http://www.angelfire.com/la/lawgiver/14thAm.html
IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 

(Dyett v. Turner, 439 P2d 266 @ 269, 20 U2d 403 [1968]) 

THE NON-RATIFICATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
(Judge A.H. Ellett) 

The method of amending the U.S. Constitution is provided for in Article
V of the originaldocument. Noother method will accomplish this purpose.
That Article provides asfollows: 

`The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem
itnecessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on
theApplication of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States,
shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either
Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this
Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the
several States, orbyConventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or
the other Mode ofRatification may be proposed by the Congress;'

The Civil war had to be fought to determine whether the Union
indissoluble and whether any State could secede or withdraw there from.
The issue was settled first on the field of battle by force of arms,
and second by the pronouncement of the highest court of the land. In
the case of State of Texas v. White, / it was claimed that Texas having
seceded from the Union and severed her relationship with a majority of
the States of the Union, and having by her Ordinance of Secession
attempted to throw off her allegiance to the Constitution of the
UnitedStates, had thus disabled herself 

from prosecuting a suit in the Federal Courts. In speaking on this
point the Court at page 726, 19L.Ed.227 held: 

`When, therefore, Texas became one of the United States, she entered
into an indissoluble relation. All the obligations of perpetual union,
and all the guarantees of republican government in the Union, attached
at once to theState. The act which consummated her admission into the
Union was something more than a compact; it was the incorporation of a
new member into the political body. And it was final. Theunion between
Texas and the other States was as complete, as perpetual, and as
indissoluble as the union between the original States. There was no
place for reconsideration, orrevocation, except through revolution, or
through consent of theStates.

`Considered therefore as transactions under the Constitution, the
ordinance ofsecession, adopted by the convention and ratified by a
majority of the citizens ofTexas, and all the acts of her legislature
intended to give effect to that ordinance, were absolutely null. They
were utterly without operation in law. The obligations of the State, as
a member of the Union, and of every citizen of the State, as a citizen
of the United States, remained perfect and unimpaired. It certainly
follows that the State did not cease to be a State, nor her citizens to
be citizens of the Union. If this wereotherwise, the State must have
become foreign, and her citizens foreigners. Thewar must have ceased to
be a war for the suppression of rebellion, and must have become a war
for conquest of subjugation.
`Our conclusion therefore is, that Texas continued to be a State, and a
State of the Union, notwithstanding the transactions to which we have
referred. And this conclusion, in our judgment, is not in conflict with
any act or declaration of any department of the National government,
but entirely in accordance with the whole series of such acts and
declarations since the first out break of the rebellion.'

It is necessary to review the historical background to understand how
theFourteenthAmendment came to be a part of our U.S. Constitution. 

General Lee had surrendered his Army on April 9, 1865, and General
Johnston surrendered his17 days later. Within a period of less than six
weeks thereafter, not one Confederate soldier was bearing arms. By June
30, 1865, the Confederate States were all restored by
PresidentialProclamation to their proper positions as States in an
indissolubleUnion, / and practically all Citizensthereof. / 

A few Citizens were excepted from the Amnesty Proclamation, such,
forexample, as Civil or Diplomatic Officers of the late Confederate
government and all of the secedingStates; UnitedStatesJudges, members
of Congress and commissioned Officers of the United States Army andNavy
who left their posts to aid the rebellion: Officers in the Confederate
military forces above the rank of Colonel in the Army andLieutenant in
the Navy; all who resigned commissions in the Army orNavy of theUnited
States to assist the rebellion; and all Officers of the military forces
of theConfederacy who had been educated at the military or naval
academy of theUnitedStates,etc.,etc., had been grantedamnesty.
Immediately thereafter, each of the secedingStates functioned as
regular States in the Union with bothState and FederalCourts in
fulloperation. 

President Lincoln had declared the freedom of the slaves as a war
measure, butwhen the warended, the effect of the Proclamation was
ended, and so it was necessary to propose and to ratify the Thirteenth
Amendment in order to insure the freedom of theslaves. 

The 11 southern States, having taken their rightful and necessary place
in the indestructibleUnion, proceeded to determine whether to ratify or
reject the proposedThirteenthAmendment. 

In order for the Thirteenth Amendment to become a part of the
Constitution, itwas necessary that the proposed Amendment be ratified
by 27 of the 36 States. Amongthose 27States ratifying theThirteenth
Amendment were 10 from the South, towit, Louisiana, Tennessee,
Arkansas, SouthCarolina, Alabama, North Carolina, Georgia, Mississippi,
Florida, and Texas. 

When the 39th Congress assembled on December 5, 1865, the Senators and
Representatives from the 25 northern States voted to deny seats in both
Houses ofCongress to anyone elected from the 11southernStates. The full
complement ofSenators from the 36 States of the Union was 72, and the
fullmembership in the House was 240. Since it requires only a majority
vote / to refuse a seat inCongress, only the50 Senators and 182
Congressmen from the North were seated. All of the22Senators and 58
Representatives from the southernStates were denied seats. 

Joint Resolution No. 48, proposing the Fourteenth Amendment, was a
matter of great concern to the Congress and to the people of the
Nation. In order to have this proposed Amendment submitted to the 36
States for ratification, it was necessary that twothirds of each House
concur. A count of noses showed that only 33 Senators were favorable to
themeasure, and 33 was a far cry from two thirds of 72 and lacked one
of being twothirds of the 50 seated Senators. 

While it requires only a majority of votes to refuse a seat to a
Senator, it requires a twothirds majority to unseat a member once he is
seated. / 

One John P. Stockton was seated on December 5, 1865, as one of the
Senators from NewJersey. He was outspoken in his opposition to Joint
Resolution No. 48 proposing the FourteenthAmendment. The leadership in
the Senate, not having control of twothirds of the seatedSenators,
voted to refuse to seat Mr. Stockton upon the ground that he had
received only a plurality and not a majority of the votes of the
NewJerseylegislature. It was the law of New Jersey, and several other
States, that a plurality vote was sufficient for election. Besides, the
Senator had already been seated. Nevertheless, his seat was -refused-
and the 33 favorable votes thus became the required two thirds of the
49 members of the Senate. 

In the House of Representatives, it would require 122 votes to be two
thirds of the182members seated. Only 120 voted for the proposed
Amendment, but because there were30abstentions, it was declared to have
been passed by a two thirds vote of theHouse. 

Whether it requires two thirds of the full membership of both Houses to
propose anAmendment to the Constitution or only two thirds of those
seated or two thirds of those voting is aquestion which it would seem
could only be determined by the UnitedStates SupremeCourt. However, it
is perhaps not so important for the reason that the Amendment is only
-proposed- by Congress. It must be -ratified- by three fourths of
theStates in the Union before it becomes a part of the Constitution.
The method of securing the passage through Congress is set out above,
as it throws some light on the means used to obtain ratification by the
States thereafter. 

Nebraska had been admitted to the Union and so the Secretary of State,
intransmitting the proposed Amendment, announced that ratification by
28 States would be needed before theAmendment would become part of the
Constitution since there were at the time 37States in theUnion. A
rejection by 10 States would thus defeat theproposal. 

By March 17, 1867; the proposed Amendment had been ratified by 17
States and rejected by10 with California voting to take no action
thereon which was equivalent torejection, thus the proposal was
defeated. 

One of the ratifying States, Oregon; had ratified by a membership
wherein twolegislators were subsequently held not to be duly elected,
and after the contest, theduly elected members of the legislature of
Oregon rejected the proposed Amendment. However, this rejection came
after theAmendment was declared passed. 

Despite the fact that the southern States had been functioning
peacefully for twoyears and had been counted to secure ratification of
the Thirteenth Amendment, Congress passed theReconstructionAct [March
2, 1867], which provided for the military occupation of 10 of
the11southern States. It excluded Tennessee from military occupation
and one must suspect it was because Tennessee had ratified the
FourteenthAmendment on July 7, 1866. 

The "Act" further disfranchised practically all white voters and
provided that noSenator orCongressman from the occupied States could be
seated in Congress until a new Constitution was adopted by each State
which would be approved by Congress. The"Act" further provided that
each of the 10 States was required to ratify the proposed
FourteenthAmendment and theFourteenthAmendment must become a part of
theConstitution of the United States before the military occupancy
would cease and theStates be allowed to have seats in Congress. 

By the time the Reconstruction Act had been declared to be the law;
three moreStates had ratified the proposed Fourteenth Amendment and two
States, Louisiana andDelaware, had rejected it. Maryland then withdrew
its prior ratification and rejected the proposed Fourteenth Amendment.
Ohiofollowed suit and withdrew its prior ratification, as also did New
Jersey and California, (whichearlier had voted not to pass upon the
proposal), now voted to reject the Amendment. Thus16 of the 37 States
had rejected the proposed Amendment. 

By spurious, non-representative governments; seven of the southern
States, (whichhad theretofore rejected the proposed Amendment under the
duress of military occupation and of being denied representation in
Congress), did attempt to ratify the proposed FourteenthAmendment.
TheSecretary of State, (of July 20, 1868), issued hisProclamation
wherein he stated that it was his duty under the law to cause
Amendments to be published and certified as a part of the Constitution
when he received official notice that they had been adopted pursuant to
the Constitution. Thereafterhis certificate contained the
followinglanguage: 

`And whereas neither the Act just quoted from, nor any other law,
expressly or by conclusive implication., authorizes the Secretary of
State to determine and decide doubtful questions as to the authenticity
of the organization of State legislatures, or as to the power of any
State legislature to recall a previous act or resolution of
ratification of any amendment proposed to the Constitution;

`And whereas it appears from official documents on file in this
Department that the amendment to the Constitution of the United States,
proposed as aforesaid, hasbeen ratified by the legislatures of the
States of [naming 23, including New Jersey, Ohio, and Oregon];
`And whereas it further appears from documents on file in this
Department that the amendment to the Constitution of the United States,
proposed as aforesaid, hasalso been ratified by newly constituted and
newly established bodies avowing themselves to be and acting as the
legislatures, respectively, of the States of Arkansas, Florida,
NorthCarolina, Louisiana, South Carolina, and Alabama;
`And whereas it further appears from official documents on file in this
Department that the legislatures of two of the States first above
enumerated, towit, Ohio and New Jersey, have since passed resolutions
respectively withdrawing the consent of each of said States to the
aforesaid amendment; and whereas it is deemed a matter of doubt and
uncertainty whether such resolutions are not irregular, invalid, and
therefore ineffectual for withdrawing the consent of the said two
States, or of either of them, to the aforesaid amendment;
`And whereas the whole number of States in the United States is
thirty-seven, to wit: [naming them];
`And whereas the twenty-three States first hereinbefore named, whose
legislatures have ratified the said proposed amendment, and the six
States next there after named, as having ratified the said proposed
amendment by newly constituted and established legislative bodies,
together constitute three fourths of the whole number of States in the
United States;
`Now, therefore, be it known that I, WILLIAM H. SEWARD,
SecretaryofState of the United States, by virtue and in pursuant of the
second section of the act of Congress, approved the twentieth of April,
eighteen hundred and eighteen, hereinbefore cited, do hereby certify
that if the resolutions of the legislatures of Ohio and New Jersey
ratifying the aforesaid amendment are to be deemed as remaining of full
force and effect, notwithstanding the subsequent resolutions of the
legislatures of those States, which purport to withdraw the consent of
said States from such ratification, then the aforesaid amendment had
been ratified in the manner hereinbefore mentioned, and so has become
valid, to all intents and purposes, as a part of the Constitution of
the United States." * * * /

Congress was not satisfied with the Proclamation as issued and on the
next day passed a ConcurrentResolution wherein it was resolved: 

`That said Fourteenth Article is hereby declared to be a part of the
Constitution of the United States, and it shall be duly promulgated as
such by the Secretary of State.'
Resolution set forth in 
Proclamation of Secretary of State, 
(15Stat.709[1868]).
See also U.S.C.A., Amends. 1 to 5, Constitution, p. 11.

Thereupon; William H. Seward, the Secretary of State (after setting
forth theConcurrentResolution of both Houses of Congress) then
certified that theAmendment: 

`Has become valid to all intents and purposes as a part of the
Constitution of the United States.' /

The Constitution of the United States is silent as to who should decide
whether a proposed Amendment has or has not been passed according to
formal provisions ofArticleV of theConstitution. The Supreme Court of
the United States is the ultimate authority on the meaning of the
Constitution and has never hesitated in a proper case to declare an
`Act' of Congress "unconstitutional" - except when the `Act' purported
to amend the Constitution. 

In the case of Leser v. Garnett, / thequestion was before the Supreme
Court as to whether or not the NineteenthAmendment had been ratified
pursuant to the Constitution. In the lastparagraph of the decision the
SupremeCourt said: 

`As the legislatures of Tennessee and of West Virginia had power to
adopt the resolutions of ratification, official notice to the
Secretary, dulyauthenticated, that they had done so, was conclusive
upon him, and, being certified to by his proclamation, is conclusive
upon the courts.'

The duty of the Secretary of State was ministerial, to wit, to count
and determine when threefourths of the States had ratified the proposed
Amendment. He could not determine that a State, once having rejected a
proposed Amendment, could thereafter approve it; nor could he determine
that a State, once having ratified that proposal, could thereafter
rejectit. The Supreme Court, and not Congress, should determine whether
the Amendment process be final or would not be final, whetherthe first
vote was for ratification or rejection. 

In order to have 27 States ratify the Fourteenth Amendment, it was
necessary to count thoseStates which had first rejected and then under
the duress of military occupation hadratified, andthen also to count
those States which initially ratified but subsequently rejected the
proposal. 

To leave such dishonest counting to a fractional part of Congress is
dangerous in theextreme. What is to prevent any political party having
control of both Houses ofCongress from refusing to seat the opposition
and then passing a Joint Resolution to the effect that the Constitution
is amended and that it is the duty of the Administrator of the General
Services Administration [now the Archivist of the United States] to
proclaim the adoption? Would the Supreme Court of the United States
still say the problem was political and refuse to determine whether
constitutional standards had been met? [Yes- Epperlyet. al. v.United
States /]. 

How can it be conceived in the minds of anyone that a combination of
powerful States can by force of arms deny another State a right to have
representation in Congress until it has ratified an Amendment which its
people oppose? [And by what aurthority does any States (or combination
thereof) claim to declare a sister State to have an invalidgovernment?]
The Fourteenth Amendment was adopted by means almost as bad as that
suggested above. 

"For a more detailed account of how the Fourteenth Amendment was forced
upon theNation, see Articles in 11 S.C.L.Q. 484 and 28 Tul.L.Rev. 22." 

/ / / / / / 

The Reconstruction Acts 

Introduction 

The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution for the United States was
questioned before the Courts of the United States in the case of Gordon
Epperly et. al. v. UnitedStates / wherein each of those Courts ruled
within un-published Opinions/Judgments that the questions raised were
"politicalquestions" to the Courts (citingColemanv.Miller/ and United
States v. Stahl /). 

Prior to 1939, the Supreme Court for the United States had taken
cognizance of a number of diverse objections to the validity of
specific amendments. Apart from holding that official notice of
ratification by the several States was conclusive upon thecourts,/ it
had treated these questions as justiciable, although it had uniformly
rejected them on the merits. In that year, however, the whole subject
was thrown into confusion by the inconclusive decision of Coleman v.
Miller. / This case came up on awrit of certiorari to the Supreme Court
of Kansas to review the denial of awritofmandamus to compel the
Secretary of the Kansas Senate to erase an endorsement on a Resolution
ratifying the proposed child labor Amendment to theConstitution of the
effect that it had been adopted by the Kansas Senate. 

Four opinions were written in the U.S. Supreme Court, no one of which
commanded the support of more than four members of the Court. The
majority ruled that the Plaintiffs, members of the Kansas State Senate,
had a sufficient interest in the controversy to give the federal courts
jurisdiction to review the case. Without agreement with regard to the
grounds for their decision, a different majority affirmed the judgment
of the Kansas court denying the relief sought. Four members who
concurred in the result had voted to dismiss the writ on the ground
that the amending process "is 'political' in itsentirety, from
submission until an amendment becomes part of the Constitution, and is
not subject to judicial guidance, control or interference at any
point."/ In an opinion reported as "the opinion of the Court," but in
which it appears that only two Justices joined Chief Justice Hughs who
wrote it, itwas declared that the writ of mandamus was properly denied,
because the question whether a reasonable time had elapsed since
submission of the proposal was a nonjusticiable political question, the
kinds of considerations entering into deciding being fit for Congress
to evaluate, and the question of the effect of a previous rejection
upon a ratification was similarly nonjusticiable, because
the1868Fourteenth Amendment precedent of congressional determination
"hasbeenaccepted."/ But with respect to the contention that the
lieutenant governor should not have been permitted to cast the deciding
vote in favor of ratification, theCourt found itself evenly divided,
thus accepting the judgment of the Kansas SupremeCourt that the state
officer had acted validly. / However, the unexplained decision
byChiefJusticeHughes and his two concurring Justices that the issue of
thelieutenant'governor'svote was justiciable indicates at the least
that their position was in disagreement with the view of the other four
Justices in the majority that all questions surrounding Constitutional
Amendments are nonjusticiable. / 

However, Coleman does stand as authority for the proposition that at
least some decisions with respect to the proposal and ratification of
Constitutional Amendments are exclusively within the purview of
Congress or the States, either because they are textually committed or
because the Courts lack adequate criteria of determination to pass
onthem. / But to what extent the political question doctrine
encompasses the amendment process and what the standards may be to
resolve that particular issue remain elusive of answers. 

We can conclude from the cases of Epperly et. al. v. United States
(supra.) that the UnitedStates Supreme Court has made a determination
that any constitutional questions regarding the amending of the U.S.
Constitution are"politicalquestions" for the Congress or the States to
address. 

/ / / / / / 

Historical Background 

The historical facts relating to the ratification of the Fourteenth
Amendment have been addressed by the Supreme Court for the State of
Utah in the case of Dyettv.Turner;(supra.) / Statev. Phillips;/ and the
legal brief of JudgeLanderH.Perez of Louisiana as published in the
Congressional Record. / 

It should be noted that the U.S. Supreme Court declared within the case
ofStateof Texasv.White,/ that a State cannot secede from the Union
after being admitted into the Union. The Supreme Court further ruled
that the southern States were States of the Union before the CivilWar,
the southernStates were States of the Union during the CivilWar and the
southern States were States of the Union after theCivilWar. 

Your attention is also called that at the time the CivilWar was
declared to be at an end, the southernStates were operating under
proper civilgovernments when the present day ThirteenthAmendment was
submitted to those States for ratification. / 

The Problem 

For the purpose of discussion, we will concentrate on the
HouseJointResolution that proposed the Fourteenth Amendment, the
ReconstructionActs of1867 and the Proclamations of Ratification by
Secretary of State, WilliamH.Seward. 

Note:

In regard to the FourteenthAmendment; the Record of the
"CongressionalGlobe" refers to the "JointResolution" proposing the
Amendment as beingH.J.R.127. The copy of the "JointResolution" that was
submitted to the States for Ratification was referred to asH.J.R.48.
Hereinafter, we will refer to the "JointResolution" asH.J.R.48.

First: 

Pretermitting the ineffectiveness of "H.J.R. 48;" seventeen (17) States
(four(4)votes are questionable) out of the then thirty-seven (37)
States of the Union rejected the proposed FourteenthAmendment between
the date of its submission to the States by the Secretary of State on
June 16, 1866 and March24,1868 thereby further nullifying said
Resolution and making it impossible for its ratification by the
constitutionally required three-fourths of such States as shown by the
rejections thereof by the legislatures of the followingStates: 

Texas rejected the Fourteenth Amendment on October 27, 1866
(HouseJournal1866, pgs. 577-584 - Senate Journal 1866, p.471.). 
Georgia rejected the Fourteenth Amendment on November9,1866
(HouseJournal1866, pgs. 61-69 - SenateJournal 1866, pgs.65-72.). 
Florida rejected the Fourteenth Amendment on December6, 1866
(HouseJournal1866, pgs. 75-80, 138, 144, 149-150 - SenateJournal1866,
pgs.101-103, 111, 114, 133.). 
Alabama rejected the Fourteenth Amendment on December 7, 1866
(HouseJournal1866. pgs. 208-213 - Senate Journal 1866, pgs. 182-183.). 
North Carolina rejected the Fourteenth Amendment on December14,1866
(HouseJournal 1866 - 1867. pgs. 182-185- SenateJournal 1866-67,
pgs.91-139). 
Arkansas rejected the Fourteenth Amendment on December 17, 1866
(HouseJournal 1866, pp. 288-291 - Senate Journal 1866, p. 262.). 
South Carolina rejected the Fourteenth Amendment on December20,1866
(HouseJournal 1866, p. 284 - Senate Journal 1866, p. 230.). 
Kentucky rejected the Fourteenth Amendment on January 8, 1867
(HouseJournal1867, pgs. 60-65 - Senate Journal 1867, pgs. 62-65.). 
Virginia rejected the Fourteenth Amendment on January 9, 1867
(HouseJournal1866-67, p. 108 - Senate Journal 1866-67, pgs. 101-103.). 
Louisiana rejected the Fourteenth Amendment on February 9, 1867
(JointResolution as recorded on page 9 of the Acts of the
GeneralAssembly, Second Session, January 28, 1867) (McPherson,
"Reconstruction," p. 194; "Annual Encyclopedia," p. 452.). 
Delaware rejected the Fourteenth Amendment on February 7, 1867
(HouseJournal1867, pgs. 223-226 - Senate Journal 1867, pgs.169,
175-176,208.). 
Maryland rejected the Fourteenth Amendment on March 23, 1867
(HouseJournal1867, pgs. 1139-1141 - Senate Journal 1867, p. 808.). 
Mississippi rejected the Fourteenth Amendment on January 31, 1867
(LawsofMississippi, 1866-1877, p. 734; House Journal 1867, pgs.201-202-
SenateJournal 1866, p 195-196) (McPherson, "Reconstruction," p. 194.). 
Ohio rescinded its Fourteenth Amendment ratification vote on January15,
1868 (House Journal 1868, pgs. 44-51 - Senate Journal 1868,
pgs.33-39.). 
New Jersey rescinded its Fourteenth Amendment ratification vote on
March24,1868 (Minutes of theAssembly 1868, p. 743 - SenateJournal1868,
p.356.). 
California on March 3rd, 1868, the Assembly, with the Senate
concurring, rejected the Fourteenth Amendment (Journal of the Assembly
1867-68, p.601). 
Oregon rejected the Fourteenth Amendment by the Senate on October6,1868
and by the House on October 15, 1868 proclaiming the legislature that
ratified the Amendment to have been a "defacto" legislature (U.S.House
ofRepresentatives, 40th Congress, 3rd session, Mis. Doc. No 12). 

