Original to: Dan Flynn, Chief of Police City of Savannah P.O. Box 1027 Savannah, Georgia 31402 Copy to: Captain Everett Ragan Internal Affairs, Savannah Police Department P.O. Box 1027 Savannah, Georgia 31402 Savannah Police Department Complaint and Statement against Savannah Police Department Officers Robert L. Chandler #108 Jack Willis Mark McCartha (trusting Loretta's identification of this officer) and Officer Everett Ragan of the Savannah Police Department's Internal Affairs This complaint is not sworn under oath due to the following religious reasons, it is also my opinion that one should not take extrajudicial oaths. Extrajudicial oath. - One taken not in the course of judicial proceedings, or taken without any authority of law, though taken formally before a proper person. [Black's Law Dict. 5th Ed.] James 5:12 (English-KJV) But above all things, my brethren, swear not, neither by heaven, neither by the earth, neither by any other oath: but let your yea be yea; and your nay, nay; lest ye fall into condemnation. Ezekiel 21:23 And it shall be unto them as a false divination in their sight, to them that have sworn oaths: but he will call to remembrance the iniquity, that they may be taken. Matthew 5:33 Again, ye have heard that it hath been said by them of old time, Thou shalt not forswear thyself, but shalt perform unto the Lord thine oaths: On Saturday, September 16, 2000, about 5:30 PM, at the location of Forsyth Park, Savannah, Georgia, the above named officers acted improperly and should be arrested, tried, convicted and punished. This is what happened, and what was said: I have a website that is anti-political and pro-Law. Loretta wanted to go to the Jazz Festival and I thought it would be a good place to associate with people and tell them about some very interesting things about Georgia and the United States that they probably didn't learn in school or the news and the best way to do that would be to hand out cards instead of do alot of talking. I also decided to take my Republic of Georgia flag along. We got to Forsyth Park about 5:30 pm. Entering on the East Side we decided to lay our mats out on the west side near the trees under the shade which we did. After listening to Jazz for a little while I got up with my flag and started distributing cards to people. I wasn't disturbing anyone. If they didn't want a card, I didn't force them to take it. I just handed people my card and said things like 'Check us out on the web.' When people wanted to know more about it or about the flag I would tell them more about it, but not unless they asked. There wasn't a single person that didn't take the card of those I offered it to. There were basically 3 different groups of people that were really interested in the subject matter. I didn't hand out that many cards either, maybe 15 at the most. A group of young college kids were interested, but being freshly indoctrinated for their college studies it was hard for them to understand, but they were listening and their gears were turning. Another group of people, one black man, a black woman and a white woman were together and they really understood what I was saying to be true and were really glad I was out there letting people know. The other group that was relatively interested in what I was saying was Dr. Weiss and his friend, mostly Dr. Weiss. That's when Officer Robert Chandler walked up and demanded that I step aside with him a minute. I got up and followed him about 8 feet. I said, What's wrong, I'm not doing anything wrong. He asked. What's the flag about? I said, 'The Republic of Georgia'. He said, And the cards? I said, am I under arrest? He said, no. I said, I'm free to go then, and went back to talk with Dr. Weiss. I wasn't able to talk with Dr. Weiss very long before Officer Jack Willis walked up with Officer Robert Chandler and Mr. Willis told me to follow him for a second, that he wanted to talk to me. So I went and followed him over near the sidewalk and now I had at least 3 cops in a group there. Mr. Willis and Chandler told me that I could not be displaying the flag here at the park. They said that is was a private event, that the Jazz Association had rented the park and that I was trespassing. They both said that the Jazz Association had rules against me displaying my flag and passing out literature. Loretta said that the event was advertized to the public in the newspaper and that the notice did not have any rules on it and that it was a public event. She asked if the rules were in writing. Mr. Willis said that 'we aren't going to go into any legal issues if you want to do that we could take this before a Judge.' Of course that was a threat of being arrested if I didn't get rid of the flag and quit handing out the cards. Then Dr. Weiss came over and asked the officers what was going on and that I wasn't doing anything wrong, that I wasn't harrassing anyone and that the officers were violating my Rights to free speech. I didn't want my new friend to get arrested to so I told him to go ahead and sit down. I regret being so adamant to my new friend and I certainly appreciated what he was doing but I didn't want him to get arrested and the police were really pressuring us with their police state tactics right at that time. Mr. Chandler asked me my name and address. I told him I didn't have to tell him and he said that yes I did, that I had to tell him my name, address and social security number or date of birth. So I asked him what was his social security number and he said I wasn't going to get that to which I