws of Kansas, Petitioner submits herein a PRELIMINARY ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT collecting authorities supporting this Court's jurisdiction to act and its constitutional duties to do so. See PRELIMINARY ARGUMENT IN SUPPORT OF JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT, infra (including: powers and duties of courts to issue writs of habeas corpus; distinction between courts of general and those of limited jurisdiction; distinction between criminal jurisdiction of the federal government and that of the sovereign States). FACTS IN SUPPORT FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT AND RELEASE FROM UNLAWFUL INPRISONMENT IN LIGHT OF EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES Petitioner will show that the United States District Court, which tried, convicted and punished him did so in complete want of subject-matter jurisdiction. The facts will conclusively demonstrate that the material essential jurisdictional fact, necessary to the District Court's jurisdiction and necessary to establish the preliminary essential element of every offense charged in the underlying indictment, not only is devoid of proof in the record of the proceedings, but did not exist as a matter of law, and that the United States, both through the Department of Justice operating through the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (Plaintiff in the underlying cause) represented by Assistant United States Attorneys Lynn Crooks and Dennis Fisher, and through United States District Judge Paul Benson, prohibited Petitioner from contesting false assertions of the jurisdictional fact and from establishing that the jurisdictional and essential elements for each asserted claim did not exist. Specifically, jurisdiction in the United States and/or its alter ego the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, depended initially upon a lawful outstanding warrant for the arrest of Gordon Wendell Kahl, which is evident on the face of the indictment and admitted by the attorneys representing the underlying Plaintiff, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. Such warrant is alleged as the essential jurisdictional element in each count of the indictment and in all pleadings and argument in the underlying cause. Copy of said warrant is submitted herewith as Exhibit No.1 with the attached statement included upon which the purported basis of probable cause to issue such warrant was submitted to the court of original issue and as the same was submitted by the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA as both evidence of the essential jurisdictional element of each alleged offense, and also as justification for federal officers to stop, assault and severely wound Petitioner on the date alleged in the indictment. Petitioner is requesting from the highest Court of the Sovereign State of Kansas immediate judicial relief from wholly unlawful imprisonment within its sovereign territorial jurisdiction. However, this extraordinary remedy is doubly-extraordinary in this case, as Petitioner is in custody of officers of the United States and/or of or on behalf of its alter ego UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and Petitioner has cause to believe that the custodian will attempt to have this petition dismissed upon the ground that Petitioner can only seek this civil remedy in a federal - i.e., District Court, by asserting that such custody is under color of the authority of the United States. Petitioner hereby notifies this Court that he has raised the issue, presented here as GROUND ONE, with complete and uncontested documentary proof in the United States District Court for the District of North Dakota upon a 2255 Motion proceeding, in the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit on appeal from the denial of the 2255 Motion after the District Court ignored the claim and refused to address it, in the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals again for rehearing en banc from a denial of the appeal after the Circuit Court of Appeals ignored the claim and refused to address it, and upon mandamus to the Supreme Court of the United States from a denial of the Circuit Court of Appeals to rehear the appeal and the Supreme Court of the United States ignored the claim and refused to address it. Pertinent portions of Petitioner's 2255 Motion proceedings, appeal therefrom to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, motion for rehearing or rehearing en banc, and petition for a writ of Mandamus to the Supreme Court of the United States are submitted as proof of unavailability of judicial review in the United States Courts as Exhibit No. 27. Petitioner's efforts to compel