There is no question that all of the southern States [which rejected
theFourteenthAmendment] had legal constituted governments; were fully
recognized by the federal government and were functioning as member
States of the Union at the time of theirrejection.
Where a proposed Amendment to the Federal Constitution has been
rejected by more than one-forth of the States, and rejections have been
duly certified, a State which has rejected the proposed Amendment may
not change its position, even if it might change its position while the
Amendment is still before the people. / 

Second: 

Several "Reconstruction Acts" were passed by Congress after the
CivilWar was proclaimed by the President of the United States to be at
an end./ The"ReconstructionActs" that will be addressed are those that
were enacted onMarch2,1867, / June 25, 1868, / July19,1867,/
March30,1870./ It is obvious that these "Reconstruction Acts" were
enacted into law over the veto of the President for the purpose of
coercing the southernStates into rescinding their vote of rejection of
the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment:

Reconstruction Act of March 2, 1867: / 

"... and when said State, by a vote of its legislature elected under
said constitution (state) , shall have adopted the amendment to the
Constitution of the United States, proposed by the Thirty-ninth
Congress, and known as article fourteen, and when said article shall
have become a part of the Constitution of the United States, said State
shall be declared entitled to representation inCongress,..."

The Act of June 25, 1868 / to admit the States of North Carolina,
SouthCarolina, Louisiana, Georgia, Alabama, and Florida,
torepresentation in Congress at Section 1: 

"That each of the States of (naming them) shall entitled and admitted
to representation in Congress as a State of the Union when the
legislature of such State shall have duly ratified the amendment to the
Constitution of the UnitedStates proposed by the Thirty-ninth Congress,
and known as the article fourteen, . . ."

The Act of March 30, 1870 / admitting the State of Texas
toRepresentation in the Congress of the United States [Preamble]: 

"Whereas the people of Texas has framed and adopted a constitution of
State government which is republican; andwhereas the legislature of
Texas elected under saidconstitution has ratified the fourteenth and
fifteenthamendments to the Constitution of the UnitedStates; and
whereas the performance of these several acts in good faith is a
condition precedent to the representation of the State in Congress: . .
."

From these three Acts of Congress, the questions must be asked: "By
what authority did the Congress rely upon to compel a State to reverse
its negative ratification vote?" And: "By what authority did the
Congress rely upon to compel a State to ratify an Amendment to the
Constitution for theUnitedStates?" 

Third: 

The Thirty-ninth Congress declared at Section 1 of the
ReconstructionAct of March 2, 1867 / that:

". . . That said rebel States shall be divided into militarydistricts
and made subject to the military authority of the UnitedStates. . ."

and at Section 6 of the same Act: 

". . . any civil governments which may exist therein shall be deemed
provisional only, and in all respects subject to the paramount
authority of the United States . . ."

and at Section 10 of the Reconstruction Act of July 19, 1867: / 

"That the commander of any district named in said act (March2,1867)
shall have power . . . to suspend or remove from office, or from the
performance of official duties and the exercise of official powers, any
officer or person holding or exercising, or professing to hold or
exercise, any civil or military office or duty in such district under
any power, election, appointment or authority derived from, or granted
by, orclaimed under, any so-called State or the government thereof, or
any municipal or other division thereof..."

and at Section 10 of that Act: 

"That no district commander . . . or any of the officers or appointees
acting under them, shall be bound in his action by any opinion of any
civil officer of the United States."

The above Sections of the Reconstruction Acts of March 2, 1867
andJuly19,1867 makes it very clear that the southern States were under
militarylaw and were without republican form of governments. The
question must be asked: "By what authority did theThirty-ninth Congress
rely upon to impose military law upon those southern States after those
States were declaredby "PresidentialProclamation" of April 2, 1868
and"PresidentialProclamation" of August 20, 1866 that the insurrection
was at anend, andthat peace, order, tranquillity and civil authority
existed in and throughout the whole of the UnitedStates of America?"
Keep in mind that the military was originally sent into those States by
"Presidential Proclamation" to surpress rebellion within those States,
not by anyAct ofCongress. 

Fourth: 

As Section 1 of the Reconstruction Act of March 2, 1867, / declares
that the southern States had no legalgovernments: 

"Whereas no legal State governments or adequate protection for life or
property now exists in the rebel States of Virginia, NorthCarolina,
South Carolina, Georgia, Mississippi, Alabama, Louisiana, Florida,
Texas, and Arkansas; . . ."

the question must be asked: "When did the southern States have
legalgovernments?" TheCongress answered the question within: - "An Act
to provide for the more efficient Government of the Rebel States"/ and
within the: - "Act to admit the States ofNorthCarolina, South Carolina,
Louisiana, Georgia, Alabama, andFlorida, toRepresentation in Congress"/
and within the: - "Act to admit the State of Texas toRepresentation in
the Congress of the United States"/ wherein the Congress declared that
the southernStates were not to be recognized as "States" with lawful
civilgovernments until said States ratified the Fourteenth Amendment.
By the mouth of Congress; the purported votes cast for the ratification
of the FourteenthAmendment under the Reconstruction Acts were cast by
unlawful governments of those southernStates [militarydistricts].

Fifth: 

If the southern States had no legal governments, as declared by
Congress; additional questions must be asked: 

Why did the Congress submit the Resolution proposing the
ThirteenthAmendment to the United States Constitution to the
southernStates for ratification? 
Why did the Congress accept the southern States "ratification votes" on
the Thirteenth Amendment? 
Why did the Congress submit the Resolution proposing the
FourteenthAmendment to the southernStates for ratification? 
As both Houses of Congress passed Resolutions/ declaring that the Civil
War was not waged in the spirit of oppression nor for purpose of
overthrowing or INTERFERING WITH THE RIGHTS OF ESTABLISHED INSTITUTIONS
OF THOSE STATES, why did Congress wait until those southern States cast
a"negative" ratification vote on the Fourteenth Amendment before
declaring the civilgovernments of those States as being unlawful? 
Did the southern States have lawful governments before the enactment of
the"Reconstruction Acts?" 
When a freely associated compact State of the united States ofAmerica
is declared to have an unlawful civil government by Congress and is
placed under "Military Law" - isthat State a "State" as that term is
used in U.S. Const., V:1:1? 
When a freely associated compact State of the united States ofAmerica
is placed under "Military Law" by the Congress - do those States have a
Republican form of government as they are to be guaranteed under
U.S.Const., IV:4:1? 
Does Congress have the authority to substitute the Republicanform of
government of a freely associated compact State of the united States
ofAmerica with another form of government for the purpose of compelling
ratification of an Amendment to theConstitution for the United States? 
If Congress has the "textually demonstrable commitment" and thus has
the exclusive and plenary powers to declare the southern States to have
unlawful civil governments - why did Congress find the need to submit
the "Reconstruction Acts" to the President of the UnitedStates for his
signature, a procedure that is governed byU.S.Const.,I:7:2? 

Sixth: 

With the United States Supreme Court's Dred Scott v. Sanford,/ ruling
that a Negro had no rights under the Constitution for the United States
to either obtain rights of citizenship or rights of suffrage;
the"Reconstruction Acts" of1867 fails on the following grounds: 

The "Reconstruction Acts" granted the Negroes of the southernStates the
rights of holding public office of Legislator and thus the U.S.
Congress granted the Negro population the status of "citizen" BEFORE
the Fourteenth Amendment was proclaimed to be an Amendment to the
United States Constitution./ 
The "Reconstruction Acts" granted the Negroes of the southernStates the
rights of "suffrage" BEFORE the FifteenthAmendment was proclaimed to be
an Amendment to the United States Constitution. / 
[The FifteenthAmendment is a formal declaration by the Congress of the
United States that the suffrage provisions within the Reconstruction
Acts of1867 are unconstitutional]. 

Seventh: 

The "Reconstruction Acts" also fails on the following grounds: 

The Congress of the United States granted authority to
"MilitaryDistricts" of theUnited States to ratify Amendments to the
United States Constitution in violation of U.S.Const., ArticleV./ 
Denied the southern States representation in Congress in violation of
Paragraph Two of Article V of the Articles of Confederation./ 
Denied the people of the southern States the privilege of holding
an"Office of Trust" ifthey were excluded under the provisions of the
FourteenthAmendment BEFORE the Fourteenth Amendment was proclaimed to
be an Amendment to the UnitedStates Constitution./ 
Denied the people of the southern States the rights of "suffrage"
unless they were qualified under the Third Article of the
FourteenthAmendment BEFORE theFourteenth Amendment was proclaimed to be
an Amendment to the UnitedStatesConstitution./ 
The "Reconstruction Acts" fails as Congress had no Constitutional
authority to create governments within a freely associated compactState
of the united States of America that consisted of"Aliens."/ 

Eighth: 

William H. Seward, as Secretary of State, expressed doubt as to whether
three-fourths of the required States had ratified the Fourteenth
Amendment (asshown by his Proclamation ofJuly20,1868./) Promptly; on
July21,1868, aConcurrent Resolution/ was adopted by theSenate and House
of Representatives declaring that three-fourths of the several States
of the Union had ratified the FourteenthAmendment. That Concurrent
Resolution; however, was not submitted to the President of the United
States for his approval as required by U.S.Const.,I:7:3 and it included
purported ratifications by the unlawful puppetlegislatures of five (5)
States (Arkansas,NorthCarolina,Louisiana, SouthCarolina, andAlabama)
which had previously rejected theFourteenthAmendment./ 

This ConcurrentResolution assumed to perform the function of the
SecretaryofState in whom Congress (by Act of April 20, 1818) had vested
the function of issuing such Proclamation declaring the ratification of
ConstitutionalAmendments. 

The Secretary of State bowed to the action of Congress and issued his
Proclamation onJuly28, 1868/ in which he stated that he was acting
under the mandate of the Congressional Act ofJuly 21, 1868: 

"Now, therefore, be it known that I, William H. Seward,
SecretaryofState of the United States, in execution of the aforesaid
act, (April20, 1818) and of the afore-said concurrentresolution of the
21st ofJuly, 1868, and in conformance thereto, do hereby direct the
said proposed amendment (Fourteenth Amendment) to the Constitution of
theUnitedStates to be published in the newspapers authorized to
promulgate the laws of the United States, and I do hereby certify that
the said proposed amendment has been adopted in the manner hereinbefore
mentioned bythe States specified in the said concurrent resolution,
namely [namingthem]; the States thus specified being more than three
fourths of theStates of the UnitedStates. . . . "

In regard to the Concurrent Resolution of July 21, 1868 - By what
authority did theCongress rely upon to make a determination as to what
States ratified theFourteenth Amendment? 
As the power to ratify Amendments to the Constitution for the
UnitedStates is with the several States of the Union, by what authority
did the Secretary of State, WilliamH. Seward, rely upon to declare that
the Concurrent Resolution ofJuly21,1868 was an "Official Notice" of
ratification? 
In regard to the Concurrent Resolution of July 21, 1868 - By what
authority did theCongress rely upon to perform the function of the
Secretary of State in whom Congress (by Act of April 20, 1818) had
vested the function of issuing Proclamations declaring the ratification
of ConstitutionalAmendments? 
In regard to the Concurrent Resolution of July 21, 1868 - By what
authority did theCongress rely upon to declare that the
SecretaryofState shall issue forth theProclamation of Ratification
ofJuly28,1868/ when the ConcurrentResolution of July21,1868 was never
submitted to thePresident of theUnitedStates for his approbation as
required by the U.S.Constitution? 

Within the Proclamation of Ratification of July 20, 1868 / -
U.S.Secretary of State, WilliamH.Seward, expressed reservations as to
the legitimacy of the governments of those southernStates that were
under the military government of the UnitedStates and what were his
responsibilities in making legal determinations regarding the
ratification votes of those States. Thequestion must be asked: "Whohas
the authority to make legaldeterminations regarding the ratification of
Amendments to the Constitution for the United States?" 

The questions presented needs to be answered and without answers,
thedeclared ratification of the FourteenthAmendment must be found
"ultra vires" and void"abinitio." 

The federal Courts of Colemanv. UnitedStates,/United States v. Stahl /
andEpperlyet.al.v. United States / have declared that all issues
pertaining to amending of the U.S. Constitution are
"politicalquestions" for Congress or the States to address. As the
Congress of the United States of America on several occassions over the
past 100 years -refused- toaddress the questions presented, theCongress
has taken the position that underArticleV / of the Constiution for the
United States of America and Article X / of the Bill of Rights, the
legislatures of the States have the "textuallydemonstrable
constitutional commitment of theissues." ItisTHEPEOPLE IN A
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OR THE LEGISLATURES OF THE SEVERAL STATES
THAT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE IF AN AMENDMENT HAS BEEN ADOPTED
IN ACCORDANCE TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION. 

/ / / / / / 

United States Constitution 

The Fourteenth Amendment 

[FICTION OR FACT] 

The validity, or should we say invalidity, of the Civil War Amendments
is very important to reinstating the inalienable rights of free white
Citizens in the United States ofAmerica. At every juncture where the
government of the United States of America and/or the governments of
the several States attempt to usurp inalienable rights, theCivilWar
Amendments are ultimately claimed to be the authority for such
deprivations of rights. 

To determine whether the Fourteenth Amendment is fiction or fact, we
will proceed to dissect each Section of the Fourteenth Amendment,
sentence by sentence. Pleaseremember that the following Authorities
reflects the understanding of the FoundingFathers at the time the
Constitution for the United States was adopted, and although they may
not be "politically" correct today, the Authorities represents the law
at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was (purportedly) adopted. 

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT - SECTION ONE 

We begin with Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment which reads: 

"All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty,
orproperty, without due process of law; nordeny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1, United States Constitution

The first sentence of Section One provides: 

"All persons born or naturalized in the United States, ..."
Fourteenth Amendment, Section One

Notice there is no relation to race and there is no definition of
person, other than the"p" in person is not capitalized, indicating the
word would not mean a "NaturalPerson," but a"juristicperson" or
"artificial person." As the courts have said, the "due process"
and"equalprotection" Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment apply to
Corporations which are juristic(artificial) persons. 

Compare this with Article II, Section 1, Clause 4 of the Constitution
for the UnitedStates ofAmerica: 

"No Person except a natural born Citizen, ..." 

Notice the "N" in "no", the "P" in "Person" and the "C" in "Citizen."
All of the capitalization is on the object to be distinguished as to
who is a Natural Person. This is further clarified inAmyv.Smith: / 

"Free negroes and mulattoes are, almost everywhere, considered and
treated as a degraded race of people; insomuch so, that, under the
constitution and laws of the UnitedStates, they can not become citizens
of the United States." 
Amy v. Smith, 1Litt.Ky.R.334.

In light of this, no person would be considered as a United States
Citizen or a citizen of the United States; as the Constitution was
framed to incorporate the commonlaw, inopposition to international law. 

common law - one race governs; 
international law - all races govern. 

The capitalization of the words "Person" and "Citizen" could mean only
one thing, the denoting of only those of one race in compliance with
the common law. 

"The American colonies brought with them the common, and not the
civillaw; and each state at the revolution, adopted either more or less
of it, and not one of them exploded the principle, that place of birth
conferred citizenship." 
Amy v. Smith, 1 Litt. Ky. R. 337-38.

Under the common-law (and under American Constitutions), "Citizenship"
was dependent upon right of inheritance which can only be passed by
lineage (race). This is in accord with thePreamble (Constitution for
the United States of America), which states that the Constitution was
adopted for the protection of "We The People" and"theirposterity," -
posterity - being a racial term. 

The "p" in "persons" of the Fourteenth Amendment is not referring to
those referred to inArticle IV, Section 2, Constitution for the United
States of America. 

"... and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, ..." 

Notice the word: "subject." Those that were not of the white race (when
the FourteenthAmendment was proposed) were natural born "subjects." 

"Blacks, whether born or in bondage, if born under the jurisdiction and
allegiance of the United States, are natives, and not aliens. They are
what the common law terms natural-born subjects ... The better opinion,
Ishould think, was, thatNegroes or other slaves, born within and under
the allegiance of the United States, are natural-born subjects, but
notcitizens. Citizens, under our constitution and laws, mean
freeinhabitants, born within the United States, or naturalized under
the law ofCongress ..." 
Commentaries of American Law, James Kent, 
7th Ed., Vol. II, at 275-78.

Thus, we find the meaning and application of the terms: "subject to
thejurisdiction." 

A United States "Citizen" (that is a common-law Citizen in one of the
severalStates at the adoption of the Constitution for the United States
of America) wasconsidered "within" the jurisdiction of the United
States. "Citizens" were never subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States. Instead,the United States was subject to the jurisdiction of
the Citizen, that is, under the common law. [See the tenth Article
inAmendment, Constitution for the United States of America]. 

According to the common law principle (upon which our Constitution
wasfounded), only the race (family) of people forming the sovereignty
to adopt the Constitution (WethePeople) areconsidered "Citizens." All
others born inside the Country and owing allegiance to "We the People"
are natural born "Subjects." Underprinciples of InternationalLaw, that
is, inter-racial law (Seedefinition in Webster'sDictionary, [1828]),
these "Subjects" (who, by special privilege, arelicensed to become
something or do something normally illegal under the common-law), are
said to be "citizens" and"persons." 

"But in considering the question before us, it must be borne in mind
that there is no law of nations standing between the people of the
UnitedStates and their Government, and interfering with their relation
to each other. The powers of the government, and the rights of the
citizens under it, are positive and practical regulations plainly
written down. Thepeople of the United States have delegated to it
certain enumerated powers, and forbidden it to exercise others." 
Dred Scott v. Sandford, (1856-1857) 
19 How. (60 U.S.) 393, 
452, 15 L.Ed. 691.

It is clear that the Fourteenth Amendment could not be referring to the
"Citizens" that are known of the white race, but must be referring to
those artificial "citizens" of the non-white races 

"... are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
theyreside ..." 

Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1.

This sentence is interesting, as it not only declares that these
"persons" (small "p") are"citizens" (small "c") of the United States,
but also of the State they choose to residein: 

"No white person born within the limits of the United States, ... or
born without those limits, and subsequently naturalized under their
laws, owes the status ofcitizenship to the recent Amendments to the
FederalConstitution." 
Van Valkenburg v. Brown, (1872) 43 Cal 43, 47.

"Prior to the adoption of this amendment, strictly speaking, there were
no citizens of the United States, but only some one of them. Congress
had the power 'toestablish an uniform rule of naturalization,' but not
the power to make anaturalized alien a citizen of any state. Butthe
states generally provided that such persons might, on sufficient
residencetherein, become citizens thereof, and then thecourts held,
abconvenienti, rather than otherwise, that they became ipso facto
citizens of the UnitedStates." 
Sharon v. Hill, (1885) 26 F 337, 343.

Notice the words: "some one of them." This refers to citizenship of
"some one" of theStates. The national government had no power to make
citizens of its own and force them upon the States. The States could
make anyone they chose to be a citizen of theirState, but only those of
the whiterace could be recognized as national citizens under the
Preamble to the Constitution for theUnited States of America and be
treated as"Citizens" in any State they entered. 

Thus, only white State citizens held the privileges and immunities
known toArticleIV,Section2, among the several States, and no State
could confer that Constitutionalprotection on any other race. In
consequence thereof, the "also" could not authorize a"non-white" to be
an "Officer" of the United States government. Theseelements were what
was referred to as "nationalcitizenship" (prior to theFourteenth
Amendment) to avoid one State (or the States collectively at the
nationallevel) from interfering in another State's sovereignty,
orthesovereignty"WethePeople". 

The Fourteenth Amendment attempts to reverse this natural common-law
order of things by making State citizenship dependent upon national
citizenship. 

"... By the original constitution, citizenship in the United States was
a consequence of citizenship in a state. By this clause [Am 14, Sec 1]
this order of things is reversed. Citizenship in the United States is
defined; it is made independent of citizenship in a state, and
citizenship in a state is a result of citizenship in the United States.
So that a person born or naturalized in the United States, and subject
to its jurisdiction, is, without reference to state constitutions or
laws, entitled to all privileges and immunities secured by the
Constitution of the United States to citizensthereof." 
U.S. v. Hall, (1871) 26 Fed. Case 79, 81.

"Prior to the adoption of this amendment, strictly speaking, there were
no citizens of the United States, but only some one of them. Congress
had the power "toestablish an uniform rule of naturalization," but not
the power to make a naturalized alien a citizen of any state. But the
states generally provided that such persons might, on sufficient
residence therein, become citizens thereof, and then the courts held,
abconvenienti, rather than otherwise, that they became ipso facto
citizens of theUnitedStates." 
Sharon v. Hill, (1885) 26 F 337, 343.

Notice the words "ab convenienti," which means after the event. This
means after the Constitutional Convention. And the words "ipso facto,"
which interprets as after the sovereignty was established, (composed
only of members of the white race [family]). 

The choice of words here is interesting, as they did not use the
words:"nuncprotunc," which means to do what should have been done in
thebeginning. Inother words, they are not saying they made a mistake by
not including other races when the Constitution was framed. They are
only claiming to changed the order of things, regardless of the
correctness of the original circumstance. 

This Section of the Fourteenth Amendment totally dissolves the State's
(people of theState) right to declare its own sovereign body. It is in
violation of "State Sovereignty" and completely violates Article IV,
Sections 2 and 4, and the Ninth and Tenth Articles inAmendment. 

"The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and
Immunities of Citizens in the several States.
"A person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime,
who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall, on
demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be
delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the
Crime.
"No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the
Lawsthereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law
orRegulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but
shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or
Labour may bedue." 
Constitution for the United States of America, Article IV, Section 2.

"The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." 
Ninth Article in Amendment to the 
Constitution for the United States of America.
"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the Statesrespectively,
or to the people." 
Tenth Article in Amendment to the 
Constitution for the United States of America.

