IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUNTY STATE OF GEORGIA SANDRA LANCE, D.C. * * Plaintiff, * * CIVIL ACTION FILE vs. * * FILE NO.:_________________ GOVERNOR ROY E. BARNES, * Chair, Board of Public Safety; * CORRECTIONS COMMISSIONER JIM * WEATHERINGTON, Co-Chair, Board of * Public Safety, COLONEL ROBERT E. * HIGHTOWER, Director, Department of * Public Safety, Director; CHRIS BRASHER, * Senior Assistant Attorney General, * and JOHN or JANE DOES * 1 through Infinity, * * Defendants. * PETITION FOR MANDAMUS Plaintiff files this Petition for Mandamus and shows the following: 1. Defendants and Jurisdiction Defendants are: Governor Roy E. Barnes, having offices at 203 State Capitol, Atlanta, Georgia 30334; Colonel Robert E. Hightower, Georgia Public Safety Director and Commissioner Jim Weatherington, Georgia Public Safety Board, both having offices at 959 East Confederate Avenue, S.E. Atlanta, Georgia 30316, Chris Brasher, Senior Assistant Attorney General, having offices at 40 Capital Square, S.W., Atlanta, Georgia 30334 and John and Jane Does 1 through Infinity. Jurisdiction and venue are proper under the Georgia Constitution, Article VI, Section II, Paragraph III; Article VI, Section I, Paragraph IV; and Article VI, Section IV, Paragraph I. The exercise of equity jurisdiction is also proper under Section 23-1-3 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated. 2. Plaintiff Plaintiff is Sandra Lance, D.C. Her office is located at 9B Lenox Pointe, Atlanta, Georgia 30324. 3. Statement of Claims Plaintiff is entitled to relief for three reasons. First, the Public Safety Department (PSD) has exceeded the authority which the Legislature attempted to establish when it passed the Fingerprints statute.1 The Georgia Legislature never intended to establish a policy of mandatory fingerprinting. Second, the PSD has violated the administrative law of Georgia by failing to adopt an administrative rule and by establishing a de facto policy that is inconsistent with the legislative grant of authority. Third, the mandatory fingerprints collection policy established by the PSD violates the Georgia constitutional law of Due Process. It is clear that for a Writ of Mandamus to issue under Georgia law, two conditions must be met: 1) the plaintiff must have a clear right to relief; and 2) there must be no other adequate remedy available. Chambers v. Fulford, 495 S.E.2d 6 (Supreme Court of Georgia, 1998); Long v. FSL Corp., 490 S.E.2d 102 (Supreme Court of Georgia, 1997); Carnes v. Crawford, 272 S.E.2d 690 (Supreme Court of Georgia, 1980). Plaintiff has a clear right to relief for the three reasons just given. The Georgia Legislature never intended to establish a mandatory policy of fingerprints collection. Moreover, the PSD has failed to comply with the administrative law statutes of Georgia and has exceeded its grant of authority by establishing a de facto policy of mandatory fingerprints collection. Finally, the mandatory fingerprints policy violates the Georgia law of Due Process. These three reasons for relief are explained more fully in the sections that follow. No other adequate remedy exists, other than to issue the plaintiff her license and to destroy the fingerprints database. No amount of monetary damages can restore the plaintiff’s fundamental right to travel, a right that the Public Safety Department has denied her. The plaintiff, like most other Georgians, needs a driver’s license because driving is a necessary part of her everyday life. Plaintiff has incurred additional expense because it has been necessary for her to travel by bus to Alabama to care for her mother who is fighting cancer. Plaintiff cannot fly, cash checks, open a bank account, procure a Post Office Box, establish a safety deposit box or return merchandise. A monetary award cannot compensate for the illegal collection of fingerprints. The fingerprints database should be destroyed. The only adequate remedy is the prompt issuance of the plaintiff’s license to drive and the destruction of the fingerprints database. A. The Public Safety Department has exceeded its authority under the fingerprints statute. 