replied that I didn't have one because I sent it back. He said, well what's your old one then, and I said I don't have one. Then he said that he wanted to see my I.D. I told him I didn't have to show him any I.D. and he said that we can either do this the easy way or the hard way. Then an officer who Loretta identifies as a Mark McCartha said 'you've got him on obstruction if he doesn't give it to you.' I knew that was a bogus charge because I wasn't obstructing anything and the officers didn't have any probable cause to stop me or even ask me my name. I knew that they did not have any reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that I was involved in any criminal activity and that absent any basis for suspecting me of misconduct, the balance between the public interest in crime prevention and my right to personal [443 U.S. 47, 48] security and privacy tilts in favor of freedom from police interference. I also knew that I read about and have actually read a Georgia Supreme Court case that stated that officers cannot charge you with obstruction for simply refusing to identify yourself. I also knew about the U.S. Supreme Court case of BROWN v. TEXAS, 443 U.S. 47 (1979) and other cases, and I know that the police officers know about these cases too but that they don't care and do whatever they please, whenever they feel like it, no matter what the Supreme Court says. I knew that the Savannah Police Department was violating the law and the Law of God as well, and I know that they continually do it on a day by day basis, but there was my options, either give them my I.D. or get arrested, so I handed Mr. Chandler the driver's license and also gave him a mailing address. When Mr. Chandler gave me back the I.D. he said that I couldn't display the flag or else I would be arrested. So then Loretta asked him if it was okay if I just rolled it up and Chandler said that no, I would have to take it and put it in the car. Then I asked Mr. Chandler if I could hand out my cards but he said that I couldn't hand out any literature but we were welcome to stay in the park otherwise. I asked Chandler for his name and badge number and he gave it to me on a piece of paper. Then I went over to talk to Dr. Weiss for a second where he was talking to Officer Willis. I arrived just in time to hear Dr. Weiss's friend say 'and if these laws and rules violate his freedom of speech?' Then was I surprised to hear Officer Willis say, 'Well, okay I'm wrong, okay. But as long as I'm here that flag is staying down.' So I asked Mr. Willis where can I find these rules, are they written down somewhere? And he said, 'It's in the Georgia Code.' I said, 'No, I mean the Jazz Association rules that you were talking about that prohibit me from handing out literature.' and he said, 'I don't know.' Then I said, 'So you have no personal knowledge of any rules. That makes you an incompetent witness of the rules and codes that you are trying to enforce. That means you are dismissed as an incompetent witness. You are dismissed.' And Willis walked away in a huff. Then I thanked Dr. Weiss for standing up for me, and took my flag and we left the park. Not only do the Savannah Police threaten people with arrest, but they continually arrest people that don't deserve it, myself included, without probable cause, all in the name of being a bully and creating revenue for the courts and their respective agencies. I know, I've been there. I have been arrested by the city of Savannah police before around 1985 when all I was doing was handing out presidential campaign literature, suffered through a 6 puppet jury trial, being charged with what amounted to 'soliciting for a man a job as president of the united States along a roadway.' I appealed the case and won. The case is Robinson vs. State and can be found in the Georgia law books. In order to appeal that case I suffered another false arrest by the county police in the county court house because a court clerk wouldn't let me see my court case file at the front counter, got beat up by the county cops in the county court house stair well, etc. I sued the City of Savannah with 26 counts against the City Police, In Propria Personna, Judge Edenfield made me reduce the counts to 6 counts, and then he threw the whole case out stating that I merely mentioned the words 'invidious discrimination' in passing' which was pure baloney because I wrote more than a full page on the subject and he was simply protecting the City. As far as I'm concerned the police, the courts, the judges and the whole court system is corrupt to the core and robbing the people of their God-given Rights. Even the grand juries are being controlled by the District Attornies instead of the people. In addition they are rigging the jury trials by stacking the juries with jurors in favor of prosecution, (police officer's wives, relatives, lawyers, FBI agents relatives, and government workers of all types) instead of properly rotating the jury pool from the general populace. That's why I was out there in the first place with the flag and the cards letting people know what is going on in the government. I am politely asking all government agencies and officials to please discontinue violating the God-given Rights of Georgians and to begin a process of large scale correction and cleansing their existing Rights violating procedures. Of course, I sincerely doubt that that will happen but we have no choice but to inform you directly because the present government in power is de facto and has robbed the people of their God-given