To understand that not only Article IV, but all other Articles (I
through VII) were written only for the government of and for the white
race (thereby barring those not of the white race from coming under
their protection), you are referred to the case of
Crandallv.Connecticut: / 

"The first Congress after the constitution was adopted, was composed of
many of those distinguished patriots, who framed the constitution, and
from that circumstance would be supposed to know what its spirit was.
Some of the earliest work they performed for the country, was to
establish by law a uniform rule ofnaturalization. The first law was by
Congress in 1790, and in its precise and technical language is used:
'Anyalien, being a free white person, may become acitizen, by complying
with the requirements hereinafter named.' In the year 1795, afurther
regulation was made by law, when the same language was used: 'Any free
white person may become a citizen,' &c. In1798-1802-1813, and 1824,
similar laws were passed, on the same subject, and in each of those
laws, the same technical language is used. These laws were carrying
into effect the constitution itself; and if the constitution in any
part of it embraced coloured persons as citizens, then Congress
mistook its duty, and early departed from its provisions. Congress have
also marked this distinction of colour in the post-office laws 'No
person of colour can be engaged in the post-office, or in the
transportation of mail.' This is a right open to all but persons of
colour." 
Crandall v. Connecticut, (1834) 10 Conn 358.

"To my mind, it would be a perversion of terms, and the well known rule
ofconstruction, to say, that slaves, free blacks, or Indians, were
citizens, within the meaning of that term, as used in the constitution.
God forbid that I should add to the degradation of this race of men;
but I am bound, by my duty, to say, they are not citizens. I have thus
shown you that this law is not contrary to the 2d section of the4thart.
of the constitution of the United States; for that embraces only
citizens." 
Ibid, at 347.

Note the word "citizen" as it used in Crandall. For the definition of
the word"citizen", werefer you to Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 8th Ed.,
(1859): 

"CITIZEN, persons. 3. All natives are not citizens of the UnitedStates;
thedescendants of the aborigines, and those of Africanorigin, are not
entitled to the rights of citizens. Anterior to the adoption of the
constitution of the United States, each State had the right to make
citizens of such persons as it pleased. Thatconstitution does not
authorize any but white persons to become citizens of the United
States; and it must therefore be presumed that no one is a citizen who
is notwhite."
Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 8th Ed. (1859), Title "Citizen," p.231.

"CITIZEN, persons. 2. Citizens are either native born ornaturalized.
Nativecitizens may fill any office; naturalized citizens may beelected
or appointed to any office under the constitution of the UnitedStates,
except the office of president and vice-president. Theconstitution
provides, that 'the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the
privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states.' " 
Ibid, at p. 231.

This leaves no doubt who (under the organic law of this Nation) are
solely defined as "Citizens" (Persons), or what race is the sovereign
body. No one else is included. TheFourteenthAmendment is an attempt to
unseat the organic law and we should question any and all government
Officials who would condone this type of deception. 

Notice in government reprints of the Constitution for the United States
ofAmerica, ArticleI,Section 2, Clause 3: 

"Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the
several States which may be included within this Union, according to
their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the
wholeNumber of free Persons, including those bound to Service for aTerm
of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all
otherPersons." 
Constitution for the United States of America, 
Article I, Section 2, Clause 3.

Upon checking the Constitution for the Confederate States of America,
the people of the Confederacy (who knew and understood the organic law
of this Nation) re-worded thePreamble and Article I, Section 2, Clause
3, as follows: 

"We, the people of the Confederate States, each State acting in its
sovereign and independent character, in order to form a permanent
federalgovernment, establishjustice, insure domestic tranquility, and
secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity --
invoking the favor and guidance of Almighty God � doordain and
establish this Constitution for the Confederate States of America." 
Preamble to the Constitution for the Confederate States of America.

"Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the
severalStates, which may be included within this Confederacy, according
to their respective numbers, which shall be determined, by adding to
the whole number of freepersons, including those bound to service for a
term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all
slaves." 
Constitution for the Confederate States of America, 
Article I, Section 2, Clause 3.

Notice "We, the people" and "to ourselves and our posterity" were
preserved. Also,notice the substitution of the word: "Persons" for that
of the word: "slaves." 

"No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the UnitedStates; ..." 
Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1.

This sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1, makes all
StateConstitutions which set their sovereign body as the white race
only (such as Oregon'sConstitution) nulland void. 

"In all elections not otherwise provided for by this constitution,
every whitemale citizen of the United States, ..."
Oregon Constitution, (1859) Article II, Section 2.

and others, such as: 

"The electors or members of the general assembly shall be free
whitemale citizens of the State, ..." 
Georgia Constitution, (1865) Article V, Section 1.

"Every free white man at the age of twenty-one years being a native or
naturalized citizen of the United States,..."
North Carolina Constitution, (1856) Article I, Section 3, Clause 2.
"Every white male citizen of the commonwealth, resident therein, aged
twenty-one years and upwards, being qualified to exercise the right
ofsuffrage ..." 
Virginia Constitution, (1830) Article III, Section 14.
"That every white male citizen of this State, above twenty-one years of
age, and neither, having resided twelve months within the State, and
six months in the county, ..."
Maryland Constitution, (1810) Article 14.
"All elections of governor, senators, and representatives shall be
byballot. And in such elections every white free man of the age of
twenty-one years, ..." 
Delaware Constitution, (1792) Article IV, Section 1.

See Neal v. Delaware, / as to nullification ofStateConstitutions under
theFourteenthAmendment.

All of these provisions of the Constitutions for the States are now
"null and void" iftheFourteenth Amendment is considered as a valid
Amendment to the Constitution for theUnitedStates of America (which it
certainly is not). No State legislature could change the governing
class which put the legislature into being and which class was set in
their own StateConstitution. 

Here we must also note the difference between the FourteenthAmendment's
"privilegesandimmunities" Clause and the "privileges and immunities"
Clauseof ArticleIV,Section2. (See Maxwell v. Dow, /). 

"... nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
orproperty, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1.

Notice how close the wording of this sentence of the Fourteenth
Amendment is to the wording of the fifth Article in Amendment: 

"... nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
dueprocess oflaw; nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without justcompensation." 
Fifth Article in Amendment, 
Constitution for the United States of America.

Notice the Fourteenth Amendment deviates from the fifth Article in
Amendment on the issue of compensation. The Fourteenth Amendment says,
"equal protection," wherethe fifth Article inAmendment says, "nor shall
private property be taken for publicuse, without just compensation." 

The problem (it appears) in this change of wording is to give martial
law properties to thefifthArticle in Amendment, thereby converting the
common-law remedial effect of the fifth Article in Amendment, to a
martial law remedy. This could be why the courts use the word "purview"
when referencing the Articles in Amendment (Articles One through Eight)
in relation to theFourteenthAmendment. 

"Purview. Enacting part of a statute, in contradistinction to
thepreamble. The part of a statute commencing with the words
'Beitenacted,' and continuing as far as the repealing clause; and
hence, thedesign, contemplation, purpose, or scope of theact." 
Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed. (1979). 

It appears that when the Judges speak of any common-law remedy,
principle, ormaxim, asbeing within "purview" of the Fourteenth
Amendment, they are converting a common-law remedy, principle, or
maxim, to a martial law remedy, principle, or maxim oflaw. In such
cases, thecommonlaw remedy, principle, or maxim is eliminated and,
ofcourse, the unalienable rights of theCitizen are also eliminated (in
favor of martiallawrule). 

This conversion of the common law to properties of martial law nature
is obvious. TheFourteenth Amendment (with military force to enforce it)
allows all races to govern. Amaxim which violates the common-law with
the power (force) of martial law. 

According to these principles, we must take another look at this
portion of theFourteenthAmendment. What is "due process" under the
Fourteenth Amendment? Amazinglyenough, "due process" is completely
defined within the Amendment by the integral words that follow those
very terms, "equal protection of the laws." 

Nothing more than "equal protection of the law" is required to satisfy
the DueProcess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, equal tyranny
and deprivation of common-law rights to all meets the equal protection
principle. So, what protection isgiven? Answer: As much as the national
government wishes to give, and no more. Congressal protection can be
enlarged and contracted as much as Congress and Administrative Agencies
wish, provided only that these changes affect all equally. Ifeveryone
is chained to a post for their own protection, then they have
"equalprotection of the law" under the law martial. 

To see the clear and inherent weakness of the "Due Process Clause" of
theFourteenthAmendment, we look below to find that the common-law
principles clearly known to the Bill of Rights do not apply to the
Fourteenth Amendment and"DueProcess." 

"The right of trial by jury in civil cases, guaranteed by the
SeventhAmendment (Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 US 90), and the right to bear
arms guaranteed by the SecondAmendment (Presser v. Illinois, 116US252),
have been distinctly held not to be privileges and immunities of
citizens of the United States guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment
against abridgement by the States, and in effect the same decision was
made in respect of the guarantee against prosecution, except by
indictment by grand jury, contained in the Fifth Amendment (Hurtado v.
California, 110US516), and in respect of the right to be confronted
with witnesses, contained in the Sixth Amendment. (Westv.Louisiana, 194
US 258). InMaxwell v. Dow, supra, where the plaintiff in error had been
convicted in a state court of a felony upon information and by a jury
of eightpersons, it was held that the indictment, made indispensable by
theFifthAmendment, and the trial by jury guaranteed by
theSixthAmendment, were not privileges and immunities of citizens of
the United States, as those words were used in the
FourteenthAmendment... the decision rested upon the ground that this
clause of the FourteenthAmendment did not forbid the States to abridge
the personal rights enumerated in the first eight Amendments, because
these rights were not within the meaning of the clause 'privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States.' ... We conclude,
therefore, that the exemption fromcompulsory self-incrimination is not
a privilege or immunity ofNationalcitizenship guaranteed by this clause
of theFourteenthAmendment against abridgement by the States...
"... it is possible that some of the personal rights safeguarded by the
first eight Amendments against National action may also be safeguarded
against State action, because a denial of them would be a denial of
dueprocess of law ... If this is so, it is not because those rights are
enumerated in the first eight Amendments, but because they are of such
a nature that they are included in the conception of due process of
law." 
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 98-99, 
29 S.Ct. 14, 53 L.Ed. 97.

Therefore, any reference to Amendments One through Eight, (when applied
totheState, orthrough purview of the Fourteenth Amendment in any way)
replaces thecommonlaw thereof with martial law. This is pure theft of
our God given commonlawbirthright. The first Section of the Fourteenth
Amendment's purpose is to: 

1.Convert common-law Citizens to statutory citizens and statutory
persons under martial law rule; and, 

2.Convert common-law remedies, principles, and maxims in Articles One
throughTen in Amendment to martial law remedies, principles, and maxims
through the FourteenthAmendment; and, 

3.Convert common-law rights ownership of property to martial law
confiscation of property, in which a private citizen is not capable of
protecting his property under the common-law; and, 

4.Completely remove the common-law jurisdiction from the original
people and their Posterity and convert them to Statutory Persons who
can be brought within purview of the FourteenthAmendment under
national, international, martiallaw rule; and, 

5.Completely destroy the restrictions on those not of the white race to
enter our Nation and dislodge the people mention in the Preamble as the
governing body of this white Nation; and, 

6.Completely destroy the ability of the said people to govern by
allowing those not of our race to hold elected Office, both State and
National. 

All this is done with the intention of breaking down State sovereignty
by an increased power of the national side of the United States
government with a corresponding loss of power for Statesovereignty on
the federal side of the United States. This leaves the existence of the
UnitedStates government less dependent (or not dependent at all) upon
the existence of the severalStates. 

The Fourteenth Amendment set the stage for the destruction of "white
rule" under Christiandoctrine in the United States of America. 

Ultimately, they will not succeed, as God has designated this land for
the regathering of the twelve tribes of Israel to become a mighty
Nation again, and so it will be as God hasproclaimed. 

/ / / / / / 

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT - SECTION TWO 

The next Section of the Fourteenth Amendment reads: 

"Sec. 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the severalStates
according to their respective numbers, counting the wholenumber of
persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. Butwhen the right
to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and
Vice-president of the UnitedStates, Representatives inCongress, the
Executive and JudicialOfficers of aState, or the members of the
Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such
State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the UnitedStates,
or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, orother
crime, the basis for representation therein shall be reduced in the
proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the
whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State." 
Fourteenth Amendment, Section 2.

The purpose of the initial sentence of section Two is clear by its own
terms: "Representativesshall be apportioned among the several States
according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of
persons in each State, . . ." Theintention is to give those persons
(previously known as "chattels") a "whole" character and to give that
character representation as a "citizen;" accordingly, allowing
theStates to claim those persons for purposes of representation in the
United States government. [Elkv.Wilkins /]. 

What does the original Constitution say on the subject? 

"Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the
severalStates which may be included within this Union, according to
their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the
whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a
Term ofYears, andexcluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all
otherPersons." 
Article I, Section 2, Clause 3, 
Constitution for the United States of America.

Under Article I, Section 2, Clause 3, we can see that the Framers
understood that they would not allow the direct taxation of property in
the several States (by the UnitedStates) by excluding those persons
held in servitude as "property" from apportionment for direct taxes.
The only exception made was that of counting those persons at
three-fifths of their actual enumeration and adding that to the whole
number of free persons. 

At the time of adoption of the Constitution for the United States of
America, thesouthernStates feared that they would be powerless in the
new government due to low population of free persons in those States. A
compromise was struck which allowed additional representation for the
populace held as slaves with a corresponding increase in taxation for
the additional representation. This carried two benefits with the
newgovernment: 

1.More revenue would be generated by the United States from these
States; and, 

2.These States would be more likely to ratify the Constitution, having
more equal authority in the central government. But even here,
representation and direct taxes were not considered on the same level.
[See:8Fed.Stat.Anno.195(1906)]. 

The first sentence of Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment is wholly
in conflictwith, and in contradiction to, Article I, Section 2, Clause
3, as well as thePreamble. The only reason these persons (Slaves) were
even given a three-fifths character in the UnitedStates Census was for
the purpose of taxation (whichincidentally, prevented the slave States
from suffering a lack of sufficient representation in the UnitedStates
House of Representatives). By no means was this three-fifths character
to imply any direct representation of the persons to whom it related.
[See:8Fed.Stat.Anno.107 (1906)]. 

Under the Fourteenth Amendment, if any State refuses to give this class
"suffrage" inStateelections (by the terms of Section Two [14th Am.]), a
disability is imposed. Whenthis disability is imposed, the State
subjected to the disability loses the three-fifthsrepresentation it had
based upon the number of such "persons" and for that reason is
repugnant to the organic law. 

Rather than returning a State to its original standing or
representation underArticle I (bycounting non-whites as three-fifths
for purposes of taxation and incidentalrepresentation),
theuncooperative State is forced into the very condition the Framers of
the Constitution intended to prevent by the compromise struck at the
ConstitutionalConvention. And since Section Two of theFourteenth
Amendment makes no mention of taxation, it is presumable that the State
would still be taxed according to at least three-fifths apportionment
for the number of those persons inhabiting theState, anunequal taxation
never intended. [See The Federalist, No. 34]. 

Moreover, without the three-fifths disability place upon non-whites,
the people mentioned in the Preamble to the Constitution for the United
States of America, (orrather, their "Posterity") nolonger can maintain
their superior character over their own governmental affairs as the
founders and sovereignty of the government. Thisamounts to no less than
allowance of a foreign invasion into the several States of theUnion,
sanctioned by Congressional (State and Federal) legislation against the
people of theStates in violation of their respective sovereignties. 

One thing that must be noted: Although this disability would be imposed
upon theStates that were uncooperative, they could still deny
"suffrage" to the "Subjects" of theUnitedStates. 

In Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment, "Indians not taxed" were
still excluded as they are in ArticleI, Section 2, Clause 3. The reason
"Indians not taxed" (taken) were still excluded is because of their
allegiance to, and membership in, a separate racialsovereignty, that
is, the Indian Nations. [See, 9 Fed. Stat. Anno. 626]. 

The court of Elk v. Wilkins, / later determined that holding Indians
outside the consideration for representation was wholly inconsistent
with destruction of racial distinction proposed by theFourteenth
Amendment. It is speculated that this decision was made because to
decide otherwise, would reveal the racial sovereignty principles of the
U.S. Constitution in Article I, Section 2, Clause 3 and thePreamble.
The purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to destroy the common-law
ideal that each race (enlargedfamily) constituted a separate
sovereignty in their own governments. Itshould be noted that this
principle (destruction of racialrecognition) has now been extended to
allraces, including artificial juristic persons (corporations etc.)
even though theFourteenthAmendment initially was put into existence on
the proposition that it was only intended to benefit the African race. 

"The Fourteenth Amendment is to be liberally construed to carry out the
purpose of its framers, but it is not to be restricted in its
application because designed originally to rectify an existing wrong.
The amendment was adopted soon after the close of the civilwar, and
undoubtedly had its origin in a purpose to secure the newly made
citizens in the full enjoyment of their freedom. But it is in no
respect limited in its operation to them. Itis universal in its
application, extending its protective force over all men, of every race
and color, within the jurisdiction of the States throughout the broad
domain of the Republic." 
8 Fed. Stat. Anno. 256; 
See also, authorities cited therein.

It is no wonder that this Amendment has been held to apply to
artificial (juristic)persons since its purpose was to artificially (by
operation or fiction of law) confer citizenship on classes never
recognized as "Citizens" under common-law principles that are based
upon the natural law. 

/ / / / / / 

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT - SECTION THREE 

Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment reads: 

"Sec. 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or
elector of President and Vice-President, or hold any office, civil or
military, under the UnitedStates, or under any State, who, having
previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of
the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an
executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution
of the UnitedStates, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion
against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But
Congress may by vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such
disability."
Fourteenth Amendment, Section 3.

This provision, at first glance, was obviously intended to punish the
active southernparticipants in the Civil War. But this Section (like
the rest of theFourteenthAmendment) later proved to deprive the rights
of Citizens in the (so-called) northern States as well. Forinstance,
under this Section, Congress enacted legislation requiring Citizens to
take an "Oath of Allegiance" before being allowed tovote (thus
interfering with their right of suffrage and exercise of sovereignty
and before obtaining judgments in the courts of the United States [thus
interfering with the Citizens right to obtain remedy]). 

The "Oath" spoken of was created during the Civil War and continued
thereafter under the martial law of this Section of the Fourteenth
Amendment. It was created with the intent to circumvent any exercise of
State sovereignty, either by Conventions of thePeople of the State or
by "Acts" of their legislature which could interfere with the
unauthorized superiority exercised by the United States government
through the force of martial law. 

"... it shall be the duty of the heads of the several departments to
cause to be administered to each and every officer, clerk, or employee,
now in their respectivedepartments, or in any way connected therewith,
or who shall hereafter in any way become connected therewith, to
following oath, viz.: "I do solemnly swear (oraffirm, as the case may
be) that I will support, protect, and defend the Constitution and
Government of the United States against all enemies, whether domestic
or foreign, and that I will bear true faith, allegiance, and loyalty to
the same, any ordinance, resolution, or law of any State Convention or
Legislature to the contrary notwithstanding; and, further, that I do
this with a full determination, pledge, andpurpose, without any mental
reservation or evasion whatsoever; and, further, thatI will well and
faithfully perform all the duties which may be required of me by law.
Sohelp me God." 
"And that each and every such civil officer and employee, in the
departments aforesaid, or in any way connected therewith, in the
service or employment of theUnited States, who shall refuse to take the
oath or affirmation herein provided, shallbe immediately dismissed and
discharged from such service or employment." 
"An Act requiring an Oath of Allegiance, and to support the
Constitution of the UnitedStates, to be administered to certain Persons
in the CivilService of theUnitedStates." 
Approved August 6, 1861, 
Ch. 64, Section 1, 12 Stat. 326.

Also see the "Oath" prescribed for West Point Cadets in "An Act
providing for the better Organization of the Military Establishment."
Approved August 3, 1861 / 

The "Oath of Allegiance" was also used in many other relations. To
obtain a"Judgment" in the courts of the United States (and to raise
claims in its departments and bureaus, for instance), Congress enacted: 

". . . the commanders of all American vessels sailing from ports in
theUnitedStates to foreign ports, during the continuance of the present
rebellion, andall persons prosecuting claims either as attorney or on
his own account, before any of thedepartments or bureaus of the
UnitedStates, shall be require to take the oathofallegiance, and to
support the Constitution of the United States (or affirm, asthe case
maybe,) as required of persons in the civil service of the United
States, bythe provisions of the act of Congress approved August Sixth,
eighteenhundred and sixtyone. . . ." 
"An Act requiring the Commanders of American Vessels sailing to
foreignports and Persons prosecuting Claims, to take the Oath
ofAllegiance." 
Approved July17,1862, 
Ch.205, Sect.1, 
12Stat.610.

". . . . Provided, however, That in order to authorize the said court
to render a judgment in favor of any claimant, if a citizen of the
United States, it shall be set forth in the petition that the claimant,
and the original and every prior owner thereof where the claim has been
assigned, has at all times borne true allegiance to the Government of
the United States, and whether a citizen or not, that he has not in any
way voluntarilyaided, abetted, or given encouragement to rebellion
against the saidGovernment, which allegations may be traversed by the
Government, and if on the trial such issue shall be decided against the
claimant, his petition shall be dismissed. AnAct to amend.
"An Act to establish for Investigation of Claims against the
UnitedStates," approved February twenty-fourth, eighteen hundred
andfifty-five. 
Approved March 3, 1863, 
Ch.152, Sect. 12, 
12Stat.765, 767.

"... Whenever it shall be material in any suit or claim before any
court to ascertain whether any person or party asserting the loyalty of
any such person to the United States during such rebellion, shall be
required to prove affirmatively that such person did, during said
rebellion, consistently adhere to the United States and did give no aid
or comfort to persons engaged in said rebellion; and the voluntary
residence of any such person in any place where, at any time during
such residence, the rebel force
or organization held sway, shall be prima facie evidence that such
person did give aid and comfort to said rebellion and to the persons
engaged therein." 
"An Act to provide for Appeals from the Court of Claims, and for
otherPurposes." 
Approved June 25, 1868, 
Ch. 71, Sec. 3, 15 Stat. 75.