1. The Georgia Legislature did not intend to require fingerprints of several million Georgia citizens. The Georgia Legislature never intended that fingerprint collection be a mandatory policy. It never intended to establish a policy whereby, in order to get a driver’s license, a citizen would be required to be fingerprinted. The Honorable Bobby Parham, state representative and Chairman of the Motor Vehicle Committee, never intended that fingerprint collection be mandatory. Representative Parham introduced HB-256 (the fingerprints statute) during the 1996 legislative session. Representative Roy Barnes introduced an amendment that removed the phrase concerning fingerprints.1 Without the fingerprints language, the bill passed the House and went to the Senate. The bill sat in the Senate until 6:00pm of the last day of the legislative session. Then with all of the House procedural rules waived the bill came back from the Senate with the fingerprints language reinstated. At a time when bills were coming back from the Senate at a rate of one every two minutes, the bill passed in the chaos. It is quite likely that many of the legislators did not read the amended bill that included the reference to fingerprinting. Indeed, in a subsequent poll 57 of the legislators could not even remember voting on anything having to with a fingerprints requirement.2 Representative Parham never intended to establish a policy of mandatory fingerprints collection. He was Chairman of the Motor Vehicles Committee. He authored and introduced the bill. Of all the sources that one might look to in order to establish the legislative intent, he is the best. No other person is in a better position to determine what the Legislature intended than the one who authored and introduced the bill. Representative Parham will offer his deposition testimony that he never intended to implement a mandatory fingerprints policy. He will offer further deposition testimony that under the statute persons with no felony record should have the right to procure a Georgia driver’s license without providing a fingerprint. Plaintiff respectfully requests that the Court immediately grant the Motion for the Expedited Deposition of Representative Parham attached hereto. It is unlikely that the Legislature considered the complete history of the fingerprints ID and its use in Nazi-occupied Europe. Millions of Jews and others were killed or died horrible deaths in concentration camps controlled by the Nazis. Many of those taken to the camps were first identified by an ID card, which contained, among other things, their name, picture and fingerprint. People in the Netherlands, France and Poland were forced to carry such ID’s so that they could be easily identified by government officials who were either Nazis themselves or Nazi-collaborators. Examples of these ID cards used in Europe are included in seven exhibits submitted for your consideration. The similarity between the ID cards used in Europe and the de facto ID cards being issued to Georgia drivers is startling. In one respect, the Georgia fingerprints system is worse than the ID system used in Nazi Europe. Under the Nazis, the fingerprints record were stored manually. In order to compare the government record with an individual’s ID, it would have been necessary to have both the record and the ID at the same physical location, i.e. a local government office. Under the Georgia fingerprints system, the fingerprints records are stored electronically. It is therefore possible to compare the government record with an individual’s ID from any remote point where a computer link can be maintained, which includes any patrol car that has the necessary equipment. The Georgia system makes it far easier for those who control the state to track their political enemies. The Georgia Legislature did not intend to establish an ID system that would be identical to and in some ways worse than the fingerprints ID system established by the Nazis in Europe. Representative Parham, Chairman of the Motor Vehicles Committee, will offer his deposition testimony that he never intended to establish a mandatory fingerprints collection policy. Because he is the best source on the issue of legislative intent, it is a sound conclusion that the Legislature never intended to establish a mandatory policy of fingerprints collection. 2. The language of the Fingerprints statute indicates that the Legislature did not intend to require fingerprints of all applicants. The language of the statute itself, which reads, “the department MAY require applicants to submit fingerprints” (emphasis added) clearly reflects the legislative intent voiced by Representative Parham. Had the Legislature intended to require fingerprints from all applicants for the driver’s license, it would have chosen unequivocal language. For example, to establish a mandatory policy, the Legislature could have chosen language like, “the department MUST require fingerprints of applicants”; or “ALL applicants WILL BE REQUIRED to submit fingerprints”. But the Legislature did not select unequivocal language of this nature. Instead, the final language of the statute reads, “The Department MAY require fingerprints from applicants…” (emphasis added) That the Legislature chose the equivocal word “MAY” instead of something more definitive like “MUST” is consistent with Representative Parham’s statement that the Legislature never intended to establish a mandatory fingerprints policy. As stated, Representative Parham is clearly the best source of authority on the meaning of the statute. It is therefore clear that the explicit language of the statute itself indicates that the Legislature did not intend to establish a policy of mandatory collection of fingerprints. 