IN THE STATE COURT OF CHATHAM COUNTY STATE OF GEORGIA THE MAYOR AND ALDERMEN OF THE CITY OF SAVANNAH PLAINTIFF VS GENE K. ROBINSON ACCUSED CASE NO. 10454 NOTICE AND DEMAND TO DISMISS FOR NO CAUSE OF ACTION COMES NOW this citizen, Gene K. Robinson, FREEMAN and a natural person, now being charged with the alleged crime of "pedestrian solicitation" instead of the prior charge "soliciting without a permit" and whatever other charges the presiding judge may decide to bring against the defendant, claiming all of his rights under the Common Law and waiving none of them at any time, appearing by motion, not granting jurisdiction to this court as the issue of jurisdiction is in question, to writ: I demand this court take judicial notice that on the June 28, 1984, 2:30 P.M. a hearing was held by complaint and at this hearing it was shown that there was no cause of action before this court: Savannah Police Officer Marlowe: "Mr. Robinson was in the middle of Abercorn and White Bluff Road, APPARENTLY soliciting funds for a Ajay Lowery for President." Defendant: "You said I was APPARENTLY soliciting. Was I soliciting or was I not?" Savannah Police Officer Marlowe: "I don't know because I wasn't out in the street." Defendant: "What did you charge me with?" Savannah Police Officer Marlowe: "Soliciting without a license and standing in the road." Judge Karpf: "What was the other charge?" Savannah Police Officer Marlowe: "It was obstructing traffic, being in the roadway." Defendant: "Do you have any witnesses to the fact that I was soliciting without a permit?" Savannah Police Officer Marlowe: "No, I do not." Defendant: "Then by what grounds do you bring these charges against me?" Savannah Police Officer Marlowe: "On the grounds that I observed you passing out literature in the middle of the roadway." Karpf: "What was the traffic situation so far as his presence in the intersection?" Savannah Police Officer Marlowe: "It was 4:00 something in the afternoon your honor." Karpf: "My question was, was there a hazard in so far as...." Savannah Police Officer Marlowe: "It would have made a hazard." The Accused demands that this court take notice that there is no proof of any crime to have been committed, and demands this court to move for dismissal because there is no cause of action before this court. "Would have made a hazard" does not a hazard make. Also, APPARENTLY soliciting is not the same thing as "soliciting." On top of all this, regardless of what many people try to make one believe, acts are not crimes. That's right. Acts are not crimes. In order for there to be a crime, along with an act there must be intent. I submit to the court that there has not been shown that the Accused has intended to obstruct traffic or even intended to solicit without a permit. As far as "pleading the code" it is kind of hard for the Accused to do so since the charges have never really been pointed out. But the Accused can point out to the court that section 6-1258 of the Savannah City Code states, "It shall be unlawful for any person to hand any free advertising matter, bills, posters, circulars or any other matter of a similar description to any person upon the streets of the City. Provided, however, that the above prohibition does not apply to election material advocating any candidacy or issue involved in any primary, special or general election held by or for the City, County, State or national governments. In that event, the election laws prohibiting the distribution of materials within two hundred fifty feet of the poll are considered adequate." In addition, the code in section 6-1615 states, "The following regulations shall apply to ... any solicitor for ... subscriptions WHO IS REQUIRED to obtain a license or permit: (b) No peddler or solicitor shall ... stand ... in any place which may disrupt or impede pedestrian or vehicular traffic. (c) No peddler or solicitor shall ... solicit in vehicular traffic lanes of the City... (j) When any officer of the Savannah Police Department ... deems that a peddler or solicitor is in violation of any provision of this article, such officer shall have authority to direct the peddler or solicitor to correct the violation immediately, and such peddler or solicitor shall comply with the directive or be subject to the penalties prescribed by this article." The court must take notice that these regulations do not apply to the Accused and that the Accused is not one WHO IS REQUIRED and this whole arrest and sentencing and set of subsequent hearings are spicious, frivolous, without foundation and without merit, and are meant only to intimidate and harass the accused and to prevent the accused from pursuing a particular political goal of getting a presidential candidate on the ballot." The accused therefore demands this court to move for dismissal on the grounds that there is no cause of action before this court. Although the Accused denies the court jurisdiction, the Accused readily recognizes certain powers of the court that the court can and does exercise whether jurisdiction is valid or not. The Accused also recognizes that the court will proceed regardless of proper jurisdiction and therefore, the Accused has no other alternative but to defend against the loss of Life, Liberty, and Property. Oral argument demanded, Dated this 5th day of December, 1984. Respectfully submitted, Gene K. Robinson In Propria Persona In Forma Pauperis ------------------------------------------- JANUARY TERM 1986 177 Ga. App. 848 71457. ROBINSON v. THE