Also see: "An Act making Appropriations for the legislative, executive,
and judicial Expenses of the Government for the Year ending the
thirteenth of June, eighteenhundred and seventy-one." Approved July 12,
1870 / 

All of these "Acts" of martial law that require an "Oath of Allegiance"
from the people who are already "Citizens" within the original meaning
of the Constitution, aregiven a continuing affect through Section Three
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Under these "Acts" created under Section
Three of the Fourteenth Amendment, Citizensare (or could be) treated as
being "guilty" of insurrection or rebellion until they prove themselves
innocent. This is again a reversal of the common-law maxim that one is
innocent until proven guilty and contrary to the intent of the fifth
Article in Amendment to the Constitution for the UnitedStates
ofAmerica. 

For those who may take offense to the use of the terms "Civil War" (as
opposed to "the war between the States"), we will continue to use those
terms for a reason. Thecause of this War was the attempt of the
national government to interfere in the sovereignty of the several
States through National Civil Law; thus, the actual controversy
("political" as well as "military") isknown as the"Civil War." 

This was a War over the intrusion of Civil Law upon the Common Law.
Thecourt of Diamondv.Harris, / calls the Civil Law (statutory law)
"superiorequity": 

"It is difficult to see how the courts of this State are to ignore the
commonlaw as a rule of decision, when it is made so by statute, and
adopt the civillaw, even though it have the merit of superior equity."
Diamond v. Harris, (1830) 33 Tex 634, 638.

In the meantime, "Civil Law" was the form of law imposed in the Roman
Empire which was largely (if not wholly) governed by martial law rule. 

"Equity" has always been understood to follow the law; to have
"superior equity," isto turn things on their head. This is exactly what
happens when martial law is imposed. If"equity" is the law, then it
follows its own course rather than following the commonlaw, thereby
destroying the common law and leaving what is called "equity" in
itsplace. We can't even begin to count the number of times Judges,
Lawyers, andStatesmen have said: 

"Thereisn't any common law anymore. It has been replaced by Statutes." 

They would be more truthful if they said: 

"There isn't any common-law any more, it has been replaced by
martiallaw." 

The 1789 Judiciary Act, Section 16 / prevented the courts of the
UnitedStates from entertaining a suit in equity where there was an
adequate remedy atlaw. 

"Sec. 16. And be it further enacted, That suits in equity shall not be
sustained in either of the courts of the United States, in any case
whereplain, adequate and complete remedy may be had at law." 
"An Act to establish the Judicial Courts of the United States,"
Approved September24,1789,
Ch. 20, Section 16, 1 Stat. 73, 82.

This statute was taken from a principle well known to the common law
and was made by men who participated in the creation of our
Constitution. The Civil Law that followed the Civil War is found to be
this so-called "Superior Equity" instituted under the policepower
created in the Fourteenth and related Amendments. This so-called
"superiorequity" can only be imposed under conditions of "martial law
rule" where the law is in suspension. 

If the judiciary has no right to proceed in equity when the law
provides adequateremedy, howdoes the Congress propose to statute the
principles of equity, andthen claim to have made law? It would seem
that such a practice is wholly unlawful (inlight of legal principles
known to the Constitution and to the several States at the time of
itsadoption). 

As well, it must be noted that "martial law" is known (for the most
part) to follow the course set by men rather that the course set by law
(its jurisdiction being based on"force" and coercedconsent). Even where
concerned, it must be justified by those imposing it or they eventually
will be held liable for damages caused by its imposition. 

"What is called 'proclaiming martial law' is no law at all; but merely
for the sake of public safety, in circumstances of great emergency,
setting aside all law, andacting under military power; a proceeding
which requires to be followed by an act of indemnity when the
disturbances are at an end." 
8 Atty. Gen. Op. 365, 367, February 3, 1857.

The Framers understood Common-Law to be superior law in all areas where
it could be given effect. In fact, the Constitution for the United
States of America incorporates the Common-Law in many of its provisions
by using Common-Law terms which only the Common-Law can define. 

It should not be forgotten, that the first laws of the United States
carry great weight in construction of the powers given in the
Constitution for the United States ofAmerica, (as well as the lawful
manner of instituting those powers /). 

"To all this mass of proof we have still to add, that Congress has
repeatedly legislated upon the same construction of the Constitution
that we have given. Three laws, two of which were passed almost
immediately after the Government went into operation, will be
abundantly sufficient to show this. The two first are particularly
worthy of notice, because many of the men who assisted in framing the
Constitution, 
and took an active part in procuring its adoption, were then in the
halls of legislation, and certainly understood what they meant when
they used the words 'people of the UnitedStates' and 'citizen' in that
well considered instrument." 
Dred Scott v. Sandford, (1856 - 1857), 
19 How. (60 U.S.) 393, 419, 15 L.Ed. 691.

While the distinction between "law" and "equity" are now claimed to be
abolished by Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
combining of both jurisdictions under a singular procedure could only
be done outside the judicial power under martiallaw rule. Some courts
still seem to recognize some distinctions in law and equity (possibly
to avoid explaining the damage done to the judicial power by this
combination). 

Getting back to the point, from Section Three of the
FourteenthAmendment we can see that the southern States would be
disabled from recovering their sovereignty by propositions of this
Section (because all that were sympathetic to their cause would be
[andwere] refused "Office" in theUnitedStates government). This was
necessary for the northernRevolutionaries to maintain the results of
their usurpation of the Preamble to theConstitution and their
imposition of "martial law." 

According to McKee v. Young, / all that is necessary to constitute:
"Aidand comfort" (asknown in Section Three of the Fourteenth Amendment)
is giving the enemy words of encouragement or expression of favorable
opinion while occupying an influentialposition. / Fromthis it is
obvious that southern PublicOfficials were targeted for punishment for
their attempts to maintain the power of thePreamble to the Constitution
for the United States of America (as well as the principles of the
Federalgovernment known to and required by that instrument). 

NOTE: Secession of the southern States is not condoned, but a
recognition that the south seceded due to the usurpatious Acts pursued
by the national government is intended. The several States did have the
right to withdraw their Senators from the national government to
suspend its operation until such time as it conformed itself to the
requirements of theConstitution. It appears that secession was used by
thenorthernRevolutionaries as justification for the acts of a
usurpatious nationalgovernment. This mistake should never be repeated.

It has been said that the Thirteenth Amendment (and subsequent
Amendments to theU.S.Constitution) bear the same authority as other
provisions of the Constitution (beingAmendments thereto) rather than
bearing the inferior quality of "statutes" which may be considered
"void" when made without authority of the Constitution as adopted. 

Not only are these Amendments contrary to the original intent of the
Framers, (whichrecognized only a white sovereignty [We the people]),
but even Congress has treated theFourteenth Amendment as a mere
statute. It is well known that the Constitution for theUnitedStates of
America may not be amended by statute. [Article V, Constitution for
theUnitedStates of America]. It is presumable that Congress fully
understands this fact. "AnActofCongress" Approved June 6, 1898, /
provides: 

". . . that the disability imposed by Section 3 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the UnitedStates Constitution heretofore incurred is
hereby removed."

According to Marbury v. Madison, / either the Constitution is the
supreme and paramountlaw, unchangeable by mere legislative enactment,
or it is a futile attempt by the people to control their government.
Either the Fourteenth Amendment has no more standing than a statute or
it violates the principles of government proposed by the original
Constitution by allowing Congress to change its provisions by its own
legislativeauthority. [See Rogers v.Bellei / (Dissenting Opinion), as
to Congress changing the intent of the Fourteenth Amendment by mere
legislation]. This being thecase, theFourteenth Amendment must be
something less than organic law. 

Ironically enough, Madison (the Defendant in Marbury v. Madison
[supra.]) intheConstitutional Convention (while moving for the
ratification of the Constitution by the people rather than the State
legislatures) agreed that a legislature could not amend the organic law
that put it into existence. 

William M. Meigs of the Philadelphia Bar, in "The Growth of the
Constitution," [See:Vol. 8, Fed. Stat. Anno. reports Madison'sviews]: 

"Madison thought the legislatures clearly incompetent (to ratify the
United States Constitution) for the very changes proposed would make
essential inroads on the State Constitution, and a legislature cannot
change the Constitution under which it exists." 
8 Fed. Stat. Anno. 243.

On this (and other basis), the Constitution for the United States of
America was ratified by "Conventions of the People" of the States
rather than the State legislatures. This raises another important
question: "Were (or are) the State legislatures competent to ratify
Amendments to the Constitution (such as the Fourteenth Amendment) which
effectually changed the State Constitution by the inroads made into
it?" 

Obviously the Constitutional Convention thought that the State
legislatures are incompetent to ratify any organic law that adversely
affected (changed) their StateConstitutions. Therefore, this would
appear to give further validity to the proposition that the State
legislatures may only amend the Constitution for theUnitedStates of
America according to Article V, thereof, when the purpose of
theAmendment is to hold the United States government to the limits of
its originalpowers. Ratification of any Amendment (which expands power
of the UnitedStates government beyond its original limits) must
therefore (by any theory) be ratified by "Conventions of thePeople" of
the class mentioned in the Preamble in their respective States. 

NOTE: The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments were not
ratified byConventions of the people and thus those Amendments
undermined the States'Constitutions by depriving both the governments
of the several States and thesovereign people of a great deal of their
powers (by purporting to transfer power to the national government).

It must also be noted: 

"There is no sounder rule of interpretation (of the Constitution) than
that which requires us (the court) to look at the whole of an
instrument, before we (the court) determine a question of construction
of any particular part..." 
U.S. v. Morris, (1851) 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15,815; 
See also Madison in The Federalist, No. 41 
and 8 Fed. Stat. Anno. 253.

Could this be why there are great efforts being put forth to call a
"ConstitutionalConvention" for the purpose of giving final validity to
these usurpatious"Acts" of American legislators? 

Regardless of this fact, it is obvious that the northern usurpation of
the Constitutionfor theUnited States of America favoring international
[interracial] law wasto be protected from southern resistance by
martial law. By Section Three of theFourteenthAmendment, the Congress
would be allowed to decide when the principles of the Preamble were
dead and when those who maintained those principles were alsodead
(orwhen they were no longer a threat to these usurpatious"Acts" against
ourConstitution). 

Considering the weight of the evidence that the FourteenthAmendment is
of martiallaw jurisdiction, we can begin to understand why it was
thought that Congress might repeal the disabilities of Section Three
without a Constitutional Amendment (outsideof the scope of Article I,
Section 8, Clause 18, Constitution for theUnitedStates ofAmerica). 

Over the years, the people have had a great deal of trouble accessing
the judicialpower of thecourts. Since martial law suspends the judicial
power (along with other regular powers ofgovernment), this is quite
understandable. Congress' power is (practicallyspeaking) "unlimited"
where the regulation of courts subjected to martiallawrule are
concerned. Therefore, why would Congress think that their power over
the martial law measures (in general), is limited to theConstitution
(especially since Congress claimed power under martial law with the
power Clauses of theThirteenth,Fourteenth,and Fifteenth Amendments)? / 

A known maxim to the Common Law is that it supersedes the military
power. Theframers of our national Constitution understood this
principle when they limited Congressal power to make military
appropriations to a maximum term of two years. / ManyConstitutions of
the several States also make this clear by requiring the militarypower
to "bear arms" to remain subordinate to the civil power. 

For example: 

"The people shall have the right to bear arms for the defence (sic) of
themselves, and the State, but the Military power shall be kept in
strict subordination of the civilpower."
Oregon Constitution, (1859) Article I, Section 27.

The second Article in Amendment also makes the subordination of the
militarypower to the will of the people clear. 

Some say we did not adopt the whole of the common law of England. This
is true to a certainextent. We did not adopt the monarchy and the
feudal law of England. Wedid adopt so much of the common law as was
intended by the Framers of theConstitution and those who ratified it.
Bythe ninth Article in Amendment, it is clear that all rights known to
Englishmen were adopted and were to be retained by the people. In
addition, "thepeople" also assumed unto themselves the powers of
sovereignty (andthe rights relatedthereto) as clearly indicated by the
tenth Article in Amendment to the FederalConstitution. This is the
American common-law. 

In the Declaration of Rights and Resolves [1774] (as well as the
DeclarationofIndependence[1776]), some of the men who framed the
Constitution complained of the force uses by the King of England that
resulted in the loss of trial byjury and violation of other many rights
now known to be protected by theBillofRights. At that time of American
history, theKing of England was already using military force (martial
law) to govern the Colonies to deprive Americans of theirrights. 

Therefore, it cannot be presumed that Congress never had the power to
use martiallaw of any form to govern within the several States. 

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT - SECTION FOUR 

Next is Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 

"The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized
bylaw, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties
for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shallnot be
questioned. But neither the United States nor any state shall assume or
pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion
against the UnitedStates, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of
any slave; butall such debts, obligations and claims shall be held
illegal and void."
Fourteenth Amendment, Section 4, United States Constitution.

As previously in this expos�, we will continue to dissect the
FourteenthAmendment with a view to its legal effects, sentence by
sentence, continuingwith the remaining portion of Section Four and
going on through SectionFive. 

The first sentence of Section Four provides: 

"The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized
bylaw, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties
for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shallnot be
questioned." 
Fourteenth Amendment, Section Four.

For years, several individuals have been questioning the issue and the
use of papermoney by the national government. Of course, we know that
the main medium which plagues us is theFederalReserveNote, but in our
zeal to uphold the original intent and purpose of ourConstitution,
these individuals have made a fatal error - they have ignored this
provision of theFourteenthAmendment. 

The arguments that have been used against these "BillsofCredit" have
always focused on Article I, Section 8, Constitution for the United
States of America. Forinstance, we know that Congress is empowered to
Coin money, not print it. 

"The Congress shall have Power . . . To coin Money, regulate the Value
thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the Standard of Weights
andMeasures;" 
Article I, Section 8, Clause 5, Const. for the U.S. of A.

Under this Clause, the Congress fixed the unit of measure for money
coined by theUnitedStates at 416 grains of standard Silver (Legal
Tender Cases /), calling the unit of measure a "dollar." Thismade the
dollar'sSilver a standard by which all other money ("foreign" as well
as"domestic") would bemeasured. As a result, there is no such thing as
a gold standard in theUnitedStates. Congress has the power to change
the weight of a gold dollar without affecting the standard in Silver.
In fact, the Congress is duty bound to change the goldcoin when it no
longer reflects a true comparative value to the standard
(adollar'sSilver). 

Consequently, legislation can be found (prior to the adoption of
theFourteenthAmendment) changing the amount of gold contained in a gold
dollar. Don't forget that the term: "dollar" reflects a unit of Silver.
When the term: "dollar" is used with respect to gold, it becomes a
comparative term between the value of Gold andSilver (with Silver being
the constant and Gold [in a sense] being given a respective value
according to true economic conditions). 

The only way that one could avoid being compelled to accept a gold
dollar of lessor weight for the completion of contracts was to make
specific reference to the weight of Gold to be transferred for payment,
thus treating the Gold as a "commodity" rather than a monetary unit for
purposes of the specific Contract. [Legal Tender Cases, /]. 

Although Congress had this power (concerning gold currency), Congress
cannot be deemed to have power to pass legislation which intended to
reflect other than the parity between the standard of measure (dollars
silver) and the gold dollar. To do so, would be to deprive those
contracting in golddollars of property without due process of law
inthat they could not recover the true intrinsic value of their
Contracts. This would violate the fourth Article in Amendment by
seizing property without warrant or probablecause upon Oath or
Affirmation, and would violate the fifth Article inAmendment by either
taking private property for public use without just compensation or by
depriving property without due process of law. 

The question is: "Can the Congress issue paper and declare it to have
an unrelated value in gold or silver, or can it issue the same without
redemption and force these "BillsofCredit" to circulate among private
Citizens by operation of law?" Thereis sufficient authority in the
originalConstitution to show that Congress was never intended to
exercise such a power, or at least, not to exercise its power in such a
way. 

In the Constitutional Convention, Sherman (in relation to Article I,
Section 10, [Const. for theU.S. of A.]) said that: "He thought this was
a favorable moment for crushing paper money." / Thiswas an extension of
the Convention's"determination to prevent the evils of paper money,
alreadymanifested by striking out from the powers of Congress the power
to 'emit bills on the credit of theUnitedStates'." / 

It should be noted that only the States were directly prohibited from
interfering in theObligation of Contracts. During the House and Senate
debates on H.J.R.192 ofJune5,1933, thisprohibition was brought into
view and it was answered that the prohibition did not apply to the
federal government. While this may be true, the fourth and fifth
Articles in Amendment of theBillofRights accomplish the same thing by
prohibiting the seizure of property without warrant or the deprivation
of property without due process of law. A man has property in his
Contracts and if the"ObligationsofContract" are interfered with, then
that property is deprived of the parties to theContract. If this
deprivation takes place without proper judicial proceedings conducted
within the limitations of the Bill of Rights, the taking of property is
without authority of law. 

When the question of "Bills of Credit" (in relation to the powers of
Congress) was raised in theConvention, the power was offered with the
Clause: "to borrow money on the credit of theUnitedStates." Governor
Morris moved to strike out the words "and emit bills on the credit of
theUnited States." Madison thought it would be enough to prohibit them
from being made a tender. Ellsworth thought this a favorable moment to
bar the door against paper money. Read that the words (if not struck
out) would be "asalarming as the mark of the beast in Revelation." On
this basis, thewords were struck out by nineStates to two. / 

It is obvious from the Convention (as well as the powers granted to
Congress concerning coinage of money and borrowing of money on the
credit of the United States) that no direct or implied power was given
to Congress to force circulation of its evidences of debt as a
currency. WhileCongress has the power to borrow money on the credit of
theUnited States, the Congress has no power to force any one to lend to
the government (much less the power to spend "debt" intocirculation)
without the intention of repaymentwhatsoever (as in the case of
FederalReserveNotes ["Promises to pay" arenot"payment"]). 

As a result of the money (credit) question (raised by the Fourth
Section of theFourteenthAmendment), we find it necessary to review the
Legal Tender Cases. Forthe mostpart, those cases were decided during
and after the Civil War Reconstructionperiod when martiallaw was in
full bloom in theUnited States. Bylooking at these cases in this new
light, muchcan be gained in theway of understanding the money issue (as
well as the Constitution ingeneral). 

From the Legal Tender Cases, we first see that the supreme court of the
UnitedStates initially declared the legal tender statutes of February
25th, 1862, July11th,1862, and March 3rd, 1863, to be upheld as: "War
measures, exceptional in theircharacter, not authorized by any express
grant of the power to Congress contained inthe Constitution, but as not
prohibited by its terms, and as justified in view of the greatpublic
exigencies which required their adoption." / In other words, paper
money was declared legitimate as "martial law money" (an emergency war
measure). 

The supreme court in Thorington v. Smith, / (in an Opinion dealing with
Judgments of the Confederate courts [relatingto property in dispute in
that case]) madea statement that is applicable to this early decision
favoring legal tender laws made during the hostilities of the Civil
War. Thecourt said in Thorington: 

"But such a judgment, in such a time, has little authority." 

Although this was said in relation to Confederate Judgments, the
principle stillapplies. In times of war (during imposition of martial
law), the will to win and martiallaw may override all true logic (even
down to the principles of the organic law). 

It appears that the supreme court held to this principle in the case of
Hepburnv.Griswald, / In Hepburn (supra.), the supreme court reasoned
that the exigency which allowed the legal tender character to be
accorded to the Civil War "Greenbacks" was over, thus the conditions
which implied the power (to make them legaltender) had ended. Thus the
law could no longer be held "constitutional" as in thepast. 

The dissenting Opinion of the Chief Justice in a later legal tender
case reports the holding of the Hepburn court: 

"The majority of the court as then constituted, five judges to eight,
felt obliged to conclude that an act making mere promises to pay
dollars a legal tender in payments of debts previously contracted is
not a means appropriate, plainly adapted, really calculated to carry
into effect any express power vested in Congress, is inconsistent with
the spirit of theConstitution, and is prohibited by the Constitution."
Legal Tender Case, (1870) 12 Wall. 571, (supra.)

The Opinion of Hepburn was ordered to be published on January 29th,
1870, and was decided in Conference on November 27th, 1870. 

"The action of Congress in passage of the first Legal Tender Act was .
. . placed distinctly upon the ground of the existing imperative need
of government, and the legaltender clause was urged and adopted as a
warmeasure." [martial law].
Julliard v. Greenman, (1884) 110 U.S. 421; 
425, 4 S.Ct. 122; 28 L.Ed. 204.

As many of us know, this is not the first time that the government has
claimed certain implied powers as an expedient of war or some other
emergency. Martiallawmeasures have consistently been imposed under the
guise of "emergencies" of all kinds (Rooseveltbeing the greatest
offender since Lincoln). The Hepburn court (withoutdirectly overruling
its previous judgment upholding the Legal Tender Acts) merely declared
that the exigency no longer existed and that continued enforcement of
the statute must be declared unconstitutional. 

After the Hepburn ruling, the United States Attorney General in the
cases of Knoxv.Lee, and Parker v. Davis, / moved to be heard on the
Hepburn question (Julliardv.Greenman,[supra.]/). These cases were heard
almost a year after theHepburn case, with the court reconstituted.
Congresshad passed an "Act" allowing for an additional Justice and one
of the Justices concurring in theHepburn case hadretired. These are the
conditions under which the question wasreheard. 

Although the Concurring Justices in the Hepburn case had not changed
theirOpinion, thelegaltender Clauses were upheld (five Justices to
four) thus overturning Hepburnv.Griswalddirectly. Many have said this
was a packed court, and this may betrue. But the court wasn't packed
merely to overturn Hepburn, rather, it was packed to assure that the
recent (andmost controversial) FourteenthAmendment would be upheld in
its entirety. The legal tender question (as we will see) was merely an
incident of the Fourteenth Amendment because of the words ofSection
Four. 

In 1870 (December), the reconstituted court (for the most part) claimed
to base its ruling overturning Hepburn on the grounds laid out in the
Dissenting Opinion of theHepburn case. The only real difference in the
Opinions of the Hepburn court and this later legal tender case
(KnoxandParker/) was that the DissentingOpinion of Hepburn became the
Concurring Opinion of Knox and Parker, and the Concurring Opinion
ofHepburn became the Dissenting Opinion ofKnoxand Parker. 