3. The PSD has established a policy of mandatory fingerprint collection despite the lack of authority for doing so. For the reasons just presented, the PSD is not authorized to require fingerprints for the driver’s license. Despite the absence of authority, the current policy of the PSD is to require fingerprints of all applicants. Plaintiff has repeatedly attended the PSD meetings and requested that they recognize an objector’s exemption.1 The PSD has repeatedly refused to recognize any exception to its de facto policy of mandatory fingerprints collection.2 So far, the PSD has collected millions of fingerprints from Georgia’s citizens. By implementing the policy of mandatory fingerprints collection, the PSD has acted outside the authority granted by the Legislature. As explained above, the Legislature never intended to authorize the PSD to collect fingerprints on a mandatory basis. Because the PSD has exceeded its authority, it is acting illegally by continuing its policy of mandatory fingerprints collection. The PSD should therefore be compelled to issue Plaintiff a license without the Plaintiff’s submission of a fingerprint. It should further be compelled to destroy the illegally collected database of fingerprints. B. The Public Safety Department has violated Georgia administrative law by its failure to adopt a rule and by the establishment of a de facto policy of mandatory fingerprints collection. To date, the PSD has collected fingerprints from several million Georgia citizens. Despite the massive effort, the PSD has never adopted a formal administrative rule as required by Georgia law. Official Code of Georgia Section 50-13-3(a)(2) requires administrative agencies such as the PSD to adopt and publish rules concerning its policies: O.C.G.A. § 50-13-3. Adoption of rules of organization and practice… (a) In addition to other rule-making requirements imposed by law, each agency shall: (b) Adopt rules of practice setting forth the nature and requirements of all formal and informal procedures available, including a description of all forms and instructions used by the agency… Official Code of Georgia Annotated, Section 50-13-3(a)(2). Instead of adopting and publishing a rule concerning its mandatory fingerprints policy, the PSD simply implemented the mandatory policy based on an inaccurate interpretation of Section 40-5-28.1 The Georgia state code makes it clear that all agencies must publish rules concerning their policies: “….each agency shall: (2) Adopt rules of practice setting forth the nature and requirements of all formal and informal procedures available…” O.C.G.A., Section 50-13-3(a)(2). When the Georgia State Legislature passed the Administrative Procedure Act, they did not leave rule-making to the discretion of the administrative agency. Had they intended to do that, they would have used a phrase like “agencies may adopt rules”; or, a phrase like “agencies have the discretion to adopt rules”. But the Legislature did not use such equivocal language. Instead, they made rule-making a legal requirement: “…[E]ach agency shall (2) [a]dopt rules of practice setting forth the nature and requirements of all formal and informal procedures available…” By using the language “shall adopt rules of practice” the Legislature undoubtedly intended that each administrative agency must adopt rules setting forth the nature and requirements of all procedures. The PSD chose not to comply with this statute and is therefore acting illegally by collecting fingerprints. Mr. Jim Shuler, Director of Public Information for the state of Georgia, admitted as much when he responded to Plaintiff’s Open Records request. Plaintiff requested a copy of the portion of the PSD’s rules and regulations that authorize the fingerprints acquisition. Director Shuler responded as follows: “Georgia Code 40-5-28 gave authority to the Department of Public Safety to require applicants to submit fingerprints. (Copy attached.) The Board of Public Safety has not found it necessary to issue regulations in this regard, therefore, there is no other document responsive to your request.”1 In other words, the PSD ignored code section 50-13-3(a)(2) and simply established a policy of mandatory fingerprints collection without adopting and publishing a rule.1 Because the PSD did not comply with administrative statute 50-13-3(a)(2) it is acting illegally. The agency should therefore be ordered to issue Plaintiff her license and destroy