the United States Courts to protect and vindicate his constitutional and constitutionally-guaranteed rights have been futile. His efforts to vindicate himself from unlawful imprisonment by his right to habeas corpus judicial enforcement has been initially long delayed and effectively suspended by the United States and/or its alter ego UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and its courts. Because Petitioner has been effectively "black-balled" from judicial relief from violations against his personal rights protected under the Constitution and laws of the United States, as well as violations of such rights protected under the Constitution and laws of his Sovereign State of North Dakota and under the Constitution and laws of this Sovereign State of Kansas, his last resort to the protection and vindication of his constitutional rights, above, is left to this Court. Therefore, Petitioner feels constrained to include a complete history of the facts which led to the underlying case, not for the purpose of establishing the merits of his respective grounds for relief, which themselves are self-proving by the documents taken from the underlying case on their face, but to confirm the conscience of this Court with both the necessity and its duty to interfere with the federal tyranny that has been and continues to oppress Petitioner and flagrantly undermine the Constitution of the United States, usurping powers denied by that fundamental law and obliterating the very principles upon which the Union was established. On February 13, 1983, former and oft-decorated WWII tail- gunner Gordon Kahl, 63, was targeted for death by U. S. Marshals in North Dakota. Outside of Medina at a roadside ambush, reminiscent of the 1934 attack on the infamous Bonnie and Clyde, Gordon's 23-year-old son, Yorie, was shot thrice before Gordon killed two marshals and wounded several more. He claimed self-defense, and the circumstances seemed to substantiate that. In November of 1982, Gordon Kahl was being monitored by the FBI. An FBI teletype alleged that Gordon Kahl was at some kind of meeting passing out "Posse Comitatus" literature. FBI REPORT, p. 6, FOIA #89-5436-149 (Exhibit No. 7). It is apparent, and becomes even moreso, that any and all activity associated with Gordon Kahl since the mid-1970's in official records were identified as "posse comitatus" or "illegal tax protester" activity. Between November, 1982, and February 13, 1983, the North Dakota State Crime Bureau were monitoring the activities of Gordon Kahl and the meetings he was attending, which centered around farm problems and particularly farm foreclosures. LETTER FROM FORMER CHIEF U.S. MARSHAL HAROLD WARREN TO LOIS MUIR (Exhibit No. 8). That information was passed directly to the U.S. Marshals in the District. id. Neither Petitioner, nor his father Gordon Kahl, nor Scott Faul, nor anyone else Petitioner knows, was aware of this intense interest in Gordon Kahl by these agencies at that time. Petitioner had never even heard of any "posse comitatus" meetings, membership or activities in North Dakota of any kind, until after February 13, 1983, and then only through the intense media campaign throughout the State and largely through the Nation that arose thereafter. Petitioner does know that his father was not involved in any "posse comitatus" or "tax protest" activities since he was released from prison and the only public announcement by Gordon Kahl involving taxes since that time was the lone newspaper interview. On February 7, 1983, U.S. Marshal Kenneth Muir contacted an undercover informant, who had been working with the U.S. Marshals Service and the North Dakota State Crime Bureau7 and demanded to know the immediate whereabouts of Gordon Kahl. The informant, Mike Phillips, then living at Ashley, North Dakota, told Muir he didn't know his exact whereabouts, but that Gordon Kahl lived on a farm near Heaton, North Dakota. Phillips told Muir that Gordon Kahl, Petitioner, and Scott Faul normally attended Sunday afternoon meetings together at Doc Martin's medical clinic at Medina, North Dakota and that a meeting was scheduled for the following Sunday, February 13, 1983. Muir asked Phillips if Gordon Kahl was armed at these meetings to which Phillips informed him that Gordon Kahl, Petitioner, and Scott Faul were always armed at these meetings. Muir replied to Phillips, "good, that's the last meeting they will ever attend, at least it will look like they had a fair chance." See AMENDED 2255 MOTION OF SCOTT WILLIAM FAUL TO U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NORTH DAKOTA, MEMORANDUM OF LAW AND FACTS IN SUPPORT, pp. 128-140 (Exhibit No. 9A).8 7. Petitioner was informed by a private investigator that this