It was noted by the Dissenting Opinion of Justice Field (12 Wall. 634),
that the court failed to give any reason for overturning Hepburn. The
question arises, with the turmoil and flat disloyalty and usurpations
involved in adoption of the FourteenthAmendment still remaining vivid
in 1870: "Did the court dare go to the 4thSection of
theFourteenthAmendment for the additional law it needed to justify such
an upset inthesupreme court?" (Note: the Fourteenth Amendment was never
touted as anAmendment that would allow Congress a legal tender power to
force papermoney onAmericanCitizens). Justice Field begins his dissent: 

"Nothing has been heard from counsel in these cases, and nothing from
the present majority of the court, which has created a doubt in the
mind of the correctness of the judgment rendered in the case of
Hepburnv.Griswold, or of the conclusions expressed in the opinion of
themajority of the court as then constituted. Thatjudgment was reached
only after repeated arguments were heard from able and eminent counsel,
and after every point raised on either side had been the subject of
extendeddeliberation." 
Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 634.

Obviously, no one had the courage to directly raise the Fourteenth
Amendment in defense of the legal tender statutes. And in fact, you
will not find any direct reference to it in the Arguments of Counsel or
the Majority Opinion of Knox and Parker, (supra.). Hadthe case turned
on this point, there may have been another Civil War spilling more
blood than thelast. 

While we do not wish to go into great detail about the "Concurring" and
"DissentingOpinions" in these cases, the court did say some things that
we will find important to thisdiscussion. 

A study of the history of the Fourteenth Amendment clearly reveals the
injustice done by theAmendment (as well as the injustice done to obtain
assent of the States to adopt it). 

The court in Knox and Parker admits that Congress, (by its legal tender
laws, ifdeclaredunconstitutional) has done a disastrous thing: 

"Indeed, legal tender treasury notes have become the universal measure
ofvalues. If now, by our decision, it be established that these debts
and obligations can be discharged only by gold coin; it, contrary to
the expectations of the parties to thesecontracts, legal tender notes
are rendered unavailable, the government has become an instrument of
the grossest injustice." 
Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 530.

By the legal tender law, itself, the government had become the
instrument of gross injustice to the rights of parties who had
contracted for specie payments, now the court is worried that the
injustice really done will be revealed. Congress also was worried
aboutthis, and that is why we have a provision in the Fourteenth
Amendment disallowing any question of the "validity of the public
debt," that is, the validity of Congress' action. Ifno one can question
this action, then how can the injustice berevealed? 

It is further said by the court: 

"It is incumbent upon those who affirm the unconstitutionality of an
act of Congress to show clearly that it is in violation of the
provisions of the Constitution." 
Legal Tender Cases 12 Wall. 531.

It must be noted that the litigants against paper money never addressed
the validity of theFourth Section of the FourteenthAmendment. No one
contested the constitutionality of theFourth Section, and while the
court alluded to its principles, directreference to it is avoided like
theplague. 

Throughout all the legal tender cases, the Justices in opposition to
legal tender present a most compelling legal argument (as well as
historical facts and motives of theframers and the people of the States
as references to show that Congress had no powerto enact a legal tender
law making paper acceptable as money [as ruled inHepburnv.Griswald]). 

If looking only at the original organic law (as the Hepburn court did),
thesearguments are absolutely valid. But we must remember that we are
not dealing only with the original organic law (and neither was the
supreme court after the unconstitutional adoption of
theFourteenthAmendment). The Fourteenth Amendment is claimed to be a
part of the organic law, no matter how false or erroneous that
assumption may be. Also, in reviewing these legaltenderdecisions, don't
forget that the supreme court is always "on notice" of the Constitution
in its entirety, whether they mention any of its specific provisions or
not in their Opinions. 

If four supreme court Justices won't be heeded when relating the true
history and meaning of our original Constitution, where can we expect
to prove our point merely on the same grounds they raised, without
dissuading the effect of subsequent (so-called)Amendments. This is
exactly what we have done, but not as well asJusticeField and his
fellow dissenting Justices. It seems like a very futileattempt. Allthat
could be said in the supreme court (about the original Constitution) in
relation to papermoney has been said by its own Justices, with one
exception; the relationship that theFourteenth Amendment bears to the
subject and the fact that theFourteenthAmendment is a merefiction, not
a part of the Constitution. This question has notbeen raised. We must
answer the question posed by Justice Field: WhatallowedHepburn to be
overturned? 

Let us look at some of the things said by the litigants and the court
in upholding the legaltender law. If we are right about the
implications of the Fourth Section of the FourteenthAmendment, then
some reference must have been made to it, even if onlyindirectly. 

You might say that the validity of the public debt has nothing to do
with papercurrency, orcurrency in general. The Attorney General of the
United States (in arguing for papermoney)disagrees: 

"There is a kinship between the borrowing of money and the issuing of a
currency made valuable by being invested with all the facilities of
money, in evidence of that borrowing."
Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 526.

Interestingly enough, no reference is made to the FourteenthAmendment
by the AttorneyGeneral when this statement was made (while the language
relates directly to provisions of the Fourth Section). 

"A decent respect for a co-ordinate branch of government demands that
the judiciary should presume, until the contrary is clearly show,
thatthere has been no transgression of power of Congress . . ." 
Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall 531.

Remember, new power was conferred upon Congress, more plenary in its
character than ever before, with exception of the ThirteenthAmendment
(as you will see in our discussion of theFifthSection of the Fourteenth
Amendment, [infra.]). 

In speaking of the powers of Congress: 

"It is allowable to group together any number of them and infer from
them all that the power claimed has been conferred." 
Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 534.

What about the new power of the Fourteenth Amendment? The court admits
that theBillofRights was intended to curtail those questionable powers
of Congress that may be implied, "these Amendments are denials of
power" (LegalTender Cases /); and refers to the Preamble of the Bill of
Rights as setting thatstandard. This will be further discussed with
reference to who is competent to amend the Constitution and under what
conditions. But right after the court says this (forthe most part) the
Bill of Rights is disregarded. Why does the FourteenthAmendment
supersede the Bill of Rights where the power exercised is a direct
power conferred after their adoption? Answer:"The limitations of
theBill of Rights are common-law principles, while
theFourteenthAmendment ismartiallaw." When "martial law" is put into
effect, it is used to suspend the common law, rightfully or otherwise,
and therefore supersedes it. 

From the standpoint of constitutional construction: 

"If there be any conflict between an Amendment and a provision of the
originalConstitution, the provision found in the Amendment mustcontrol,
under therule that the last expression of the will of the lawmaker
prevails over an earlier one" 
9 Fed. Stat. Anno. 255.

This also raises the question: "Who is the lawmaker if there is to be a
change in the members of the sovereign body?" Is it not the sovereign
body itself, rather than theircreations (State legislatures or
Congress)? 

It is said that the Congress has power to borrow on the credit of the
UnitedStates, and the power to emit "bills of credit" is incident to
that power. But the court relates that when the legal tender laws were
passed, it was the fact that the credit of the UnitedStates had run out
which caused the exigency (emergency) requiring a legal tender law. 

"Meanwhile the public treasury was nearly empty, and the credit of the
government, if not stretched to its utmost tension, had become
nearlyexhausted . . ." 
Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 541 (Concurring Opinion)

If the credit is exhausted, where is their power to borrow on the
credit or any implied power under it? But, this is not true if the
validity of the debt cannot be questioned (FourteenthAmendment,
SectionFour). 

The basic reasoning of the concurring court in Knox and Parker / was
that Congress has the power to declare war and repel insurrection
(powers of martial law); from this power is the implied power to make
war or the power to execute such war (implied powers of martial law);
coupled with the war powers (martiallaw powers) is the power to borrow
money on the credit of the UnitedStates; when the credit of the
UnitedStates runs out or is short, an emergency exists (an excuse for
imposition of martiallaw measures) and, under the war powers, loans may
be forced. Under this implied power to enforce loans, the government
may issue "billsofcredit" evidencing the debt and force their
acceptance by declaring them "legaltender." Here we see an implication
of power not directly given (in its fourth generation of implication)
alljustified under the power of "martial law." This is stretching
things to say the least, and we have already discussed the borrowing
power being extinguished when the credit of the UnitedStates becomes
none existent. Theconsequence of a marriage between the warpowers and
emergency borrowing when there is no credit to borrow against is
legaltender papermoney, which would be better called "martial law
money." 

Basically, the power exercised in legal tender was a military power
(martiallawpower) and when we go back to the Hepburn case, we see that
to be true according to the supreme court. Nowwith the war over,
wherein could the implied martial law powers rest? They had no basis,
thiswas the decision of Hepburn. 

It becomes obvious that Congress needed a new direct grant of power to
enforce the legaltender laws. Thus the Fourth Section of the Fourteenth
Amendment was purposed to maintain the validity of the public debt,
leaving the Bills of Credit issued as evidence of that debt valid
(under an implied power derived from a new source). Therefore, the
Fourth Section of theFourteenthAmendment was intended to imply the
power to make them (Greenbacks) a legaltender to maintain the validity
of the debt from another source. Nonetheless, the martiallaw nature and
origin of the debt and its currency (legaltender)cannot be doubted. It
is clearly stated in the Fourth Section of theFourteenthAmendment. 

By the Fourth Section of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress claims a
new directpower as a basis for implied powers that could not lawfully
be used except bynecessity of military exigency. TheFourteenth
Amendment is an extension of the Congress'military (martiallaw) power
over the entire United States, not confined byanyof the Clauses of the
original Constitution for the UnitedStates of America (iftheFourteenth
Amendment is fact instead of fiction). 

Look at what is alleged to have started the Civil War. Allegedly, a
shot was fired onFortSumpter. Congress has full power under Article I,
Section 8, Clause 17 to governForts, and it could truly be said that an
insurrection had been done against not one of the UnitedStates, but
against the property under control of the Congress of theUnitedStates.
Congress (claiming its martial law "power to declare war,"
"suppressinsurrections" and "repel invasions") imposed martial law on
theUnitedStates and never discontinued it. The result was an extension
of military and municipaljurisdiction of Congress. But where is the
evidence of this? Look at theThirteenthAmendment, the Civil Rights
Acts, the Legal Tender Laws, theFourteenthAmendment,etc., etc., etc.. 

The fact that Congress did not merely extend its coinage power over
currency is clearly admitted by the court: 

". . . nor do we assert that Congress may make anything which has no
valuemoney."
Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 553. (Concurring Opinion)

Paper "money" isn't issued under the money powers of Congress, but
under the militarypower (in conjunction with the borrowing power) and
this power is not the original power under the originalConstitution,
but a new and different power of martiallaw rule under the Fourth
Section of theFourteenth Amendment. 

The original borrowing power is only solvent when the credit of the
United States isintact. Section 4 of the Fourteenth Amendment confers
authority beyond that known to the borrowing power of Article I,
Section 8, Clause 3 which is obvious since it also relates to the
validity of the public debt and consequently borrowing to create that
debt. 

In reference to the federal and national characters of the U.S.
Government, JusticeBradley says "it is a national power that prevents
the States from seceding from theUnion." (Ibid. at 555). Whenthis power
is exercised in prevention of insurrection (asin the CivilWar), it is a
national power, and any powers implied by its exigencies are also
national powers. In this case, we are clearly talking about the
national power ofmartiallaw. 

The Fourteenth Amendment is an extension of national military powers
presently used in a municipal character and enforced by municipal laws,
stretched far beyond their original limitations and enforced in Article
I Tribunals. See the discussion of SectionFive of the Fourteenth,
(infra.) concerning Article I Tribunals. 

The court even had the nerve to go to the taxing power of Congress to
draw certain implications about Congress' power. We know the lawful
bounds of the taxing power originally conferred are "uniformity" and
"apportionment." Ben Franklin referred to papermoney as imposing "akind
of imperceptible tax". (See "Concurring Opinion" ofJusticeBradley,
Legal Tender Cases /). Without the FourteenthAmendment, howwould such
taxation be lawful? Don't forget theFourteenthAmendment is considered
the last word on the subjects with which itdeals. 

In 1884, the case of Julliard v. Greenman / again raised the legal
tender issue. Up to thispoint, no one mentioned the Fourteenth
Amendment in legaltender litigation (atleast as far as we have found).
Twenty-six years after the FourteenthAmendment, thePlaintiff in Error
inJulliardv.Greenman finally makes reference to it: 

"The forced loans of 1862 and 1863, in the form of legal tender notes,
werevital forces in the struggle for national supremacy. Theyformed a
part of the public debt of the UnitedStates, the validity of which is
solemnly established by theFourteenthAmendment to theConstitution." 
Julliard v. Greenman, 110 US 432.

The Fourteenth Amendment was further alluded to by the Plaintiff in
Error: 

"The question of the constitutionality of an act of Congress, as well
as the question of its construction, must be considered in the light of
the history of the time when it was enacted." 
Julliard v. Greenman, 110 US 430.

Is this also not true of an Amendment to the Constitution? 

"And whenever the power sought to be exercised depends, or must be
predicated, upon a given state of facts, the existence of the power is
a judicial question to be determined upon the facts." 
Ibid.

And, after alluding to cases which support this principle in
development of the martiallaw jurisdiction (wherein the law of the
Fourteenth Amendment lies); he goes ontosay: 

"The same doctrine is maintained in the Slaughter-House Cases. / " 
Ibid.

The Slaughter-House cases are adjudications of civil rights protected
by the FourteenthAmendment, and are consistent with the other cases
cited by the PlaintiffinError. 

Then at the end of the page 430, the truth really comes out: 

"The exercise of jurisdiction by a court or a legislature assumes the
existence of the jurisdiction in the tribunal or body exercising it." 
Ibid.

What is really being said here? The Fourteenth Amendment has been here,
andthe Congress has been allowed to exercise jurisdiction under it for
some 26years, therefore, itmust be assumed to exist. Even the court
upheld this jurisdiction in theSlaughter-House cases, there is no
inconsistencyhere. 

It appears that the Plaintiff in Error in Julliard understood exactly
what he was talking about, especially when he says the Fourteenth
Amendment makes the public debt unquestionable in the sameargument. 

Of course, the Julliard court again gives the same arguments in favor
of legaltendernotes, (ashad been given in the past). Again, this
argument seems to be lacking in something to give itvalidity. A close
look at the Opinion again reveals the court alluding to the principles
of theFourteenth Amendment to uphold its position andJusticeField
"Dissents" with the same argument as he, and his like minded Associates
had used in the past, still failing to convince the majority of
thecourt. 

These, the arguments of Justice Field (and many more arguments) have
been offered against paper money. Consistently, these arguments have
met with little success even when they are valid arguments under the
original Constitution of the United States. 

The problem is that Congress has claimed a new power through
theFourteenthAmendment. We have been missing the point all along. Our
attention has been focused upon the original Constitution and away from
those Amendments that are designed to destroy our original concept
ofgovernment. By Amendment, itissaid: "Thevalidity of the public debt .
. . shall not bequestioned". If no one is allowed to question the
public debt, then how can anyone question the"Notes" representing that
debt or the enactments of the legislature forcing us to accept it.
Wecan not even question Congress'adoption of the immoral principle of
"I'd rather owe you than cheat you out ofit". 

From this we see that the only reason for this Clause of the
FourteenthAmendment was to (expostfacto) give validity to "Martial Law
Acts" (notauthorized by theConstitution) and to prevent the people from
contesting those unauthorized "Acts" ofmartiallaw. 

Why have we not been able to prevent the increase of the national debt?
Because,wehave no right to question the validity of the debt in court
as long as theFourteenthAmendment is considered to be a valid Amendment
to the Constitution, (whichitisn't). First, we must attack
theFourteenthAmendment as "unconstitutional" before any of the
otherwise valid arguments againstpaper money will have any effect.
Wehave not been making the wrong arguments, we just haven't directed
them against theperversions of our organic law. 

Why do we have the Federal Reserve Corporation? If the Congress is
claiming a power to create an unquestionable public debt, then they
will also claim the right to exercise that power through any agent they
wish, especially when that agent simplifies the process of imposing the
debt and increasing it. Congress may claim this power under guise of
the "necessary and proper" Clause ofArticle I, Section 8, Clause 18,
but all of us will know that the power actually lies under
theFourteenth Amendment, Section Five, "the power to enforce this
Amendment by appropriatelegislation." 

The Civil War Congress not only wanted to protect the "Greenbacks" in
circulation after the Civil War, but it wanted to make provision for a
new and increasingdebt. Notice the words: "including debts incurred . .
. in suppressing insurrection andrebellion...". HadCongress only
intended to protect the "Greenbacks" of the CivilWar, these would have
been the only debtsprotected. Instead,the Congress also included the
public debt (ingeneral) allowing the inclusion of any debt enacted
byCongress. If you wish to study the LegalTenderCases further, hereare
some authorities: 

Houston v. Moore, (1820) 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1, 49; 5 L.Ed. 19. 

Briscoe v. Bank of Commonwealth of Kentucky, (1837) 

36 U.S (11Pet.) 257, 9L.Ed.709. 

Lick v. Faulkner, (1864) 25 Cal. 405. 

Thorington v. Smith, (1868) 8 Wall.1 (supra.). 

Veazie Bank v. Fenno, (1869) 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533; 19L.Ed.482. 

Legal Tender Cases, (1870)12 Wall. 457, (supra.). 

Legal Tender Case, (1884) 110 U.S. 421, (supra.). 

It is clear from these cases that the Fourteenth Amendment is a
continuation of militarypower (martial law) exercised by Congress
during the Civil War and that papermoney (legal tender) is martial law
money. 

As previously stated in this expos�, we will continue to dissect the
FourteenthAmendment, with a view to its legal effects, sentence by
sentence, continuingwith the remaining portion ofSectionFour and going
on through Section Five. 

Let us go to the next portion of the Fourth Section of the Fourteenth
Amendment and see what relation it has to the first portion and the
money issues we have faced. 

"But neither the United States nor any state shall assume or pay any
debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against
the UnitedStates. . ."

One of the obvious intentions of these words, was to prevent the
southern States from paying (and their creditors from collecting) debts
incurred through participation in the Civil War. Thus, all those
persons who had become the creditors to the southernStates were
deprived of property without due process of law. Such a deprivation of
property by "Legislative Act" constitutes a"BillofAttainder" and in its
lesser form, a "Bill of Pains and Penalties." Congress, as well as
theStates, areprohibited from passing such "Acts" in Article I,
Sections 9 and 10 of theUnitedStatesConstitution. Further more, the
"Act" is an "ex post facto law" punishing the act committed with a law
enacted after commission of the act. 

This being true, how could power be claimed by Congress to amend the
Constitution in this manner? And how could the State legislatures claim
the power to ratify such anAmendment? 

This portion of the Fourth Section of the Fourteenth Amendment also
acts as an"Indemnification Act" for the United States by making it
impossible for any one to lay claims for the destruction committed by
the armies of the United States while enforcing martiallaw upon
thesouthern States. 

The final portion of the Fourth Section casts light on the money issue
previously discussed as well as the issues of the aforementioned
paragraph. 

"But neither the United States nor any state shall assume or pay . . .
any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such
debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void."

The enactment of Congress forcing the emancipation of the slaves, was a
great loss of property to those who held them in subjection. The first
emancipation of slaves was ordered by Proclamation ofAbraham Lincoln,
President, acting as Commander-in-Chief of the military forces of
theUnitedStates (and was later claimed to be made perpetual by the
Thirteenth Amendment). Byoperation of these enactments, property was
taken and no compensation was offered and militaryforce was used to
enforce this deprivation ofproperty. "Emancipation" was born out
ofmartial law and survives under the power of martiallaw today. 

The fourth Article in Amendment makes such an unreasonable seizure of
property (seizure of property without warrant issued upon "Oath" or
"Affirmation") unconstitutional and prohibits Congress from legislating
to this end. Similarly, the Constitutions of the States disable
theStatelegislatures in the same respect. Neither the Congress nor the
Statelegislatures had power topass such legislation, whether in the
form of anAmendment ora Statute. 

In addition, the fifth Article in Amendment prohibits the taking of
property for public use without compensation and further prohibits the
taking of property without dueprocess of law. "Dueprocess of law"
requires a trial by jury in civil cases at common-law (seventhArticle
inAmendment) and an indictment and speedy public trial by an
impartialjury of the State and District wherein the crime shall have
been committed, andetc., with the right to subpoena witnesses and face
your accusers in criminal cases (sixthArticle inAmendment). Clearly,
the members of Congress knew that they could not preventclaims "for the
loss or emancipation of any slaves" from being successful
insouthernCourts. Also, the members of Congress clearly knew that
southern Juries would uphold claims against the United States as well
as the ConfederateStates for debts incurred and damages done by the
CivilWar. Instead of facing this fact, the members ofCongress chose to
usurp the law that would be enforced by Juries, that is, theCommon-Law. 

Moreover, the States are prohibited from passing any law violating the
"ObligationofContracts" (Article I, Section 10, Constitution for the
United States ofAmerica). Everyman who holds property lawfully acquired
usually has a "Bill of Sale" evidencing the transfer of ownership
rights. The "Bill of Sale" is an executed Contract, and as such, isone
of the few Contracts that has real standing at law. 

The courts of equity may "void" a Contract for "fraud" and other
similarconditions; butno one has any power or right to interfere with
valid Contracts and the property rights acquired under them. If the
State can pass no such law, and the Constitution and itsAmendments are
law; from whence did the power come for the Statelegislatures to ratify
such an Amendment? Martial Law is the onlyanswer. 

As a result of this Section of the Fourteenth Amendment, litigation
arose concerning confederate currency. The adjudication of these cases
is of importance to our understanding of the issues concerning paper
money. The confederate currency bears similarities to
theFederalReserveNote of today that cannot be ignored. 

Many have said that the use of Federal Reserve Notes gives rise to
jurisdiction over the transaction for which they were used. The
confederate currency (being designed by the southernStates for all
transactions therein [although never made a legaltender]) was
considered tobe: " . . . a currency imposed upon the community by
irresistibleforce." [Branch v. Haas /]. InThoringtonv.Smith / the
supreme court said: 

"They have no necessary relations to the hostile government, whether
invading or insurgent. They are transactions in the ordinary course of
civil society, and though they may indirectly and remotely promote the
ends of the unlawful government, arewithout blame, except when proved
to have been entered into with actual intent to further invasion
orinsurrection."

This is also true of Federal Reserve Notes which are imposed by
irresistible force on the normal course of life and business. Even more
so, since the Federal Reserve Notes were declared "legal tender" from
June 5, 1933 (as were their predecessors, the"Greenbacks"). 