the database. Under Georgia code section 50-13-3(a)(3), an agency must make available for public inspection all rules: (a) In addition to other rule-making requirements imposed by law, each agency shall: (3) Make available for public inspection all rules and all other written statements of policy or interpretations formulated, adopted, or used by the agency in the discharge of its functions… O.C.G.A. Section 50-13-3(a)(3); State v. Cooper, 493 S.E.2d 1 (Court of Appeals of Georgia, 1997); So v. Ledbetter, 434 S.E.2d 517 (Court of Appeals of Georgia, 1993). It is clean under Georgia law that the administrative rule must (1) be published and (2) be made available for public inspection. State v. Cooper, 493 S.E.2d 1 (Court of Appeals of Georgia, 1997); So v. Ledbetter, 434 S.E.2d 517 (Court of Appeals of Georgia, 1993). The PSD never published rules or made them available for public inspection because they never published a rule in the first place. The Director of the Public Information Office, Jim Shuler, was asked in writing by Plaintiff to produce a copy of the rules and regulation that authorize fingerprints collection.1 Director Shuler responded that “The Board of Public Safety has not found it necessary to issue regulations in this regard, therefore, there is no other document available or responsive to your request.”2 The PSD never published rules or made them available for public inspection because they never published a rule in the first place. The Director of the Public Information Office, Jim Shuler, was asked in writing by Plaintiff to produce a copy of the rules and regulations that authorize fingerprints collection. Director Shuler responded that “The Board of Public Safety has not found it necessary to issue regulations in this regard, therefore, there is no other document available or responsive to your request.” Because the PSD found it unnecessary to issue rules or regulations, they failed to meet the requirements of section 50-13-3(a)(3). Since they are acting illegally, they should issue a license to Plaintiff and destroy the fingerprints database. C. The mandatory fingerprints collection policy of the PSD violates the Georgia law of Due Process. The mandatory fingerprints policy of the PSD is inconsistent with the original intent of the Georgia Constitution. The Georgia Constitution begins with this basic principle of law: "No Person Shall be Deprived of Life, Liberty or Property Except by Due Process of Law.” Constitution of Georgia, Article I, Section I, Paragraph I. The Due Process Right is traceable back to the Magna Carta. To understand the meaning of the Due Process clause, we must understand the history of its interpretation. The English philosopher John Locke understood the concept of property within the Due Process clause to be quite general. He wrote, “by property I must be understood here as in other places to mean that property which men have in their persons as well as goods.”1 Clearly Locke understood property to include not only material possessions but one’s person or body as well. He would have certainly included bodily information such as one’s fingerprint to be within one’s property. James Madison also had a broad concept of property. The federal Constitution that he authored became the model for many of the later state constitutions, such as the 1983 Constitution of Georgia. In his 1792 essay on Property, he wrote that property embraces “every thing to which a man may attach a value and have a right.” He wrote further: “a man has property in his opinions and the free communication of them. He has a property of peculiar value in his religious opinions, and in the professions and practices dictated by them. He has property very dear to him in the safety and liberty of his person. He has an equal property in the free use of his faculties and free choice of the objects on which to employ them. In a word, as a man is said to have a right to his property, he may equally be said to have a property in his rights.”2 On the basis of the original interpretation of the property concept, it is apparent that property included not only material possessions but one’s person and one’s rights as well.3 It is therefore true that one’s bodily information such as fingerprints and one’s rights such as a driver’s license are protected property under the Due Process clause. 