STATE. (341 SE2d 497) CARLEY, Judge. Appellant was tried before a jury and convicted for violating OCGA sec. 40-6-98. The following provisions of OCGA sec. 40-6-98 are relevant to the resolution of the instant case: "No person shall stand in a roadway for the purpose of soliciting a ride. No person shall stand on a highway for the purpose of soliciting employment, business, or contributions from the occupant of any vehicle." OCGA sec. 40-6-98 (a) and (b). Appellant appeals from the judgment and sentence entered on the guilty verdict. Appellant's sole enumeration of error is that the trial court erred in denying his motion for directed verdict of acquittal. The uncontradicted evidence is that appellant's alleged criminal behavior consisted of his standing in the roadway and passing out literature in support of a presidential candidate. This activity was certainly not the solicitation of "employment" for himself. The statute does not, however, specifically proscribe solicitation only for one's own employment. The initial question thus becomes whether appellant's activity can be characterized as a solicitation of "employment" for the political candidate he was supporting. There is language which might ostensibly lend support to the notion that in a broad sense, appellant was soliciting for the purpose of "employment." "'[A]n office is an "employment"....' ... 'An "office" is defined to be an employment on behalf of the government in any station of public trust not merely transient, occasional, or incidental.'" Board of Education of Doerun v. Bacon, 22 Ga. App. 72, 74 (95 SE 753) (1918). However, it has also been recognized that the concept of "employment," as it is ordinarily understood, does not include "public office." "[T]hough an employment may be created by law, it is not necessarily so, but is often, if not usually, the creature of contract. A public office, on the other hand, is never conferred by contract [but by law]." (Emphasis supplied in part and in original in part.) Board of Education of Doerun v. Bacon, supra at 75. In cases involving statutory construction, "the ordinary signification shall be applied to all words..." OCGA sec. 1-3-1 (b). It would, therefore, appear that the "ordinary signification" of the word "employment" in OCGA sec. 40-6-98 is not so broad as to include "public office," but is limited in its meaning to "the existence of the relationship of master and servant. [Cit.]" Griffin v. Hardware Mut. Ins. Co., 93 Ga. App. 801, 803-804 (92 SE2d 871) (1956). Moreover, "when a criminal statute is reasonably subject to two constructions, one of which would make an act criminal and one of which would not, such statute must be construed in favor of the accused and strictly against the State." Carsello v. State, 220 Ga. 90, 94 (137 SE2d 305) (1964). "Penal statutes must be strictly construed, and they will not be given such a construction and interpretation as will make penal any act not therein plainly made penal and prohibited. [Cit.] Under this rule, penal statutes cannot be extended beyond their precise and plain provisions. [Cit.]" State of Ga. v. Schafer, 82 Ga. App. 753, 756 (62 SE2d 446) (1950). Accordingly, we are constrained to hold that appellant was not engaged in the act of soliciting "employment." The evidence also would not authorize a finding that appellant was soliciting "business" "'[B]usiness' is a very comprehensive term and embraces everything about which a person can be employed; 'that which occupies the time, attention, and labor of men for the purpose of a livelihood or profit.'" (Emphasis supplied.) Norman v. Southwestern R. Co., 42 Ga. App. 812, 816 (157 SE 531) (1930). Other definitions of "business" which have been adopted by Georgia courts are similar. "'[B]usiness' ... signifies the employment or occupation in which a person is engaged to procure a living." Brush Elec. &c. Co. v. Wells, 110 Ga. 192, 198 (35 SE 365) (1899). Merely acting as a volunteer distributor of liberature which informs the public of the candidacy of one running for political office does not constitute the conducting of "business" activity or solicitation for purposes of "business." See generally Brown v. City of Albany, 108 Ga. App. 647 (134 SE2d 566) (1963). There was also no evidence adduced at trial that appellant was soliciting either contributions or rides from the passing motorists. Accordingly, his activity did not fall within any proscription of OCGA sec. 40-6-98. Compare Zeiger v. State, 140 Ga. App. 610 (231 SE2d 494) (1976), in which the appellant was "selling or giving away newspapers or asking donations..." (Emphasis supplied.) The evidence being insufficient to support his conviction, the trial court erred in denying appellant's motion for a directed verdict of acquittal. Whether the mere distribution of political material is to become a criminalized act of solicitation within the proscription of OCGA sec. 40-6-98 is a matter for legislative determination. Under the applicable rules of statutory construction, "a construction different from that which [we reach in the instant case] is not within the proper exercise of the power of this court." Ellis v. State, 5 Ga. App. 615, 618 (63 SE 588) (1909). Judgment reversed. Birdsong, P.J., and Sognier, J., concur. Decided February 17, 1986. Solicitation, Chatham State Court. Before Judge Mikell. G.Terry Jackson, for appellant. Gene K. Robinson, pro se. Spencer Lawton, Jr., District Attorney, Laura Marcantonio, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.