In the same case, the court said: 

"We cannot doubt that such contracts should be enforced in the courts
of the United States after restoration of peace, to the extent of their
just obligation." 
Ibid. 
See also, 9 Fed. Stat. Anno. 237.

Many have contested the obligations of private contracts on the basis
of unlawful issuance of credit or the medium of exchange designated in
the Contract. We have (through such Contracts) obtained "substance"
with the credit issued (which indicates that a just obligation arose
out of them). We will find ourselves hard pressed to abrogate such
Contracts merely on the basis of currencydesignated: 

"Transaction between individuals, which would be legal and binding
under ordinary circumstances, cannot be pronounced illegal and of no
obligation because done in conformity with laws enacted or directions
given by the usurping power. Between these extremes of lawful and
unlawful there is a large variety of transactions to which it is
difficult to apply strictly any general rule; but it may be safely said
that transactions of the usurping authority, prejudicial to the
interests of citizens of other states excluded by the insurrection and
by the policy of the national government from the care and oversight of
their own interests within the states in rebellion cannot be upheld in
the courts of that government."

So, only those transactions which are specifically intended to support
the usurping power would be considered to have any connection with the
usurpation. In the meantime, those transactions (private in nature)
only made according to irresistible forces imposed upon the parties are
without blame of the parties and binding to their just value. 

The bottom line is - the money issue is a very weak, if not a
non-existent argument inrelation to private Contracts. The Constitution
applies to governments interaction with the citizen, but not to
citizens interaction with one another. The use of the
FederalReserveNotes (imposed upon us by irresistible force) does not
give rise to blame or attachment to the usurping authority. 

Although there may be one exception in the case of "Contracts"
adjudicated in Statecourts. Under Article I, Section 10, Constitution
for the United States of America, "no state shall make any Thing but
gold and silver a tender in payment of debt" andtherefore, it is
doubtful that theStatecourts would have jurisdiction to enforce
theContracts (inthe case were "Contracts" make something other than
"gold" or"silver" atender in payment in debt). Consequently, the
Statecourt could adjudicate the Obligation of the Contract for
FederalReserveNotes, but could not make aJudgment in that medium. This
situation creates an interesting paradox when you demand that
aStatecourt define the medium of exchange in a Judgment on a
(so-called) privateContract written in terms of legal tender. 

FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT - SECTION FIVE 

The final section of the Fourteenth Amendment (as reported in the
reprints of the UnitedStates Constitution) claims to authorize: 

"The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation,
the provisions of this article." 
Fourteenth Amendment, Section 5, 
United States Constitution.

From the words: "of this article" it would appear to have little
meaning. But an understanding of this Section will lead us to a greater
understanding of this Amendment'srepugnance to the original United
States Constitution. We will also see its repugnance to the
Constitutions of the several States and the incompetence of the
legislativebodies which claimed authority to ratify it. 

We know that this provision is identical to Section Two of
theThirteenthAmendment (whichis also of martial law origin). The import
ofSectionFive of theFourteenthAmendment, whilebeing similar to Section
Two of theThirteenthAmendment in some respects, is much different in
other respects. Thereason is that the power Clause of each Amendment
(while conducive to the sameend) put different powers into force, and
when put into force, they apply to differentobjects. 

The Thirteenth Amendment was specially designed to operate directly
against the Citizen holding Negroes in subjection. It directly removed
property, or property rights, from the hands of the Citizen mentioned
in the Preamble to the UnitedStatesConstitution. As a result,
theThirteenthAmendment is construed to operate against individuals
(ingeneral) as is legislation made in pursuance thereof. Thisis not the
case with theFourteenthAmendment. 

"We must not forget that the province and scope of the Thirteenth and
FourteenthAmendments are different; the former simply abolished
slavery; the latter prohibited the status from abridging the privileges
or immunities of citizens of theUnitedStates; from depriving them of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law, and from denying
to any the equal protection of the laws. The amendments aredifferent,
and the powers of Congress under them are different. What Congress has
power to do under one, it may not have power to do under the other.
Under the ThirteenthAmendment, it has only to do with slavery and its
incidents. Under the FourteenthAmendment, it has power to counteract
and render nugatory all state laws and proceedings which have the
effect to abridge any of the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States, or to deprive them of life, liberty, or property
without dueprocess oflaw, or deny any of them the equal protection of
the laws. Under the ThirteenthAmendment, the legislature, so far as
necessary or proper to eradicate all forms and incidents of slavery and
involuntary servitude, may be direct and primary, operating upon the
acts of individuals, whether sanctioned by state legislation or not;
under the Fourteenth, as we have already shown, it must necessarily be,
and can onlybe, corrective in its character, addressed to counteract
and afford relief against state regulations orproceedings." 
Civil Rights Cases, (1883) 109 U.S. 3, 23; 
3 S.Ct. 18; 27 L.Ed. 835.

The Fourteenth Amendment operates against the States as a whole, that
is, either against the different branches of state government, or the
people (sovereign body) ofeachState, as a whole, when acting in their
sovereign or legislative political capacity to create or enforce State
law. 

Considering that Congress' powers are enumerated in Article I,
Section8, Constitution for the United States of America, it is
reasonable to assume that Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment is
intended to give Congress new powers or to extend some existing power
beyond the limits established by the original Constitution. Inreference
to the Fourteenth Amendment, the supreme court said: 

". . . It is the power of Congress which has been enlarged. . . ."
Ex Parte, Virginia, (1879) 100 US 339, 344; 
25 L.Ed. 676; 9 Fed. Stat. Anno. 634.

Not only did the supreme court say that Congress'power was enlarged,
thesupremecourt also made it clear that it was only Congress'power that
was enlarged and not that of the generalgovernment. 

"All of the amendments derive much of their force from this
latterprovision. Itis not said that the judicial power of the general
government shall extend to enforce the prohibitions and to protecting
the rights and immunities guaranteed." 
Ex Parte, Virginia, (1879) 100 US 339, 344; 
25 L.Ed. 676; Stat. Anno. 634.

This raises a peculiar question in relation to this claimed expansion
of power on the part ofCongress. If the judicial power is not expanded
by this provision, then, isacourt (upon whom Congress confers
jurisdiction) exercising "judicial power" or the power of theCongress
when adjudicating Civil Rights cases? Any "so-called" court that
enforces legislation under an Amendment with this (or a similar power
Clause) isproceeding as anArticle I legislative Tribunal of Congress,
notas an Article III JudicialCourt of theConstitution. 

We know from the Internal Revenue Code, Sec. 7441 that the U.S. Tax
Court is what is known as an Article I (legislative) Court (tribunal). 

"There is hereby established, under Article I of the Constitution of
the UnitedStates, a court of record to be known as the United States
TaxCourt. The members of the Tax Court shall be the chief judge and the
judges of the Tax Court." 
26 U.S.C. 7441

We also know that an Article III court, that is, a court that actually
exercises the judicialpowers vested by Article III, can be created by
Congress and vested with purely judicial power. 

Here we see that Congress exercises the power to create two different
kinds ofcourts, however, only one is vested with the judicial powers
known to Article III of theU.S.Constitution. How do these courts
differ? And what power does an ArticleICourt depend upon or exercise? 

Once Congress has created an Article III court (and vested it with
specificjurisdiction), itbecomes independent of Congress. Its judges
have perpetual term of office as long as they are in good behavior
(Article III, Section 1) and its Judges may only be removed from office
by impeachment (Article II, Section 4). The Judges of anArticle III
court may not have their compensation diminished during their term
ofoffice (Article III, Section 1). Itis only the courts with these
attributes which actually can exercise the judicial power ofArticle III
of the U.S. Constitution and it is only these courts which can truly
operate within the doctrine of separation of powers, a doctrine
indispensable to our republican form ofgovernment. [Northern Pipe v.
MarathonPipe/]. 

Since the Officers of an Article III court may act without retribution
for theiractions, the court has both the power and the duty to lay
statutory law next to the Constitution and see if the latter squares
with the former, and if the statutory law does not conform to the
Constitution it must be declared "null" and "void."
[Marburyv.Madison/]. This being the attributes of an Article III court,
the same must have been created by the power granted in Article III. 

"The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in ...
suchinferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain
andestablish." 
Article III, Section 1, Const. for U.S. of A.

The words of this Clause give the courts thereunder the attribute of
permanence by the words "ordained and established", that is, these
courts have a fixed character and they are as perpetual as the Union
itself. 

How does an Article I court differ in character when compared to
anArticleIIIcourt? Anddoes an Article I court exercise the lawful
judicial power of the United States? 

Article I contains another reference to Congress'power concerning what
appear tobecourts: 

"The Congress shall have power . . . to constitute Tribunals inferior
to theSupreme Court;" 
Article I, Section 8, Clause 9, Const. for U.S. of A.

Notice the difference in wording between the Clause of Article I and
the Clause ofArticle III. The latter makes reference to "courts"
(inferior) to the "supreme court" while the former refers to"Tribunals"
inferior to the "Supreme Court." Article III lays certain requirements
on tenure ofoffice, etc., while Article I lays no such requirements.
So, in Article I we see the raw power ofCongress (without respect to
the limitations theConstitution) places upon theArticle III
judicialpowers. When that power (judicialpower) is exercised within the
confines of Article III, it is said that the court created is a
judicial body exercising a power separate from the legislature (which
is the judicial power conferred and limited byArticle III). It should
be noted that as Article I makes reference to "Tribunals" inferior to
the Supreme Court, the "Supreme Court" ofArticle I must also be a
"Tribunal" and thus is not the same "supreme court" of that
inArticleIII. 

It is interesting to note that the Federal Statutes Annotated, Volume
8, p. 633 (indiscussing Article I, Section 8, Clause9) only makes
mention of Congress' power underArticle I being used within the
confines of Article III, that is, up to 1864. Yet,today, we have
Tribunals known asArticleIcourts. It would seem logical then to deduce
that in 1864 (or some time thereafter) Congress' power was extended in
such a manner as to allow Tribunals to be created by the raw power of
Congress withoutArticleIII limitations (and without the necessity of
Article III altogether). TheFourteenthAmendment was allegedly ratified
on July 9, 1868. In 1879, thesupremecourt ruled that only
Congress'power was extended by theAmendment(14th). 

In relation to the Tax Court, Congress was allegedly vested with
extended power in the area of taxation (Sixteenth Amendment), and
consequently we have an ArticleIcourt with relation to the tax imposed
under that Amendment. 

Another point must be looked at in reference to these questions.
Congress has exclusive legislative power over the District of Columbia: 

"The Congress shall have Power . . . To exercise exclusive Legislation
in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding tenMiles
square) as may ...become the Seat of the Government of the United
States . . ." 
Article I, Section 8, Clause 17, Const. for U.S. of A.

But this is not the power that is exercise by Congress under Martial
Law Rule of theCivilWarAmendments 

Congress also claims the power to legislate, in certain cases, by
implication of powers specifically granted: 

"The Congress shall have Power . . . To make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper in Execution of the foregoing power, and all other
Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United
States, or in any Department or Officer thereof." 
Article I, Section 8, Clause 18, Const. for U.S. of A.

This also is not the power exercised by Congress under the martial law
rule of theCivilWarAmendments. This Clause requires legislation to be
both "necessary" and"proper." The wording of Article I, Section 8,
Clause 18 (requiring Congress legislation to be "proper") leavesit in
the hands of the judicial power to determine whether Congress action is
"constitutional." On the other hand, the wording of the powerClauses of
the Civil War Amendments (requiring"appropriate" legislation to enforce
theAmendments) leaves it in the hands of Congress to determine what
legislation is "appropriate" as a political consideration.
Consequently, the courts of judicial power are prevented from
determining the constitutionality of Congress'action under these power
Clauses because judicial Courts have always claimed they cannot decide
politicalquestions without violating the separation of powers.
Therefore, without challenging validity of the entireAmendment, we
cannot challenge the Constitutional validity of any"Act" of Congress
under theAmendment having this type of power Clause. 

Taking all this into consideration (along with the alleged extension of
solely Congressionalpower authorized by Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment) it could only be deduced that an Article I court, (created
under this power) exercises legislative rather than judicialpower.
Remember, the power of the judiciary was not extended bySectionFive. 

If an Article I court exercises only legislative power, then these
courts apparently do not have the power (as does the Article III court)
to lay a legislative enactment next to the Constitution and declare its
validity or invalidity. This is the design of the Civil War Amendments
and any other Amendment with a similar power Clause. Being in exercise
of merely legislative power, theArticleIcourt (tribunal) must follow
the dictates of the legislature (Congress) and no other, because it is
merely an extension of the legislature. 

How many times have you heard of Tax Court cases when the Tax Court has
saideither, theConstitution is inapplicable, or that a claim of
Constitutional limitations isfrivolous? This alone supports the
aforementioned proposition. 

This indicates, in the area of the Thirteenth (and subsequent
Amendments), that all power exercised under them is "legislative" and
any body that exercises powers similar to those ofSectionFive of the
Fourteenth Amendment, are merely extensions of thelegislature. 

Now we see why the supreme court refers to the power Clause as an
enlargement of power rather than a creation of new power. It is an
enlargement because the extension of martialpower is used in
conjunction with previous powers initially conferred uponCongress. 

Going back to Congress' power under Article I, Section 8, Clause 18;
look at what the government's own Publication says in relation to the
judiciary in the DistrictofColumbia. 

"In the District of Columbia there is no division of powers between the
general and local government. Congress has the entire control over the
District for every purpose of government, and in organizing a
judicialdepartment, all judicial power necessary for the purpose of the
government may be vested in the courts of justice of the District." 
8 Fed. Stat. Anno. 659.

All judicial power? This conveys the fact the Congress may create
courts in theDistrictofColumbia under authority of Article I without
reference to Article III (or any other provision of the original
Constitution). So called Article I courts are "Tribunals." 


Congress has followed a similar scheme in the case of national Article
I Tribunals and in the case of vesting Article III courts with the
power of Article I Tribunals. This is why there has been some
confusion. Some people believe the Congress has expanded its
jurisdiction over theDistrictofColumbia and its territories beyond the
limitations of the Constitution into the severalStates. But this is in
error. Congress has expanded its jurisdiction through the power
ofMartial Law and created a whole new venue, aregionalvenue. This is
what "regionalism" isallabout: 


"The general restrictions of the Constitution which govern the exercise
of jurisdiction by the courts of the United States within the several
states of the Union have no operation in the District of Columbia, and
the conditions of jurisdiction existing in theDistrict make the
provisions of section 1 of the Act of 1887, defining the jurisdiction
of the circuitcourtsin districts within the several states, plainly
inapplicable. Generalprovisions of an Act of Congress not locally
applicable are controlling under the provisions of Sec. 93, Rev. Stat.
D.C."
Gilford Granite Co. v. Harrison Granite Co., 
23 App. Cas. (DC) 22 (1903).

Under the authority of Congress to make "municipal law" for the
DistrictofColumbia, Congress need not hold to the Constitution (as it
must with respect to the several States) nor (itappears) even to the
doctrine of "separation of powers" (which is inapplicable in
theDistrictofColumbia). A similar scheme is followed in the case of
Martial Law "regionalism" (again creating the aforesaid confusion),
thedifference being that judicialcourts are prevented from questioning
the "Acts" of Congress under MartialRule while in the District of
Columbia (the judicial courts had the power to determine whether
Congress had exceeded the limits of authority related to the
DistrictofColumbia). 

We know that the Fourteenth Amendment interferes with the sovereignty
the severalStates retained prior to its alleged ratification. If this
was a mere expansion of municipal power of theDistrictof Columbia, the
judicial courts would be able to adjudicate the constitutionality of
the expansion of venue and jurisdiction. But this is not the case. The
Fourteenth Amendment places prohibitions upon the States that never
existed before (without reference to the District of Columbia or other
territory of the United States) which said prohibitions encroach upon
State sovereignty: 

"The prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment are directed to the
states and they are to a degree restrictions of state power." 
9 Fed. Stat. Anno. 631.

Congress' power allegedly was extended into State sovereignty.
WasCongress'municipal authority over the District of Columbia extended
into theseveralStates to create Article I courts in the States to
enforce theFourteenthAmendment? The power exercised is purely
"legislative," notjudicial, butit is not the power over the District of
Columbia, it is national martial law power, (notlimited by
Constitutional provisions related to the District of Columbia or other
territory appertaining to the United States). 

It's unquestionable that Congress conferred jurisdiction on the courts
of theUnitedStates to hear Civil Rights cases. The power exercised
(beingpurelyCongressional) by any court which exercises jurisdiction
pursuant to the FourteenthAmendment, acts as an Article I Tribunal. You
might say: "ButArticleIIIcourts were vested with this (civil rights)
jurisdiction." That may be true, butwhen an Article III court exercises
"legislative power," it must act as alegislativeTribunal and is reduced
to an Article I Tribunal for the adjudication of suchcases. 

Either the Tribunal exercises the power of the legislature or it
exercises the power of the judiciary as a court. The body (tribunal or
court) cannot exercise both "legislative" and "judicialpowers"
simultaneously under the original Constitution and since only the power
of Congress is allegedly enlarged by Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment, a"Tribunal" cannot exercise both powers under this Clause
either. 

Who can claim these Fourteenth Amendment protections and through whom
is this national martial law power of Congress extended into the
several States? 

"Until some state law has been passed, or some state action through its
officers or agents has been taken, adverse to the rights ofcitizens
sought to be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, nolegislation of
the United States under said amendment, nor any proceeding under such
legislation, can be called into activity;... the amendment was intended
to provide against ... state laws or state action of some kind, adverse
to the rights of the citizen secured by the amendment." 
Civil Rights Cases, (1883) 109 U.S. 3, 13, 
3 S.Ct. 18, 27 L.Ed. 835;
9 Fed. Stat. Anno. 631.

"Non-whites" are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore,
Congress found these"persons" a fit instrument for spreading their
Martial Law jurisdiction throughout the severalStates. The unfortunate
part of this "for persons of color" is that they have been led to
believe they are allowed to access the judicial power of the
UnitedStates when the truth is that they have only been allowed to
access the arbitrary power of Congress under the Civil War Amendments.
This is why"persons of color" in the UnitedStates continue to feel that
they have no rights, because they have no independent judicial power to
protectthem. 

Thus, Congress legislates between two or more races. A nation is a race
or viceversa (Title:"Nation", Webster's Dictionary [1828]). Congress'
legislation then is based on principles of"international law," and
therefore is a form of international law for all intents and purposes.
"Martial law" and "international law" work well together for Congressal
purposes because they do not respect the authority of the Common-Law. 

The exercise of Martial Law jurisdiction within the several States, is
the usurpation of theCommon Law and subjects the sovereign body (white
Citizenry) to a jurisdiction that has no right to exist within the
States. 

Furthermore, since the Amendment (14th) only can invoke Congress'power
(wheninvolving those intended to be protected thereby, such as the
Thirteenth and FourteenthAmendments), whiteCitizens have no rights to
sue under this Amendment. 

There is, of course, one exception to this rule. If a white Citizen
acquires the same legal status (artificial character) as those
protected by the Amendment (through the operation of some statutorylaw
of Congress), then said white Citizen may be brought within the venue
of theAmendment as a statutory (juristic) person. By this means,
whiteCitizens birthrights become of no affect and their rights are
reduce to the inferior character of statutory Civil Rights
(merelegislativeprivileges). 

It must be remembered that the white Citizen obtaining this status will
also be "subjectto the jurisdictionthereof" (ofthe United States
Congress) and can legally be regulated by the laws Congress passed
under its Martial Law authority. Here the extension of municipal laws
of Congress outside the boundaries set by the U.S.Constitution
iscomplete. By this contrivance (and others emanating from
theFourteenth Amendment), the States have been reduced to mere
administrative arms and provisional appendages of Congress and
Congress' power has been extended to include the entirety of
theUnitedStates. 

The difference between the white man holding citizenship intact
according to thePreamble of the United States Constitution (and all
others who claim protection under theFourteenthAmendment), is the
difference between a natural birthright known to the Common-Law (or
privilege, or immunity, guaranteed by the original Constitution) and a
"so called" right, privilege, or immunity, created by the Constitution
and Statute (aprivilege or immunity that never before existed for the
party upon whom it was conferred by statute). The supreme court has
recognized that Congress may protect both: 

"A right or an immunity, whether created by the Constitution or only
guaranteed by it, even without an express delegation of power, may be
protected byCongress." 
Strauder v. West Virginia, (1879) 100 US 303, 310, 25 L.Ed. 664 
reversing State v. Strauder, (1877) 11 W.Va. 745.

But we would venture to say that a Citizen will find more protection in
a "naturalright" than a"privilege" conferred by Congress. The
institution of government was inherently for the protection of natural
rights (Preamble - U.S. Const.), while the granting of a privilege is
merely at the tolerance of the sovereign body that created government
and at the tolerance of the government the sovereign body created. The
main point is, the courts have recognized that there are both "natural
rights" and those "socalled" rights artificially created by law
(privileges). 

In fact, State common law (natural rights) seem to receive no
protection. Itshould also be noted that where a State government has
agreed to usurp its sovereignbody (freewhite State Citizens) and show
itself disloyal to them by passing legislation in conformance with the
Fourteenth Amendment, Congress' power isextinguished. In this relation,
the U.S. supreme court said: 

"When the state has been guilty of no violation of its provisions; when
it has not made or enforced any law abridging the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the UnitedStates; when no one of its
departments has deprived any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process oflaw, or denied to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws; when on the contrary,
the laws of the state, are enacted by itslegislative, and construed by
its judicial, and administered by its executive departments recognize
and protect the rights of all persons, theamendment imposes no duty an
confers no power upon Congress." 
U.S. v. Harris, (1882) 106 U.S. 629, 632, 
1 S.Ct. 601, 27 L.Ed. 290.

In other words, when State martial law is imposed within the State to
enforce National martial law, Congress has no reason to exercise its
martial law powers. 

If a State has conformed to the new Order, there is no need for
Congress tointervene. And if a white Citizen has not obtained the
standing of a formerslaveby petitioning Congress for admittance to
venue and jurisdiction of theFourteenthAmendment (i.e. statutory
character of "person"), then Congress has no power over that individual
under this Clause (Amend. 14, Sec. 5). / 

With all that has been said about the Fourteenth Amendment in this
expos�, theultimate question remains: "Is the Fourteenth Amendment a
part of the UnitedStates?" Or, rather, "Is it constitutionally a part
of our organic law?" 