1. Plaintiff has a property interest in her driver’s license that is protected by the Due Process clause of the Georgia Constitution. One has a property interest in one’s driver’s license that cannot be denied without Due Process of law. Quiller v. Bowman, 425 S.E.2d 641 (Supreme Court of Georgia, 1993); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971). Georgia law has followed the Madisonian view of property, that one has a property interest in one’s rights. It is therefore apparent that Plaintiff has a property interest in her driver’s license. Quiller v. Bowman, 425 S.E.2d 641 (Supreme Court of Georgia, 1993); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971). Generally, once a license is issued, it is protected by the Constitution. Hicks v. Georgia State Board of Pharmacy, 553 F.Supp. 314 (D.C.Ga. 1982). Nevertheless, the PSB has refused to renew Plaintiff’s License unless she submits to fingerprinting by means of the inkless scanning device. 4 Because the state has violated Plaintiff’s Due Process Right, it should issue her a new driver’s license. 2. Plaintiff has a property interest in her person that the state cannot take without Due Process of law. Under Georgia law, Plaintiff’s property interest in her person includes her bodily information such as her fingerprint image. Georgia and many other jurisdictions have followed the Madisonian view that one has a property interest in one’s person. As noted, this view of property dates back several centuries, at least to the time of John Locke. The commercial appropriation cases are modern examples of the property interest in the person. A defendant cannot appropriate for its own use the name or likeness of another person. Maples v. National Enquirer, 763 F.Supp. 1137 (N. D.Ga., 1990); Cabaniss v. Hipsley, 151 S.E.2d 496 (1966); Factors v. Pro Arts, 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir., 1978); Cepeda v. Swift, 415 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir., 1969). Under Georgia law, the appropriation of another’s name or likeness in the form of a photograph is a tort. Martin Luther King, Jr. Center for Social Change v. American Heritage Products, 296 S.E.2d 697 (Supreme Court of Georgia, 1982). Just as a baseball player has a property right in his image that can be sold so too Plaintiff has a property right in her fingerprint image. Hundreds of millions of dollars are at stake in the fingerprint license business for both the state of Georgia and the Polaroid company.5 By requiring that Plaintiff give away her fingerprint image in order to obtain a driver’s license, the PSD has attempted to take away her property right in her person without Due Process of law. Because the PSD has violated the Due Process rights of millions of Georgia citizens by requiring them to submit their fingerprint image with no compensation, it should be ordered to destroy the fingerprints database. The PSD should also be ordered to issue Plaintiff her license without requiring her fingerprint image. 3. The PSD’s policy of collecting fingerprints is an invasion of the Plaintiff’s privacy and violates her Right to Be Let Alone under the Georgia Constitution. Under the Georgia law of Due Process, an individual has the Right to Be Let Alone. Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18 (Supreme Court of Georgia, 1998). The Right to Be Let Alone under the Georgia Constitution is far broader than the Right to Privacy protected by the federal Constitution. Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18 (Supreme Court of Georgia, 1998). The courts of Georgia give careful consideration to intrusions on the Due Process Right to Be Let Alone. Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18 (Supreme Court of Georgia, 1998). In fact, the Supreme Court of Georgia has been a pioneer in the law of Privacy, Katz, The History of the Georgia Bill of Rights, 3 G.S.U.L.Rev.83 (1986). In the landmark case Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance, the Supreme Court of Georgia stated that the Right of Privacy is derived from the Due Process clause of the Georgia Constitution, among other sources: “The Right of Privacy within certain limits is a right derived from natural law, recognized by the principles of municipal law, and guaranteed to persons in this state by the Constitutions of the United States and of the State of Georgia, in those provisions which declare that no person shall be deprived of liberty except by due process of law.” Pavesich v. New England Life Insurance, 50 S.E. 68, 71 (Supreme Court of Georgia, 1905). In Powell, the Supreme Court relied heavily on the Pavesich decision. The Court noted that the liberty interest embraced the right of a person to be free int he use of his or her facilities. This Court restated that liberty includes “the right to live as one will, so long as that will does not interfere with the rights of another or of the public.” Powell at 22, quoting Pavesich. The Court reiterated that the individual has freedom in determining his or her manner of life and the public has no authority to arbitrarily take that liberty away. This freedom is recognized as the Right to Be Let Alone. Powell at 22. It is also