particular informant also worked for the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF) and was sent into the North Dakota area to set up Gordon Kahl and the group he was involved with. Petitioner cannot prove the BATF connection, but was solicited by this informant to kill a U.S. Attorney at one time shortly prior to the incident in question on February 13, 1983. Petitioner possesses affidavits by others that affirmatively state this informant tried to solicit bombing of buildings and the killing of others as well. The informant's attempts to create firearms and explosive offenses, matters within BATF jurisdiction, creates at least a suspicion that he may have worked for or received direction from the BATF. 8. Phillips had been working with the U.S. Marshals in the North Dakota District since at least July of 1982 and had been contacted by U.S. Marshal Muir, who tried to get Phillips to burglarize Gordon Kahl's home, which Phillips refused, and Muir, throwing a tantrum, and in an apparent emotional explosion told Phillips to "forget it, just fucking forget it, we'll take care of those fuck'n guys, we'll take them off this fuck'n planet" and hung up the phone. Id., p. 131. Muir's hoped for burglary was an attempt to obtain pictures of one of his deputies, Carl Wigglesworth, taken at an attempted forced sale by the IRS of a portion of Gordon Kahl's family farm in November, 1982. id. After the February 7, 1983 call by Muir, Phillips realized that Muir intended to use the opportunity of the up-coming Sunday meeting to start a shoot-out with and to murder Gordon Kahl, Petitioner, and Scott Faul. Phillips made an anonymous call to the Medina, North Dakota, Chief of Police and warned him that the marshals intend ed to create a shoot-out in Medina on the 13th with Gordon Kahl, Petitioner, and Scott Faul. id., p.132. On February 8, 1983, Phillips informed North Dakota State Crime Bureau Agent Milton Lennick that U.S. Marshals were going to create a shoot-out at Medina on February 13, 1983 with Gordon Kahl, Petitioner, and Scott Faul and he believed someone would be killed. id. Lennick assured Phillips that he would relay the information to the U.S. Marshals Service. id.; See also Affidavit of Byron Dale (Exhibit No. 16-B)(disclosing fact that Phillips admitted to a friend of his that he knew about the shootout before it happened). On February 9, 1983, Medina Chief of Police Chief Graf telephonically ordered three training tapes titled "ARREST TACTICS," "FELONY ARRESTS, APPREHENSION and STOPS," and "PUBLIC RELATIONS" from Major James Martin, the Law Enforcement Training Coordinator at the Law Enforcement Training Academy at Bismarck, North Dakota, and informed Major Martin he needed them right away as he was expect ing trouble in Medina on Sunday, February 13, 1983. id., pp. 138-139. Cass County Deputy Sheriff Christopher Denis delivered the tapes to Medina Police Officer, Steve On February 10, 1983, a series of false APB's was transmitted State-wide. The first APB was transmitted State-wide by Ward County Sheriff Art Anderson from his office at Minot, North Dakota. See ALL POINTS BULLETIN No. 0015, 12:06 CDT, 2/10/83 (Exhibit No. 10A). The second and third APB's were released by the North Dakota State Communications from Bismarck, North Dakota. See ALL POINTS BULLETIN No. 0016, 12:24 P.M. CST, 2/10/83 (Exhibit No. 10B) and ALL POINT'S BULLETIN No. 0017, 12:35 P.M. CST, 2/10/83 (Exhibit No. 10C). The first APB issued was a look-out for a white Oldsmobile station wagon with North Dakota license number 1906, purported to be driven by "Albert Kouba" and containing a "group" of others armed with handguns and AR-15's. The APB alleged the group "[is] going around protesting foreclosure sales" and that Sheriff Anderson had recently held a foreclosure sale on Kouba's house and Kouba had threatened him. APB No. 0015, supra. The second APB, issued approximately 20 minutes after the first, reported that "Rusty Kouba" was traveling with 2-3 other males and were seen leaving Carrington, North Dakota within the past hour, en route to Minot, North Dakota. The APB stated these "subjects" were heavily armed with AR-15 rifles and other weapons" and that "Gordon Kahl" may be one of the subjects for whom the U.S. Marshals had an outstanding warrant. The identification of the vehicle was restated with the date of manufacture and the APB emphasized that "Rusty Kouba" had made threats against the Ward County Sheriff, Art Anderson . APB No. 0016, supra. The third APB issued to correct Kouba's name, misspelled in the second APB as "Kuba" and to explain that "Rusty" was Kouba's nickname. APB No. 0017, supra. 