The original Resolution which proposed the Fourteenth Amendment to the
several States legislatures for ratification contained a Clause which
does not appear in the reprints of theUnitedStates Constitution: 

"Be it resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
UnitedStates of America in Congress assembled, (two thirds of
bothHousesconcurring). That the following Article be proposed to the
legislatures of the several States as an Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States, which, when ratified by three fourths of said
legislatures, shall be valid as a part of the Constitution, namely: -
Article XIV . . ." 
14 Stat. 358 (1866).

In looking into the Constitutionality of this Amendment (14th), we must
look to see who proposed it; who ratified it; and if the power was
actually vested in those bodies by the people of the United States of
America in national Constitution to lawfully do so. 

From the foregoing Preamble to the Resolution proposing the
FourteenthAmendment, we can see that Congress proposed it, and it was
intended that the several States legislatures would ratify it. 

There is a great deal of recorded history that shows the unscrupulous
way in which the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment was achieved.
The basic disloyalties, themartial law, and political usurpations that
took place after the Civil War are revealed by history to be: 

Military occupation of the several southern States under declaration by
Congress, that the southern State governments were not valid, even
though they had just been allowed to ratify the Thirteenth Amendment; 
Franchisement of non-citizens (basically Negroes) into the body
politic; 
Disfranchisement of white Citizens (members of the sovereignty) from
the bodypolitic; 
Institution, through a military government, of predominantly Negro
legislatures (whileNegroes were not citizens); and 
The ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment by these non-citizen
legislatures in the southern States, after the lawful legislatures
(which existed prior to militaryoccupation) had rejected this same
Amendment. 

There are no doubts that these are the historical facts. Let us now
take a look at the legal side of the question. 

We know several things about the Fourteenth Amendment in relation to
Congress and the prohibitions laid against Congress by the original
Constitution for the UnitedStates ofAmerica, (including the Bill of
Rights). We know what the Amendment was designed to do and that it does
the following things: 

It violates the Preamble, which defines the whole intent of all powers
granted to Congress, by introducing a foreign member into the sovereign
body. 
It is an "ex post facto law" punishing Southerners in many ways for
acts not necessarily illegal at the time of their commission. 
It is a "bill of attainder" (in its lesser form of a "bill of pains
andpenalties") depriving all southern slave holders of property without
trial. 
It deprived Southerners of property by unreasonable seizure and without
just compensation, bringing Congress beyond limitations set out by the
Fourth and FifthArticles in Amendment (Bill of Rights). 
It lays prohibitions upon the States beyond those known to the original
Constitution of theUnited States and makes inroads upon the
Constitutions of the severalStates, encroaching upon sovereignty
belonging to the people of the severalStates which is prohibited by
theTenth Article in Amendment (BillofRights). 
It created purely legislative "Tribunals" without respect to the
separation ofpowers. 
It extended Congress' "martial law power" allowing the emission of
"billsofcredit" andetc.. 
The list is too long to completely enumerate. (Referback within this
expos� to list more Constitutional violations) 

We know that the United States government is one of enumerated powers
only, and that specific prohibitions were placed on those powers by
Article I, Section 9 and theArticles of theBillofRights (as well as
other provisions of the UnitedStatesConstitution). 

Of course, the main points we are interested in are the prohibitions
laid onCongress. Congresshas no power to pass any "bill of attainder"
or "ex post factolaw" to make law which unreasonably deprives a Citizen
of "property" or deprives the Citizen of "security in his person
oreffects;" to encroach upon a State's sovereignty retained at the
adoption of theUnitedStatesConstitution, or to make any law taking
property for public use without justcompensation. 

The fact is, Congress exceeded the powers granted to it and violated
prohibitions laid against it (in several areas) and had absolutely no
right, power, or authority to propose such legislation and could only
claim an exception through a similarly unlawfulAct, theSecondSection of
theThirteenthAmendment. Thus we find that we will have to show
theThirteenth Amendment to be invalid and unconstitutional, andinfact,
not a part of the Constitution in order to judicially destroy
theFourteenthAmendment (at least with respect to the power of Congress
as regards the proposing the Fourteenth Amendment). 

But now let us take into consideration who actually claimed the power
to ratify theFourteenthAmendment, the State legislatures. We know
everyone in government claims theFourteenth Amendment is a part of the
Constitution because it was ratified according to the provisions of
Article V of the original U.S. Constitution which says that
threefourths of the legislatures may ratify an Amendment to the
Constitution and thus make the Amendment part of the organic law, but
can the legislatures of the several States constitutionally make
ratifications in all instances? 

According to the principles upon which our form of government is
founded and considering who originally ratified the Constitution, the
answer to this question must be in the "negative" as a matter of law.
We start to see the evidence in the law immediately with Article V of
theConstitutionfor the United States of America. 

". . . Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the year
onethousand eight hundred and eight shall in any manner effect the
first and fourthClauses in the Ninth Section of the firstArticle; and
that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal
Suffrage in theSenate."
Article V, Const. for U.S. of A..

Here we see two specific exceptions to the law of Amendment contained
inArticleV. Manytimes, the courts have ruled that when specific
exemption is provided in the Constitution, thatnone other exists. In
this case, that construction will not properlyapply, especially since
those exceptions applied both to the State legislature andConventions
ofPeople of the several States. 

When the construction of the Constitution is doubtful or the language
ambiguous, resort may be made to other portions of the Constitution and
finally to the "ConventionNotes" and the"FederalistPapers." Article V
contains two methods of amending the Constitution; 

". . . by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or
byConventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode
ofRatification may be proposed by the Congress: . . ." 
Article V, Const. for U.S. of A.

Why were the two modes of ratification provided for? Is it possible
that cases might arise where it was absolutely necessary for
Conventions of the several States to ratify an Amendment instead of the
several State legislatures? And if an Amendment required ratification
by Conventions of the people of the several States, could Congress
expect a lawful and constitutional ratification from the legislatures
of the several States? Furthermore, even if Congress could recommend
either mode ofratification, could the State legislatures lawfully and
constitutionally make this ratification when it affected the
Constitution of the State which created them? These are valid and
important questions which must be answered as a matter of, and
according to law, (in relation to Article V and thetwomodes of
ratification). These questions consequently leave the language
ofArticleV in somewhat of an ambiguous state. 

To find the answer to these important questions, we will start at the
beginning, thecreation of our government. Justice Taney in Dred Scott
v. Sandford / relates the history of the beginning of our government
and the meaning of the Preamble to the UnitedStates Constitution.
Thereinwe find (aswe do in the words of the Preamble) thatthe sovereign
people ("WethePeople") adopted [ratified] the Constitution and it was
on their authority (as the sovereign bodies, in their respectiveStates)
that theGeneralGovernment was formed (andthat it was formed for their
protection, as well as the protection of their posterity). 

Some might say that the Constitution for the United States of America
could as easily have been ratified by the legislatures of the several
States; but if this is true, whydoes history (as well as
theConstitution) reflect that it was ratified by the people
inConventions of the severalStatesinstead?/ The fact is, the
legislatures of the severalStates had no lawful authority to ratify the
UnitedStates Constitution. TheConvention related the legal reason why
the Constitution had to be ratified by the people instead of the
legislatures. The following remarks were made with reference to Article
VII, Constitution for the United States of America. 

". . . Madison thought them essential and remarked that otherwise in
cases of conflicts between laws of the States and of Congress, the
courts of the former might decide in favor of their own laws; and he
remarked further that it might be asserted that the Union was a mere
treaty among independent States, and therefore a breach of any one
article absolved the other parties from the whole obligation," 
8 Fed. Stat. Anno. 243.

Here, Madison thought the peoples ratification necessary to the
supremacy Clause ofArticle VI. Knowing this, (contrary to the ruling of
the supreme court of the UnitedStates in Neal v. Delaware /),
thesupremacyClause of the nationalConstitution could not be applied the
Amendments which made inroads into theConstitutions of the several
States (and which were only ratified by Statelegislatures). 

Question: "Is this why the several States have been coerced to amend
their own Constitutions consistent with national martial law
Amendments?" 

Question: "Is this why the provisional States, such as the provisional
StateofWashington, were induced into placing a provision in the
(so-called) StateConstitution making the United States Constitution the
Supreme Law of theLand?" [WashingtonConstitution (1889), Article I,
Section 2.] 

If the State Constitutions declare the national Constitution "supreme,"
then thesupremacyClause of the national Constitution will not come into
play in adjudication's concerning theCivilWarAmendments (and like
Amendments). 

If the State Constitutions adopt the provisions that are consistent
with theCivilWarAmendments (and like Amendments) then, again, the
application of supremacyClause of the national Constitution will not be
questioned concerning conflicts of law between theStates and the United
States, because there will be no conflict of law. Laterin the
Convention: 

"Governour Morris argued that, as no alteration could be made under
theConfederation without unanimous consent, and change in the proposed
Constitution not made in accordance with this provision, must be held
void by thejudges as unconstitutional, if the reference would be made
to the legislatures; while,if the reference should be made to the
people of the United States, the federalcompact may be altered by a
majority ofthem." 
8 Fed. Stat. Anno. 243.

Morris understood that the people were sovereign above the several
Statelegislatures. Finally,Madison made the most important legal
argument showing that the States legislatures were incompetent to
ratify the Constitution for the United States ofAmerica and this
argument still appliestoday. 

"Madison thought the legislatures clearly incompetent, for the very
changes proposed would make essential inroads on the State
Constitutions, and a legislature cannot change the Constitution under
which it exists. Thedifference between a system founded on the
legislature only and one founded on the people is, he said, that
between a league or treaty and aConstitution." 
8 Fed. Stat. Anno. 243, 244.

While all the other Conventioneers arguments related to the
ArticlesofConfederation, Madison was capable of showing the absolute
legal incompetence of the State legislatures to ratify the national
Constitution. If a Statelegislature allows inroads to be made upon the
Constitution under which it exists (byratification of a national
Constitution, much less an Amendment thereto), it is Constitutionally
incompetent to pass upon the legislation. This is consistent with the
principles of aConstitutional Republic where the institutions of
government cannot change the organic law of the people under which the
government legally exists. Only the sovereign body (the people) can act
upon such legislation because it is "organiclaw" (extraordinary
legislation), not mere ordinary legislation. 

We have seen the inroads that the Fourteenth Amendment made on the
Constitutions of the several States, whether they were southern or
northern. With the possible exception of one ortwoStates, this
Amendment (14th) made inroads into all State Constitutions under which
theStatelegislatures existed when they ratified theFourteenth
Amendment. Here, the reason for twomethods of ratification comes to
light in the first instance: 

It may be said that the "Notes" on the Convention are not a reliable
source of construction of the Constitution. And in certain cases, this
may be true. But not here! The supreme court (asinDredScott v.
Sandford, / [supra.]) has said that legislation most recent to the
adoption of the Constitution lays closest to the foundation of the
organic law and must be accorded the necessary respect due according to
the era of theirenactment. Obviously, this is true (considering that
such legislation is contemporary to the organic law), that is, it is
contemporary to a time when the original intent was foremost in the
minds of the Officials of government, both State and Federal. 

Article V had at least one primary purpose in the Constitution. In the
Convention itwas agreed that a provision should be made in the
Constitution so that the severalStates might add aBillofRights to the
U.S. Constitution as a condition of itsadoption. 

Pursuant to this proposition of the Convention (and with the
understanding that aBillofRights could be added), Conventions of the
People of the several States ratified the Constitution and proceeded to
propose Articles of the Bill of Rights to be addedaccordingly. 

In the Preamble to the Bill of Rights (seldom found reprinted in any
Constitution, whether printed by the federal government or private
parties), we find the first impression of the several States, as to the
purpose of Article V, Constitution for the United States ofAmerica. 

The Bill of Rights was ratified by the legislatures of the several
States; and of this there is nodoubt. Obviously, both Congress and the
several States legislatures believed they had the power to make the
ratification. When we look at the Preamble to the BillofRights, we see
under what circumstance the power was believed to exist: 

"THE Conventions of a number of the States, having at the time of their
adopting the Constitution, expressed a desire, in order to prevent
misconstruction or abuse of its powers, that further declarative and
restrictive clauses should be added: And as extending the ground of
public confidence in the Government will best insure the beneficent
ends of itsinstitution.
"RESOLVED by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
UnitedStates ofAmerica in Congress assembled, two thirds of the Houses,
that the following Articles be proposed to the Legislatures of the
severalStates as Amendments to the Constitution of the United States,
allor any of which Articles when ratified by three fourths of the
saidLegislatures, to be valid to all intents and purposes as part of
the saidConstitution. vis!
"ARTICLES in addition to, and Amendment of the Constitution of the
UnitedStates of America, proposed by Congress, and ratified by
theLegislatures of the several States, pursuant to the fifth Article of
the original Constitution." 
Preamble to the Bill of Rights, U.S. Constitution.

So the Bill of Rights (as ratified by the State legislatures) was
ratified with the intention of limiting the federal government to the
power granted to it, for the preservation of the powers of theseveral
States and the individual Citizen'snaturalrights. Here, the
legislatures of the several States did not attempt to expand the powers
ofCongress (by inroads into their own respectiveConstitutions), but,
instead, ratified the added assurance that Congress would not usurp its
powers in deprivation of the powers of the several States or the people
of the several States respectively. [Articles Nine and Ten
inAmendment]. 

If we read Hans v. Louisiana, / wefind that the State legislatures
again ratified anAmendment of the United States Constitution with the
same purpose, that is theEleventhAmendment. Not until the
ThirteenthAmendment were the powers of Congress so 

widely expanded, or for thatmatter, expanded at all by an
allegedAmendment to theConstitution. Going back to the assertions of
Madison in theConvention; "Where did the legislatures of the
severalStates derive power to ratify any Amendment which made inroads
into the Constitution under which they existed?" The power, in itself,
would be"nugatory." 

Obviously, Article V provides for ratification of an Amendment by
Conventions of the People of the several States for occasions such as
this. In fact, the principles upon which the federalConstitution was
founded absolutely demand that such Amendments be ratified by the
people rather than the State legislatures. No legislative body has the
power to change the organic law and its relation to the sovereign body
(Nation) that created it. Only the sovereign people, themselves, have
the power to add to its members a new class of persons. 

As a result, we see that no competent body purposed nor ratified
theFourteenthAmendment (or any like Amendment affecting the sovereign
body), thatsaidAmendment is not a part of theConstitution for the
United States of America, andthat the Amendment (and like Amendments)
areabsolutely unconstitutional in thisrespect. They are not Amendments
of our Constitution. 

Not only do the Amendments discussed herein (such as the
FourteenthAmendment) make inroads into State Constitutions (especially
where theStates have a Bill of Rights similar to that of
theConstitution for the United States ofAmerica), but the several
Statelegislatures are also prohibited by "thepeople" intheConstitution
for the UnitedStates of America, itself, from enacting (ratifying) such
legislation into law. 

Article I, Section 10, Constitution for the United States of America,
laysprohibitions on the several States (similar to those laid against
the United States government in ArticleI, Section 9, Constitution for
the United States of America) withone further prohibition; the several
States have no power to violate the"ObligationsofContract" by laws
enacted in the State. As we previously discussed, many "bills of sale"
(executedContracts) that were violated by theThirteenthAmendment were
sanctioned to be violated by adoption of theFourteenthAmendment. 

Not only are the State legislatures prohibited by their own respective
StateConstitutions from passing such legislation, but they are also
prohibited by theConstitution for the United States of America from
passing such legislation into law, Organic or otherwise. We find no
repeal of those original prohibitions at any time before or after the
alleged adoption of the Thirteenth orFourteenthAmendments. 

The bottom line is that the State legislatures were, and are,
incompetent to ratify theFourteenth Amendment for no power of
ratification having existed in the bodies to whom it waspresented. 

Another point to address is the 14th Amendment to the Constitution for
the UnitedStates ofAmerica is not an "Amendment," it is a "Revision." 

Case law is evidently unanimous in support of the view that there is a
distinction of substance between the concept of "Amendment" and
"Revision" and that some proposed constitutional changes can only be
accomplished by revision. / The line between changes which are
permissible as"Amendments" and those which must necessarily be
"Revisions" cannot be drawn with precision. Ingeneral, changes which
are "few and simple andindependent" can be considered Amendments,
whereas "sweeping change" requires the Revision process. / The case of
McFadden is instructive on the distinction between "Amendment" and
"Revision." Quoting from an earlier case, the McFadden court discussed
revisions made by a Convention in which "the entire sovereignty of the
people isrepresented . . ." Id. at 789. 

"The character and extent of a constitution that may be framed by that
body is freed from an limitations other than those contained in the
constitution of theUnitedStates. . . the very term 'constitution'
implies an instrument of a permanent and abiding nature, and the
provisions contained therein for its revision indicated the will of the
people that the underlying principles upon which it rests, as well as
the substantial entirety of the instrument, shall be of a like
permanent and abiding nature. On the other hand, thesignificance of the
term 'amendment' implies such an addition or change within the lines of
the original instrument as will effect an improvement, orbetter carry
out the purpose for which it was framed." /
McFadden v. Jordan, 196 P.2d 787, 789

The court held that the measure in question was so "far reaching
andmultifarious" that it was revisory rather than amendatory in nature.
/ The court listed numerous sections of the Constitution which the
measure in question wouldaffect./ This review demonstrated: 

". . . the wide and diverse range of subject matters proposed to be
voted upon, and the revisional effect which it would necessarily have
on our basic plan ofgovernment. Theproposal is offered as a single
amendment but it obviously ismultifarious. It does not give the people
an opportunity to express approval or disapproval severally as to each
major change suggested. . . ."
McFadden v. Jordan, 196 P.2d 787, 796-97

In Adams v. Gunter, / the court opined that amendment as distinct from
revision authority "includes only the power to amend any section in
such a manner that such Amendment, if approved, would be complete
within itself, relate to one subject and not substantially affect any
other section of Articles of the Constitution or require further
Amendments to the Constitution to accomplish itspurpose." / 

The above authorities quoted merely suggest factors that should be
considered in determining whether a proposed constitutional change is
"amendatory" or "revisory." The14th Amendment addresses multifarious
issues ranging from status of citizenship, disqualification of
representatives, 

taxes, apportionment of representatives, and the debt of the United
States. And taking into consideration what we have studied,
the14thAmendment has altered more than one Article of theConstitution
for the UnitedStates of America. 

The bottom line is that Congress was and is incompetent to make
"Revisions" to theConstitution for the United States of America, that
the 14thAmendment is absolutely unconstitutional and therefore
"nullandvoid" ab initio for no power of "Revision" exist in
theCongress. 

We cannot emphasize enough that, as a matter of law, there is
noFourteenthAmendment to the Constitution for the United States and
that even if therewere, it would have absolutely no lawful application
to the individual free whiteCitizens of the several States. 

/ / / / / / 

The Law Martial 

Introduction 

In this expos�, we have briefed the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution for theUnitedStates of America and the powers acquired by
Congress thereunder to impose LawMartial upon the States. What most
people don't realize is that they have been under Martial Law Rule for
over60years. / 

The case of Ex parte Milligan, / is where our study of the Law-Martial
begins wherein theUnited States supreme court lists and explains
threeforms of Martial-Law. Like it or not, we have to deal with these
three forms: 

1.Full Martial Law. 

2.Martial Law Proper. 

3.Martial Law Rule. 

Full Martial Law is when a Declaration of Martial Law is issued,
andmilitarytroops are put in the streets to control a region or
district with military force. Thefederal armed forces with theNational
Guard are on every street corner enforcing military jurisdiction on
every Citizen of theNation. This form is only supposed to be used when
the Nation is at War, a declared War byCongress, and should only be
used on foreign soil unless the country is actually invaded by some
foreign power or to put down an armed rebellion too large to be dealt
with by the civil authorities orpowers of our constitutionalgovernment. 

The first indication of imposition of Full Martial Law (with the
exception of the troops actually in the streets wielding their military
power), is the suspension of the constitutional civil judicial power to
enforce the rights of liberty with the privilege of theWrit of Habeas
Corpus. This is clear from the American Constitutions (both State
andfederal) which generally provide that this great bulwark ofliberty
may not be suspended except upon declaration of the legislature that
the public safety require it due to rebellion or invasion. [For
example, Const. for U.S. of A., Article 1, Section 9, Clause 2.] The
cause that allows suspension of the privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus is the only cause for imposition of Full Martial Law. 

Martial Law Proper is the law governing the internal operation of the
armedforces. It is this law that is followed to control military
command of armed forces. For example, it is the law used to enforce an
"Order" of a Sergeant upon a Private. It is the law that is enforced by
Courts Martial. 

Martial-Law Rule is the law of necessity and emergency. This form
allows a domestic use of martial law powers, but only for as long as
the necessity oremergencyexist. The most dangerous thing about this
form of Martial Law is that this form of Martial Law is used during
times of peace. 

Called by some writers on the subject (and termed such by a
fewConstitutions)-the"LawMartial," this jurisdiction has existed since
the UnitedStates Constitution was firstestablished. The Congress and
the President of theUnitedStates have argued since the beginning on how
far the Law-Martial power can be exercised by both branches of the
government. TheUnitedStates Constitution and the State Constitutions
authorize the power to exist, but they do not necessarily define its
proper or legitimate use. Should the Law Martial power be abused by
theExecutive and/or the Legislative Branches (when the Judicial Branch
will not check the abuse of the LawMartial powers), the people (being
confused) become alarmed and begin to disobey theStatutes authorized
under the powers of the Law Martial. 

Any one of the three forms (used strictly for the purpose they were
structured for) would be (according to the United States supreme Court)
constitutional. It appears that it is the third form of the Law Martial
[Martial Law Rule] that could be and is used to destroy the letter and
spirit of the original UnitedStatesConstitution. It is also the
thirdform [Martial Law Rule] that can be administered as to lead the
people to believe that the Government is administering constitutional
law when in fact, the Government is administering Martial-Law Rule
under the appearance of constitutional law. 

Try as the government may, the people smell a rat. The "Federal Tax
Laws" is the first line of disobedience by the people. The people for
the last fifty years have in large numbers disobeyed thetaxlaws
(particularity the "Personal Federal Income Tax") whichis claimed by
these people to be"un-Constitutional." Many have come forth with their
claims to the un-Constitutionality of thetaxlaws and have failed. Have
they failed because they have not understood that the"FederalPersonal
Income Tax" is within a military venue and is enforced under
aMartialLawJurisdiction? The Government seizes their property without
"Court Orders." TheGovernment seizes their bank accounts without "Court
Orders" and the Government seizes their wages without "CourtOrders."
The people just can't seem to grasp the source of power that
theGovernment is exercising. If they read General Order No. 100 by
Abraham Lincoln, they will discover the source of their problem. 