clear from Powell and Pavesich that the Right of Privacy or the Right to Be Let Alone is a fundamental constitutional right. Infringement of that right received careful scrutiny if it is narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state interest. Powell at 24. The fundamental nature of this right under Georgia law can be traced back tot he Pavesich decision: “The right of privacy, or the right of the individual to be let alone, is a personal right, which is not without judicial recognition. It is the complement of the right of the immunity of one’s person. The individual has always been entitled to be protected in the exclusive use and enjoyment of that which is his own. The common law regarded his person and property as inviolate, and he has the absolute right to be let alone. Cooley, Torts, p. 29. The principle in fundamental and essential in organized society that every one, in exercising a personal right and in the use of his property, shall respect the right and properties of others.” Pavesich at 77, quoting Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Company, 71 N.Y. Supp. 876 (Supreme Court of New York, 1901). Plaintiff’s Right to Be Let Alone has been violated by the state because of the mandatory fingerprints policy implemented by the PSD. The mandatory fingerprints p[olicy serves no compelling state interest. The purported goal behind the Fingerprints statute was to reduce the level of fraudulent license use. With the level of fraudulent use at about 700 cases a year out of 5 million licenses (a .00014 incidence rate), the policy represents a “solution in search of a problem” as Representative Mitchell Kaye has aptly stated.6 The effective policy of the PSD - to fingerprint everyone who applies for a license - can hardly be said to have been “narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state interest”. The statute was not narrowly tailored, since it begins with the utterly nonsensical phrase “Specifically but without limitation, the Department may require fingerprints...” Further, because Plaintiff’s fingerprint is a part of her body, the state has no authority to take it from her. The Pavesich court had this to say about the Right of Personal Security and the free use of one’s body and limbs: “[In the Right or Personal Security] is embraced a person’s right to a “legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation...” Pavesich at 70. For these reasons, it is clear that Plaintiff’s Right to Be Let Alone has been violated by the state and that the violation is not justified by any compelling state interest. Moreover, the PSD’s mandatory fingerprints collection policy is an invasion of Plaintiff’s privacy. Under the Georgia law that protects against invasion of privacy, one is protected against unwarranted use of one’s image and personality or the appropriation of one’s image and personality. Fincher v. State, 497 S.E.2d 632 (Georgia Court of Appeals, 1998). To allow the PSD its unwarranted use of Plaintiff’s fingerprints image would be to allow it to invade her privacy. Such an invasion of privacy would violate the Right to Be Let Alone under the Georgia law of Due Process. Powell v. State, 510 S.E. 2d 18 (Supreme Court of Georgia, 1998). The PSD should therefore be ordered to issue Plaintiff her driver’s license and to destroy the fingerprints database that has been illegally complied. 4. The mandatory fingerprints policy, which implements an ID system identical to the ID system used by the Nazis in Europe, violates Georgia Due Process law because it is arbitrary and because it shocks the conscience. When considered in light of its use in Nazi-occupied Europe, the fingerprints ID system is clearly arbitrary and shocking to the conscience. Millions of Jews and others were identified by the Nazis through the use of a fingerprints ID system identical to the one now required in Georgia. Many of these people were then taken away and either imprisoned or executed. The way people were treated under the fingerprints identification system was horrible. It truly shocks the conscience to think that the PSD has implemented the same fingerprints ID system here in Georgia. To meet the requirements of Due Process under Georgia law, a state policy must not only 1) have a reasonable relationship to a proper legislative purpose and 2) be non-discriminatory, it must also 3) not be arbitrary. Bradshaw v. Dayton, 514 S.E.2d 831 (Supreme Court of Georgia, 1999). To implement a fingerprints ID system that is identical to the fingerprints ID system used by the Nazis is clearly arbitrary. The Nazis were the epitome of brute, arbitrary power. The mandatory fingerprints policy of the PSD, which implements a system that is identical to the fingerprints system used by the Nazis, unquestionably