Rights. Even violations of our most basic God-given Rights such as Freedom of Speech, (as is very obvious from this complaint,) continue to occur everyday in Georgia many times over, not just here in this one instance. The people have their backs against the wall but the government just keeps pushing, keeps taxing, keeps regulating, keeps fining, keeps imprisoning, keeps confiscating and keeps oppressing and they won't let up. I can truthfully say that the government agencies in power today have destroyed my life. There isn't a facet of life, liberty and property left today that the government structure and people in and behind that structure hasn't infringed upon, taxed, confiscated and regulated into obscurity. I have no choice but to fly the flag and hand out cards. No choice whatsoever because to do otherwise is unthinkable. ================================================================= Your 'law' and government structure states the following but you continually violate it: CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA Ratified General Election, November 2, 1982; Governor's Proclamation, March 1,1983. Effective, July 1,1983 Article 1. Bill of Rights Section I. Rights of Persons Paragraph I. Life, liberty, and property. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property except by due process of law. Paragraph II. Protection to person and property; equal protection. Protection to person and property is the paramount duty of government and shall be impartial and complete. No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws. Paragraph V. Freedom of speech and of the press guaranteed. No law shall be passed to curtail or restrain the freedom of speech or of the press. Every person may speak, write, and publish sentiments on all subjects but shall be responsible for the abuse of that liberty. - - - - - - - - - - U.S. Supreme Court BROWN v. TEXAS, 443 U.S. 47 (1979) 443 U.S. 47 BROWN v. TEXAS. APPEAL FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 2, EL PASO COUNTY, TEXAS No. 77-6673. Argued February 21, 1979. Decided June 25, 1979. Two police officers, while cruising near noon in a patrol car, observed appellant and another man walking away from one another in an alley in an area with a high incidence of drug traffic. They stopped and asked appellant to identify himself and explain what he was doing. One officer testified that he stopped appellant because the situation "looked suspicious and we had never seen that subject in that area before." The officers did not claim to suspect appellant of any specific misconduct, nor did they have any reason to believe that he was armed. When appellant refused to identify himself, he was arrested for violation of a Texas statute which makes it a criminal act for a person to refuse to give his name and address to an officer "who has lawfully stopped him and requested the information." Appellant's motion to set aside an information charging him with violation of the statute on the ground that the statute violated the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments was denied, and he was convicted and fined. Held: The application of the Texas statute to detain appellant and require him to identify himself violated the Fourth Amendment because the officers lacked any reasonable suspicion to believe that appellant was engaged or had engaged in criminal conduct. Detaining appellant to require him to identify himself constituted a seizure of his person subject to the requirement of the Fourth Amendment that the seizure be "reasonable." Cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873. The Fourth Amendment requires that such a seizure be based on specific, objective facts indicating that society's legitimate interests require such action, or that the seizure be carried out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648. Here, the State does not contend that appellant was stopped pursuant to a practice embodying neutral criteria, and the officers' actions were not justified on the ground that they had a reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that he was involved in criminal activity. Absent any basis for suspecting appellant of misconduct, the balance between the public interest in crime prevention and appellant's right to personal [443 U.S. 47, 48] security and privacy tilts in favor of freedom from police interference. Pp. 50-53. Reversed. BURGER, C. J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Raymond C. Caballero argued the cause and filed a brief for appellant. Renea Hicks, Assistant Attorney General of Texas, argued the cause for appellee pro hac vice. With him on the brief were Mark White, Attorney General, John W. Fainter, Jr., First Assistant Attorney General, and Ted L. Hartley, Executive Assistant Attorney General. * [ Footnote * ] Evelle J. Younger, Attorney General, Jack R. Winkler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Daniel J. Kremer, Assistant Attorney General, and Karl Phaler, Deputy Attorney General, filed a brief for the State of California as amicus curiae. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court. This appeal presents the question whether appellant was validly convicted for refusing to comply with a policeman's demand that he identify himself pursuant to a provision of the Texas Penal Code which makes it a crime to refuse such identification on request. I At 12:45 in the afternoon of December 9, 1977, Officers Venegas and Sotelo of the El Paso Police Department were cruising in a patrol car. They observed appellant and another man walking in opposite directions away from one another in an alley. Although the two men were a few feet apart when they first were seen, Officer Venegas later testified that both officers believed the two had been together or were about to meet until the patrol car appeared. The car entered the alley, and Officer Venegas got out and asked appellant to identify himself and explain what he was [443 U.S. 47, 49] doing there. The other man was not questioned or detained. The officer testified that he stopped appellant because the situation "looked suspicious and we had never seen that subject in that area before." The area of El Paso where appellant was stopped has a high incidence of drug traffic. However, the officers did not claim to suspect appellant of any specific misconduct, nor did they have any reason to believe that he was armed. Appellant refused to identify himself and angrily asserted that the officers had no right to stop him. Officer Venegas replied that he was in a "high drug problem area"; Officer Sotelo then "frisked" appellant, but found nothing. When appellant continued to refuse to identify himself, he was arrested for violation of Tex. Penal Code Ann., Tit. 8, 38.02 (a) (1974), which makes it a criminal act for a person to refuse to give his name and address to an officer "who has lawfully stopped him and requested the information." 1 Following the arrest the officers searched appellant; nothing untoward was found. While being taken to the El Paso County Jail appellant identified himself. Nonetheless, he was held in custody and charged with violating 38.02 (a). When he was booked he was routinely searched a third time. Appellant was convicted in the El Paso Municipal Court and fined $20 plus court costs for violation of 38.02. He then exercised his right under Texas law to a trial de novo in the El Paso County Court. There, he moved to set aside the information on the ground that 38.02 (a) of the Texas Penal Code violated the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments and was unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The [443 U.S. 47, 50] motion was denied. Appellant waived a jury, and the court convicted him and imposed a fine of $45 plus court costs. Under Texas law an appeal from an inferior court to a county court is subject to further review only if a fine exceeding $100 is imposed. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 4.03 (Vernon 1977). Accordingly, the County Court's rejection of appellant's constitutional claims was a decision "by the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had." 28 U.S.C. 1257 (2). On appeal here we noted probable jurisdiction. 439 U.S. 909 (1978). We reverse. II When the officers detained appellant for the purpose of requiring him to identify himself, they performed a seizure of his person subject to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. In convicting appellant, the County Court necessarily found as a matter of fact that the officers "lawfully stopped" appellant. See Tex. Penal Code Ann., Tit. 8, 38.02 (1974). The Fourth Amendment, of course, "applies to all seizures of the person, including seizures that involve only a brief detention short of traditional arrest. Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 -19 (1968). `[W]henever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has "seized" that person,' id., at 16, and the Fourth Amendment requires that the seizure be `reasonable.'" United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975). The reasonableness of seizures that are less intrusive than a traditional arrest, see Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 209 -210 (1979); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968), depends "on a balance between the public interest and the individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law officers." Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109 (1977); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 878. Consideration of the constitutionality of such seizures involves a [443 U.S. 47, 51] weighing of the gravity of the public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty. See, e. g., 422 U.S., at 878 -883. A central concern in balancing these competing considerations in a variety of settings has been to assure that an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy is not subject to arbitrary invasions solely at the unfettered discretion of officers in the field. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 -655 (1979); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 882. To this end, the Fourth Amendment requires that a seizure must be based on specific, objective facts indicating that society's legitimate interests require the seizure of the particular individual, or that the seizure must be carried out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers. Delaware v. Prouse, supra, at 663. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 558 -562 (1976). The State does not contend that appellant was stopped pursuant to a practice embodying neutral criteria, but rather maintains that the officers were justified in stopping appellant because they had a "reasonable, articulable suspicion that a crime had just been, was being, or was about to be committed." We have recognized that in some circumstances an officer may detain a suspect briefly for questioning although he does not have "probable cause" to believe that the suspect is involved in criminal activity, as is required for a traditional arrest. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 880-881. See Terry v. Ohio, supra, at 25-26. However, we have required the officers to have a reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that the individual is involved in criminal activity. Delaware v. Prouse, supra, at 663; United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, at 882-883; see also Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939). The flaw in the State's case is that none of the circumstances [443 U.S. 47, 52] preceding the officers' detention of appellant justified a reasonable suspicion that he was involved in criminal conduct. Officer Venegas testified at appellant's trial that the situation in the alley "looked suspicious," but he was unable to point to any facts supporting that conclusion. 2 There is no indication in the record that it was unusual for people to be in the alley. The fact that appellant was in a neighborhood frequented by drug users, standing alone, is not a basis for concluding that appellant himself was engaged in criminal conduct. In short, the appellant's activity was no different from the activity of other pedestrians in that neighborhood. When pressed, Officer Venegas acknowledged that the only reason he stopped appellant was to ascertain his identity. The record suggests an understandable desire to assert a police presence; however, that purpose does not negate Fourth Amendment guarantees. In the absence of any basis for suspecting appellant of misconduct, the balance between the public interest and appellant's right to personal security and privacy tilts in favor of freedom from police interference. The Texas statute under which appellant was stopped and required to identify himself is designed to advance a weighty social objective in large metropolitan centers: prevention of crime. But even assuming that purpose is served to some degree by stopping and demanding identification from an individual without any specific basis for believing he is involved in criminal activity, the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment do not allow it. When such a stop is not based on objective criteria, the risk of arbitrary and abusive police practices exceeds tolerable limits. See Delaware v. Prouse, supra, at 661. [443 U.S. 47, 53] The application of Tex. Penal Code Ann., Tit. 8, 38.02 (1974), to detain appellant and require him to identify himself violated the Fourth Amendment because the officers lacked any reasonable suspicion to believe appellant was engaged or had engaged in criminal conduct. 3 Accordingly, appellant may not be punished for refusing to identify himself, and the conviction is Reversed. APPENDIX TO OPINION OF THE COURT "THE COURT:... What do you think about if you stop a person lawfully, and then if he doesn't want to talk to you, you put him in jail for committing a crime. "MR. PATTON [Prosecutor]: Well first of all, I would question the Defendant's statement in his motion that the First Amendment gives an individual the right to silence. "THE COURT:... I'm asking you why should the State put you in jail because you don't want to say anything. "MR. PATTON: Well, I think there's certain interests that have to be viewed. "THE COURT: Okay, I'd like you to tell me what those are. "MR. PATTON: Well, the Governmental interest to maintain the safety and security of the society and the citizens to live in the society, and there are certainly strong Governmental interests in that direction and because of that, these interests outweigh the interests of an individual for a certain amount of intrusion upon his personal liberty. I think these Governmental interests outweigh the individual's interests in [443 U.S. 47, 54] this respect, as far as simply asking an individual for his name and address under the proper circumstances. "THE COURT: But why should it be a crime to not answer? "MR. PATTON: Again, I can only contend that if an answer is not given, it tends to disrupt. "THE COURT: What does it disrupt? "MR. PATTON: I think it tends to disrupt the goal of this society to maintain security over its citizens to make sure they are secure in their gains and their homes. "THE COURT: How does that secure anybody by forcing them, under penalty of being prosecuted, to giving their name and address, even though they are lawfully stopped? "MR. PATTON: Well I, you know, under the circumstances in which some individuals would be lawfully stopped, it's presumed that perhaps this individual is up to something, and the officer is doing his duty simply to find out the individual's name and address, and to determine what exactly is going on. "THE COURT: I'm not questioning, I'm not asking whether the officer shouldn't ask questions. I'm sure they should ask everything they possibly could find out. What I'm asking is what's the State's interest in putting a man in jail because he doesn't want to answer something. I realize lots of times an officer will give a defendant a Miranda warning which means a defendant doesn't have to make a statement. Lots of defendants go ahead and confess, which is fine if they want to do that. But if they don't confess, you can't put them in jail, can you, for refusing to confess to a crime?" App. 15-17 (emphasis added). Footnotes [ Footnote 1 ] The entire section reads as follows: " 38.02. Failure to Identify as Witness "(a) A person commits an offense if he intentionally refuses to report or gives a false report of his name and residence address to a peace officer who has lawfully stopped him and requested the information." [ Footnote 2 ] This situation is to be distinguished from the observations of a trained, experienced police officer who is able to perceive and articulate meaning in given conduct which would be wholly innocent to the untrained observer. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 -885 (1975); Christensen v. United States, 104 U.S. App. D.C. 35, 36, 259 F.2d 192, 193 (1958). [ Footnote 3 ] We need not decide whether an individual may be punished for refusing to identify himself in the context of a lawful investigatory stop which satisfies Fourth Amendment requirements. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 210 n. 12 (1979); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 34 (1968) (WHITE, J., concurring). The County Court Judge who convicted appellant was troubled by this question, as shown by the colloquy set out in the Appendix to this opinion. [443 U.S. 47, 55] ================================================================= My Law states the following and I continually strive to uphold it: Constitution 2000 for The Republic of Georgia Declaration of Intent I. We hold that God's Law is the Supreme Law of the Land, above and beyond any mere constitution or act of man, and that from these Supreme Laws come our God-given Rights. II. We hold that crimes are against God and the victim, not against any form of government. We hold that victims should be compensated, in court where possible, or under court order, in accordance with the scriptures and judgment of a Common Law Jury. We hold that this compensation shall come from the party or parties found guilty as punishment for their crime. We hold that government shall not profit from acts of crime. All references to a Jury in this constitution refer to a Common Law Jury of twelve jurors selected randomly from the men and women citizens of the respective county in Georgia. III. We hold that the people of Georgia are free to create a new government in accordance with the precedents set by the following authorities: - - - - - - - - - - Section 5. Each individual has the inherent Right of defending the life, liberty, or property of any individual using whatever force is necessary, through whatever means available, including the use of deadly force. Section 11. The free communication of ideas and opinions is one of the most precious of the Rights of man. Every individual may, accordingly, speak, write, print and communicate by other media with freedom, but shall be responsible for such abuses of this freedom as shall actually cause harm, as determined by a Jury, and only to the extent of the harm actually caused. The government shall never curtail or license or limit or regulate or in any manner infringe the liberty of speech or of the press, nor of any form of communication by any medium whatsoever. - - - - - - - - - - Section 14. No individual shall be accused, arrested, or imprisoned except in the cases and according to the forms prescribed by this constitution. As all individuals are held to be innocent of all accusations until they shall have been declared guilty by a Common Law Jury of twelve, if arrest shall be deemed indispensable, all harshness not essential to the securing of the prisoner's person shall be severely repressed. No individual shall be held for indictment by a people's grand Jury to answer for any criminal charge without a confirmation of an accusation by an accuser. No individual shall be held for trial without first being held for and receiving an indictment by a people's grand Jury. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the Republic of Georgia, or any place subject to its jurisdiction. ================================================================= Upon going down to the Savannah Police Department's Internal Affairs Department on September 18, 2000, I noticed that the Department has no visible signs from the street to let the public know where their office is located. This is grievious and needs to be corrected. Upon entering the Internal Affairs Department, Officer Everett Ragan claimed to have known my name to be 'Robinson' before I identified myself. Also Officer Everett Ragan mentioned the flag before I even said a word about it. Officer Lavon Oglesby of the Internal Affairs Department wanted to interview me about the incident, but I told him I just wanted a copy of the complaint form and that I would collect my thoughts about the incident and return later with a completed complaint and we could talk later. But then it wasn't long before Officer Everett Ragan chimed in that this wasn't Texas, this was Georgia, basically saying that the police were within their rights to do what they did. I countered Officer Everett Ragan with the fact that there is a Georgia Supreme Court case that states that people are not to be charged with obstruction for simply refusing to identify themselves to a police officer. This shows bad faith on the part of Officer Everett Ragan and further discussion with the Internal Affairs Department would prove to be unfruitful by all indications. Mr. Dan Flynn, new City of Savannah Police Chief, I demand that I be advised, within 30 days of your receipt of this complaint, as to what corrective action will be taken to keep this from happening in the future and what actions were taken against Robert L. Chandler #108, Jack Willis, and Mark McCartha, and the Internal Affairs Department as a result of this complaint. Gene Karl, Robinson 22 W. Bryan St., #353 Savannah, Republic of Georgia _______________________________ _____________ Signature Date