8 (cont'd) Schnabel before the Sunday shoot-out. id., p. 139. These facts, and numerous others, have been presented to the District Court in North Dakota. That Court, acting through Judge Kermit Edward Bye (Circuit Judge sitting by designation) held that even if these facts were true and the jury had known the truth - i.e., the shoot-out was a pre-text created by the U.S. Marshals to deliberately murder Gordon Kahl, Petitioner, and Scott Faul that back- fired - it would have made no difference. ORDER DENYING SCOTT FAUL'S 2255 MOTION, pp. 11-14 (Exhibit No. 9B). Indeed, the federal courts have exhibited complete indifference to all claims raised by Petitioner and his co-defendants since the case began and, as shown, the pattern was inherent in the federal persecution of Gordon Kahl since the mid-1970's. This indifference to the Constitution and laws of the United States, as well as the Constitution and laws of the States where federal action has occurred in all matters involving Gordon Kahl, his family and friends, is prima facie evidence of an inability to seek and obtain constitutionally mandated review and relief in federal courts. It gets even worse. infra. This series of false APBs was created, fabricated and caused to be issued by none other than U.S. Marshal Muir and deputy U.S. Marshal Wigglesworth.9 The government did not deny that the APB's were absolutely false, at trial or since. The government, through AUSA's Lynn Crooks and Dennis Fisher, also deceived the defendants at the later trial, as well as the jury by impressing upon them that only one APB had issued and introduced APB No. 0016 as the APB in question as evidence that Gordon Kahl, an outstanding warrant for his arrest and U.S. Marshals were involved and that the defendant's had such knowledge. The defendants had heard a rumor of an APB issued on a car similar to that of Scott Faul's, but dismissed it. They had heard nothing of an APB involving Gordon Kahl, a warrant for his arrest or U.S. Marshals. In an effort to persuade the jury that the defendants were lying, the prosecution introduced the second-issued APB as evidence and demanded the jury read it closely to see the mention of Gordon Kahl, a warrant and U.S. Marshals without informing them of the existence 9. This was admitted by Wigglesworth at trial under oath following the shoot-out. Wigglesworth alleged that the source of the information was an undercover confidential informant, which now appears admitted to be Mike Phillips. Trial Trans., Vol. XI, pp. 140-143 (Wigglesworth's admission that he and Muir persuaded Sheriff Anderson to transmit or caused to be transmitted the false APB's). Petitioner asserted that Phillips was the alleged informant in his 2255 proceedings and the government did not deny it and the Court presumed it true. It has not been proven that Phillips was the source of the information and Petitioner has been denied all opportunity to test that assertion. It is more likely that the then- unnamed informant was used as a scapegoat to cover the deliberate issuance of the false cover-up APB's as part of Muir's plans to murder Gordon Kahl, Petitioner, and Scott Faul. In fact, the uncontested evidence at this stage tends to prove that Phillips actually tried to obstruct Muir's plans. Phillips was given $10,000.00 in cash by federal agents and moved to Canada prior to the trial following the shoot-out. Petitioner has a witness that can be subpoenaed to testify to this, if necessary. In any case, Phillips was a critical material witness to the facts leading to the shoot-out, Muir's state of mind and essential to the defense. His personal knowledge of these events was deliberately hidden and the trial proceedings deliberately perverted by federal agents. Former FBI Special Agent M. Wesley Swearingen, author of FBI SECRETS, supra, and the FBI agent responsible for exposing the deliberately false, fraudulent and contrived trial and conviction of Elmer "Geronimo" Pratt by the FBI, has reviewed FBI documents and other matter involving the alleged "confidential informant," which Marshal Wigglesworth and AUSA's Crooks and Fisher refused to disclose, and it is his informed and expert opinion, based upon his training and experience as an FBI agent and Freedom of Information Act specialist and particularly his experience involving informants that the non-disclosure of the alleged informant in this case was to purposely cover- up official "wrongdoing." See Affidavit of M. Wesley Swearingen, August 27, 1998 (Exhibit No. 11). Mere "wrongdoing" is an understatement and, as will be more clearly demonstrated herein, the cover-up of the Phillips/informant matter is part of a far greater cover- up that continues and included conspiracy to murder, attempted murder and actual murder involving numerous federal agents and agencies.