violates the test of arbitrariness set forth in Bradshaw. Because the mandatory fingerprints policy is arbitrary, it violates Due Process. The policy of mandatory fingerprinting is obviously prohibited by Georgia constitutional law and the law of Due Process specifically. The courts of Georgia have consistently construed the Due Process Right as a safeguard against arbitrary power. Cutsinger v. City of Atlanta, 83 S.E.263 (Supreme Court of Georgia, 1914). The exercise of arbitrary power is forbidden under the Federal and Georgia constitutions. Hawkinsville v. Clark, 219 S.E.2d 577 (Supreme Court of Georgia, 1975). Arbitrary decision-making is not allowed under Georgia law. Hawkinsville at 578. Moreover, the courts of Georgia throughout their history have found limitations on the police power of the state. “The police power is subject to the constitutional limitation that it may not be exerted arbitrarily or unreasonably.” Humthlett v. Reeves, 90 S.E.2d 14 (Supreme Court of Georgia, 1955). The principle of limited police power has been restated more recently in Arras v. Herrin, 334 S.E.2d 677 (Supreme Court of Georgia, 1985). “The police power does not exempt the state from the operation of the 14th Amendment.” Arras at 679. To allow the state to fingerprint virtually everyone in Georgia just as Hitler fingerprinted the Dutch, French and Polish citizenry would be to ignore the limitations on the police power that have been repeatedly recognized by the courts of Georgia.7 It is further recognized that the Due Process Right of the Georgia Constitution is a broader safeguard than federal Due Process. “The Due Process clause of the Georgia Constitution, while mirroring the language of the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, affords greater protection than does federal Due Process.” Suber v. Bulloch County, 722 F.Supp. 736 (S.D. Georgia, 1989). In short, Due Process protects the individual from abuse of power. Shahar v. Bowers, 836 F.Supp. 859 (N.D.Ga. 1993) Conduct on the part of the state that shocks the conscience also violates Due Process. Brown v. Noe, 711 F.Supp. 1114 (N.D.Ga. 1989). It is shocking to the conscience to see that the state has fingerprinted millions of Georgia citizens in much the same way the Nazis fingerprinted, branded and marked the people of Europe. Georgia courts have repeatedly recognized that state action that shocks the conscience violates Due Process. Henderson v. Sherrington, 376 S.E.2d 397 (Appeals Court of Georgia, 1988). Because the fingerprints policy represents such egregious conduct, it violates Due Process. Finally, it is worth noting that General Dwight Eisenhower made it a point to visit the concentration camps in Europe after he defeated the Nazis. His purpose was to document the horrors that occurred in the camps. Thanks to his efforts, we have solid evidence of the manner in which a fingerprints ID system can be abused. To allow such a system to be implemented in this state is simply unconscionable. 4. Conclusion For these reasons, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court issue the Writ of Mandamus and order the PSD to issue Plaintiff’s license and destroy the fingerprints database. The PSD has exceeded its grant of authority under the Fingerprints statute by establishing a policy of mandatory fingerprints collection. The PSD has further violated Georgia administrative law by failing to adopt and publish a formal rule. Finally, the PSD’s policy of mandatory fingerprinting violates the Due Process clause of the Georgia Constitution. Plaintiff has a clear right to the relief sought by Plaintiff, but Plaintiff has no other remedy, other than mandamus, to obtain such relief. WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays that the Court issue a mandamus nisi to the defendants requiring them to show cause at a time and place to be designated by the court not less than ten days, nor more than thirty days from this date, why a mandamus should not be issued against them requiring them to issue Plaintiff her driver’s license and destroy the fingerprints database, and that on the hearing the mandamus may be made absolute and the defendants be required to issue Plaintiff her driver’s license and destroy the fingerprints database. This __________ day of _____________________, 2000. Respectfully submitted, _______________________________________ Wade D. Hobbs, Jr., Esquire D.C. Bar No.: 433470 Counsel for Plaintiff Suite 800 2121 K Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20037 (202) 261-3530 THE ROBERTS LAW FIRM, P.C. _______________________________________ John A. Roberts, Esquire Georgia State Bar No.: 608705 THE ROBERTS LAW FIRM, P.C. One Live Oak Center, Suite 980 3475 Lenox Road, N.E. Atlanta, Georgia 30326 (404) 841-0661