============================= 

INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE
FIELD

The following material is part of Instructions For The Government of
Armies of the United States in the Field, prepared byFrancis Lieber,
promulgated as GeneralOrders No. 100 by President Lincoln,
(24April1863). General Orders No.100 can be found published in the book
The Law of Armed Conflicts, Third Ed., Edited by Dietrich Schindler and
Jiri Toman, wherein its inclusion was explained as follows: 

The Lieber Instructions represent the first attempt to codify the laws
ofwar. They were prepared during the American Civil War
byFrancisLieber, then a professor of Columbia College in New York,
revisedby a board of officers and promulgated byPresidentLincoln.
Although they were binding only on the forces of theUnitedStates, they
correspond to a great extend to the laws and customs of war existing at
that time. The Lieber Instructions strongly influenced the further
codification of the laws of war and the adoption of similar regulations
by other states. They formed the origin of the project of an
international convention on the laws of war presented to the Brussels
Conference in1874 (No. 2) and stimulated the adoption of the Hague
Conventions on land warfare of 1899 and 1907 (No's. 7 and 8). - [The
Law of ArmedConflicts, p. 3]. 

The Law of Armed Conflicts also lists as sources of the published text
in English asfollows: 

Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in
theField, prepared by Francis Lieber, LL.D., Originally Issued as
GeneralOrders No. 100, Adjutant General's Office 1863, Washington1898,
Government Printing Office; Francis Lieber, Contributions to Political
Science, Including Lectures on the Constitution of the United States
and Other Papers, Miscellaneous Writings, Vol.II,1881, p. 245; Wilson -
Tucker pp. VI-XXXVI; Friedman. pp.158-186. 

For the purpose of this expos�, we will quote only those Articles of
the LieberInstructions (with comments) that affect us on a day to day
basis. 

============================= 

SECTION I 

Martial Law - Military jurisdiction - Military necessity - Retaliation 

Art. 1. A place, district, or country occupied by an enemy stands, in
consequence of the occupation, under the Martial Law of the invading or
occupying army, whether any proclamation declaring Martial Law, or any
public warning to the inhabitants, has been issued or not. Martial Law
is the immediate and direct effect and consequence of occupation or
conquest. The presence of a hostile army proclaims its Martial Law. 

NOTE: Is there a hostile army presence in every State in the Union,
enforcingMartial-Law jurisdiction on the Citizens of the severalStates?
Has America been taken by conquest? According to the United States
Supreme Court inTexasv.White, (1868) 7Wall.(U.S.)721, the court ruled
the Civil War was not awar of conquest. If the civilwar was not a war
of conquest, then we are under one of the forms of the LawMartial. We
must be under occupation. Theabove Article does not say the Nation has
to be under occupation by a foreign nation's army. In and after the
Civil War, Citizens of this Nation were under the Law-Martial and
occupation of the Union Army. The fact is, we must prove today that the
several States are under occupation by a domestic army to prove that
the Citizens are under theLawMartialJurisdiction. 
Citizens see this domestic Army of Occupation every day, but don't
recognize them as the Military Police. This domestic Army is on every
street of every State in this Union. Citizens don't recognize this Army
because the Army hides behind a Vail of secrecy, what appears to be a
civilian uniform. To unveil this Army, the people need to look up the
StateStatutes on the term: "Peace Officer." Every State in the Union
has a Statute establishing "Peace Officers." The term: "Peace Officer"
in these Statutes means: the Military Police of theState. The "Military
Police of the State" is not the State Militia. 
Examine your State, County, and City Police. All of the civil police
officers are statutorily defined as a single form of "Officer," a"Peace
Officer." Do local police units have military ranks such as
"Sergeants," "Captains," "Lieutenants," and"Quartermasters?" Have you
ever heard the police refer to people as "civilians?" What National
flag and/or State Flag is displayed at your local police department?
TheCounty Sheriff Deputies in Oregon wear the yellow fringe National
Flag patch on their uniforms. Are you beginning to recognize the troops
of occupation on every street of this Union? Are you under occupation?
When a local policeman enforces a curfew (as they are across this
Nationtoday), is the policeman enforcing the curfew as a
Sheriff'sDeputy, State Policeman, or City Policeman, or are all three
enforcing the curfew as "Peace Officers" i.e. "State Military Police?"
The answer falls in the Statute or Ordinance they are enforcing.
"Curfew" is strictly under aMartial Law jurisdiction. How many other
State Statutes, orCounty/CityOrdinances have been enacted by the State
Legislators, County Commissioners, and City Councils, under Martial Law
Jurisdiction? 
One more point. The "Military Police" must have a "MilitaryVenue" to
perform as the "State Military Police." The State Regional Areas under
Metro-Government provide the Military Venue for the Peace Officers to
enforce Martial Law Jurisdiction. Now, can you understand that the
Nation is under occupation? 

Art. 2. Martial Law does not cease during the hostile occupation,
except by special proclamation, ordered by the commander in chief; or
by special mention in the treaty of peace concluding the war, when the
occupation of a place or territory continues beyond the conclusion of
peace as one of the conditions of the same. 

NOTE: There is no treaty of peace between the Union and the
severalStates that is know of and the end of full martial law was
finally declared by withdrawal of troops in the streets, but repeal of
all forms of the lawmartial has never been declared. 

Art. 3. Martial Law in a hostile country consists in the suspension, by
the occupying militaryauthority, of the criminal and civil law, and of
the domestic administration and government in the occupied place or
territory, and in the substitution of military rule and force for the
same, as well as in the dictation of general laws, as far as military
necessity requires this suspension, substitution, or dictation. 

The commander of the forces may proclaim that the administration of all
civil and penal law shall continue either wholly or in part, as in
times of peace, unless otherwise ordered by the military authority. 

NOTE: Under the Law-Martial, only the criminal jurisdiction of a
MilitaryCourt is the recognized law. But as Article Three says, "the
civil courts can continue wholly or in part as long as the civil
jurisdiction does not violate the Military orders laid down by the
Commander in Chief or one of his Commanders." By this means; a military
venue, jurisdiction, and authority are imposed upon the occupied
populace under disguise of the ordinary civil courts and officers of
the occupied district or region, because the so-called civil
authorities in an occupied district, or region, only act at the
pleasure of a military authority. 
It should also be noted here that the several State Legislatures,
CountyBoards ofCommissioners, and City Councils, are constantly
legislating to please the edicts of the federal government (the
occupying force) and that their legislation, in this sense, isnot an
exercise ofStatesovereignty, but instead, a compliance with edicts of
the militaryforce which occupies the several States and consequently
are edicts ofMartialLaw Rule. 

Art. 4. Martial Law is simply military authority exercised in
accordance with the laws andusage's of war. Military oppression is not
Martial Law: It is the abuse of the power which that law confers. As
Martial Law is executed by military force, it is incumbent upon those
who administer it to be strictly guided by the principles of justice,
honor, and humanity - virtues adorning a soldier even more than other
men, for the very reason that he possesses the power of his arms
against the unarmed. 

NOTE: What is being said is abuse of the Martial Law power is not
considered MartialLaw. We agree. It's called TREASON. (SeeArticleIII,
Sec. 3, U.S. Const.). Meanwhile (under this principle), the Officers
operating under MartialLaw Rule are required to act in strict
accordance with Statutes andRegulations under which MartialLaw Rule is
imposed. That is why "StatutoryTribunals" (courts) will declare the
acts of "PeaceOfficers" statutorily defective in some cases, but at the
same time, refuse to impose constitutionallimitations. Basically, when
a Tribunal declares that a"Peace Officer" failed to follow the
requirements of a Statute, what that Tribunal has done is declared that
the "Peace Officer" failed to follow the Rules of War while exercising
aMartialLaw power and therefore, was not justified in his acts. 

Art. 5. Martial Law should be less stringent in places and countries
fully occupied and fairlyconquered. Much greater severity may be
exercised in places or regions where actual hostilitiesexist, or are
expected and must be prepared for. Its most complete sway is allowed -
even in the commander's own country - when face to face with the enemy,
because of the absolute necessities of the case, and of the paramount
duty to defend the country against invasion. To save the country is
paramount to all other considerations. 

NOTE: The above Article Five can also be understood to save a
Martial-Law system as paramount to all other considerations. As long as
the system survives without armed hostility against it, Martial Law is
imposed in the milder form ofMartial Law Rule, but the minute any armed
hostility is raised or threatened against the occupying force,
fullMartialLaw is again imposed with troops in the streets to enforce
MartialLaw authority. Dothe Los Angeles and Chicago riots ring a bell?
How about Waco and RubyRidge? 

Art. 6. All civil and penal law shall continue to take its usual course
in the enemy'splaces and territories under Martial Law, unless
interrupted or stopped by order of the occupying military power; but
all the functions of the hostile government- legislative executive, or
administrative - whether of ageneral, provincial, or local character,
cease under Martial Law, or continue only with the sanction, or, if
deemed necessary, the participation of the occupier or invader. 

NOTE: Thus, it appears that the State Legislatures and local
governmental units in the several States are still operating under a
Constitutional authority, when in fact, they are operating at the
pleasure of, or with the sanction of, the Commander in Chief of the
occupying force. Take a look at the legislation and court decisions in
your State and you will find that more than not, the legislation and
court decisions are designed to please the edict of the federal
government in matters such as the CivilWarAmendments. 

Art. 7. Martial Law extends to property, and to persons, whether they
are subjects of the enemy or aliens to that government. 

NOTE: All the "non-resident alien" pleaders can trash their argument.
Underany of the three forms of the Law-Martial, it just doesn'tmatter. 

Art. 8. Consuls, among American and European nations, are not
diplomaticagents. Nevertheless, their offices and persons will be
subjected to MartialLaw in cases of urgent necessityonly: their
property and business are not exempted. Any delinquency they commit
against the established military rule may be punished as in the case of
any other inhabitant, and such punishment furnishes no reasonable
ground for international complaint. 

NOTE: All the "Ambassadors of God" pleaders just got trashed
byArticleEight. 

Art. 9. The functions of Ambassadors, Ministers, or other diplomatic
agents accredited by neutral powers to the hostile government, cease,
so far as regards the displaced government; but the conquering or
occupying power usually recognizes them as temporarily accredited to
itself. 

Art. 10. Martial Law affects chiefly the police and collection of
public revenue and taxes, whether imposed by the expelled government or
by the invader, and refers mainly to the support and efficiency of the
army, its safety, and the safety of its operations. 

NOTE: As we have said, the Federal Personal Income Tax is collected
under a MilitaryVenue within a Martial-Law jurisdiction. Federal
Reserve Notes areMilitaryScrip circulated within a MilitaryVenue. The
problem is the people don't understand how the entire United States is
covered by a Military Venue. The first MilitaryVenue covering the
entire United States was brought into existence through the Social
Security Act. Under the Social Security Act, there was brought into
existence Ten Federal Regional Areas. These ten federal regional areas
are the same as a military base. It is not unconstitutional to
circulate "military scrip" on a militarybase as the base is considered
to be a military venue. "Militaryscrip" cannot circulate in the civil
jurisdiction of the several States. To get around this
Constitutionalbar, theCongress (via the Social Security Act), created
TenMilitaryVenues, called "FederalRegional Areas." Theproblem the
Congress realized was, while Congress could restructure the
GovernmentAgencies into these Federal Regional Areas, thepeople could
not be identified to be within this MilitaryVenue by their ownconsent.
The solution was to create another MilitaryVenue which would trick the
people to voluntarily accept recognition that they are within a
MilitaryVenue. Congress solved this problem by creating the ZIP CODE. 
The "zip code" divides the United States into Ten Military Venues
called "NationalAreas." When a Citizen receives mail from an agency of
the federalgovernment (such as the I.R.S.), in the return address of
the federal agency is the district within the regional area the letter
is sent from, and on the address of the"Citizen" it was sent to is the
national area [ZIP] in which he received the correspondence from the
I.R.S.. In other words, the correspondence was sent from one of the
federal regional areas [militaryvenue] to one of the National Areas
[anothermilitary venue]. "Taxing Districts" are established within one
of theFederalRegional Areas, which places the collection of taxes under
amartiallawjurisdiction. 
Military commanders can set up "taxing districts" in an occupied
region. Inthe UnitedStates, the President (who is the Commander in
Chief of theMilitary) has been authorized to set up Internal Revenue
TaxingDistricts, ever since the Civil War. [see26 U.S.C. � 7621]. 

Art. 11. The law of war does not only disclaim all cruelty and bad
faith concerning engagements concluded with the enemy during the war,
but also the breaking of stipulations solemnly contracted by the
belligerents in time of peace, and avowedly intended to remain in force
in case of war between the contracting powers. 

It disclaims all extortion's and other transactions for individual
gain; all acts of private revenge, or connivance at such acts. 

Offenses to the contrary shall be severely punished, and especially so
if committed by officers. 

NOTE: Here is the basis for Title 42 suits (Title 42, United States
Code), andthe reason why 99% of Title 42 suits fail. The Title 42
guru's never get the point. They are trying to sue what they call
"ExecutiveOfficers" (assuming these Officers are in the
civiljurisdiction of a State or the civiljurisdiction of the United
States [who, in reality, are "Military Officers" (Peace Officers)
protected from liability for Constitutional violations as they are not
bound to the Articles of the Constitutions (State or Federal) but
rather, are bound to the RulesofWar]). As an example, President
Clintonsays he can't be forced to court by a woman who is suing him as
he is protected in his capacity as Commander in Chief. Of course, the
Articles of theFederalConstitution or the Articles of the State
Constitutions, (and their BillofRights) do not apply to Officers within
a Military Venue. TheseOfficers (appearing as "Executive Officers" of
the States orFederalGovernment) are"PeaceOfficers" and can only be
charged if they violate Article 6 of theseOrders, (or any other
Articles under this Order regulating theirduties). Under Military
Rules, Title42 suitors have no Constitutional charges to bring against
a MilitaryOfficer under the Rulesof Occupation. 

Art. 13. Military jurisdiction is of two kinds: First, that which is
conferred and defined bystatute; second, that which is derived from the
common law of war. Militaryoffenses under thestatute law must be tried
in the manner therein directed; but military offenses which do not come
within the statute must be tried and punished under the common law of
war. The character of the courts which exercise these jurisdictions
depends upon the local laws of each particular country. 

In the armies of the United States, the first is exercised by
courts-martial, while cases which do not come within the "Rules and
Articles of War," or the jurisdiction conferred by statute on
courtsmartial, are tried by military commissions. 

NOTE: As you can see, some regulations are by Acts of Congress and some
regulations are the acts of the Commander in Chief (or one of
hisCommanders). The most interesting part of this Article is the
reference to the "common law of war." Is this the "federal common law"
the federalcourts are referring to? 

Art. 15. Military necessity admits of all direct destruction of life or
limb of armedenemies, andof other persons whose destruction is
incidentally unavoidable in the armed contests of the war; itallows of
the capturing of every armed enemy, and every enemy of importance to
the hostilegovernment, or of peculiar danger to the captor; itallows of
all destruction of property, andobstruction of the ways and channels of
traffic, travel, or communication, and of all withholding ofsustenance
or means of life from theenemy; of the appropriation of whatever an
enemy's country affords necessary for the subsistence and safety of the
army, and of such deception as does not involve the breaking of good
faith either positively pledged, regarding agreements entered into
during the war, or supposed by the modern law of war to exist. Men who
take up arms against one another in public, war do not cease on this
account to be moral beings, responsible to one another and to God. 

NOTE: Article 15 sounds like the creed of the I.R.S.. Under this
Article, would the I.R.S. be exercising "Federal Common Law?" 

Art. 16. Military necessity does not admit of cruelty - that is, the
infliction of suffering for the sake of suffering or for revenge, nor
of maiming or wounding except infight, nor of torture to
extortconfessions. It does not admit of the use of poison in anyway,
nor of the wanton devastation of a district. It admits of deception,
but disclaims acts of perfidy; and, in general, military necessity does
not include any act of hostility which makes the return to peace
unnecessarily difficult. 

NOTE: GRANT, Sherman, and bloody Buttler must have missed reading
Article 16. 
This Article admits that it is perfectly fine to deceive the occupied
populace into believing they are governed by their own civil
government, while in reality, they are being governed behind the scenes
by a militaryforce. Such deception provides the greatest opportunity
for military occupation without hostility (under the pretense that no
occupation or hostility exists). Simply put, if you can control peoples
minds, youdon't have to control their bodies. One who doesn't believe
he lost his liberty will never break out in open hostility to restore
it. Such deception provides the maximum amount of control of the
occupied region with the minimum expenditure ofresources, and is geared
to avoid "any act of hostility which makes the return to peace (or the
appearance of peace) unnecessarily difficult." 

Art. 17. War is not carried on by arms alone. It is lawful to starve
the hostile belligerent, armed or unarmed, so that it leads to the
speedier subjection of the enemy. 

NOTE: Is Article 17 justification for the depression of 1929?
Justification for leading people to believe they cannot work or survive
without being a member ofSocialSecurity? Justification for leading the
people to believe that they cannot function without permission of
government officials at every turn? Justification for depriving any
aspect ofLife, Liberty, or Property (pursuit of happiness), without the
dueprocess of law required by constitutional limitations, both State
andfederal? 

Art. 18. When a commander of a besieged place expels the noncombatants,
inorder to lessen the number of those who consume his stock of
provisions, it is lawful, though an extreme measure, todrive them back,
so as to hasten on the surrender. 

NOTE: Is this authority to regulate the farmers to bring about
theirsurrender? 

Art. 22. Nevertheless, as civilization has advanced during the last
centuries, sohas likewise steadily advanced, especially in war on land,
the distinction between the private individual belonging to a hostile
country and the hostile country itself, with its men in arms. The
principle has been more and more acknowledged that the unarmed citizen
is to be spared in person, property, and honor as much as the
exigencies of war will admit. 

NOTE: Article 22 must have been written for the cowards who live in
fear of the occupiers and the people. 

Art. 26. Commanding generals may cause the magistrates and civil
officers of the hostilecountry to take the oath of temporary allegiance
or an oath of fidelity to their own victoriousgovernment or rulers, and
they may expel everyone who declines to do so. Butwhether they do so or
not, the people and their civil officers owe strict obedience to them
as long as they hold sway over the district or country, at the peril of
their lives. 

NOTE: Article 26 is a mouth full. The "Order" that the StateOfficials
is take an Oath to uphold the Fourteenth Amendment, or be expelled from
office, comestomind. Isn'tstrict obedience of the StateOfficials what
the United States Supreme Court demands today? Today, we don't have
StateOfficials with the guts to stand up to the federal power, butthere
was a man in the 1800's who did stand up: 
Toombs, Robert Augustus (1810-1885), served in the United States
Congress before the Civil War and then became Confederate Secretary
ofState. Toombs refused to swear allegiance to the government of the
United States after the war and lost hiscitizenship. 
There are still a few men today who place "Honor" above personal safety
asMr.Toombsdid. 
To whom, or to what have the Officials in your State sworn allegiance
to in order to enter office? Your first clue should come from the fact
that they executed a voter registration card, (regulated under
authority of the UnitedStates) to enter into a (so-called) State
Office. 

=========================
SECTION II
Public and private property of the enemy - Protectionof persons, and
especially of women, of religion, the arts andsciences - Punishment of
crimes against the inhabitants of hostile countries.

Art. 31. A victorious army appropriates all public money, seizes all
public movable property until further direction by its government, and
sequesters for its own benefit or of that of its government all the
revenues of real property belonging to the hostile government or
nation. The title to such real property remains in abeyance during
military occupation, and until the conquest is made complete. 

NOTE: All movable property, real property, public money. Sounds like
theI.R.S. confiscating all the Citizens' property for their master,
theCongress of theUnitedStates. 

Art. 34. As a general rule, the property belonging to churches, to
hospitals, orother establishments of an exclusively charitable
character, to establishments ofeducation, or foundations for the
promotion of knowledge, whether public schools, universities, academies
of learning or observatories, museums of the fine arts, or of
ascientific character such property is not to be considered public
property in the sense ofparagraph 31; but it may be taxed or used when
the public service may require it. 

NOTE: Look at the Churches, Schools, etc, of today. If they don't
preach orteach government doctrine, are they not harassed and face
confiscation of theirproperty? Andare they not put up to the public as
less than trueAmericans? 

Art. 37. The United States acknowledge and protect, in hostile
countries occupied by them, religion and morality; strictly private
property; the persons of theinhabitants, especially those ofwomen: and
the sacredness of domestic relations. Offenses to the contrary shall be
rigorouslypunished. 

This rule does not interfere with the right of the victorious invader
to tax the people or theirproperty, to levy forced loans, to billet
soldiers, or to appropriate property, especially houses, lands, boats
or ships, and churches, for temporary and military uses. 

NOTE: The FBI sure didn't read this article when they killed men,
women, and children at Waco and Ruby Ridge. 
Notice that a part of the martial law is to levy taxes (for which
taxing districts may be set up), and to levy forced loans (for which
instruments of debt may be issued andcirculated). 
The President has been setting up taxing districts called
"internalrevenuedistricts" starting with the Civil War and continuing
to date (26U.S.C. � 7621). Theestablishment of revenue districts by the
president (presumably as commander-in-chief) was initially enacted to
administer the first"income taxes" in the United States, to provide
revenue to execute the Civil War. The "Act" to provide the increased
revenue from imports to pay interest on the publicdebt, and for other
purposes, was approved August 5, 1861, Ch.45,��49,50,51, 12 Stat. 292,
309-310. 
Paper money was also issued as a war measure in the Civil War to force
loans upon the American populace through legal tender laws. Those
forced loans continue to be imposed under the Federal Reserve Act
andthe legal tender statutes requiring theiracceptance.
TheFourteenthAmendment in the Fourth Section further protects the
inviolability of these forced loans and the Federal Reserves Notes by
declaring that the public debt incurred by the Civil War (or by law)
may not bequestioned. 

Art. 39. The salaries of civil officers of the hostile government who
remain in the invaded territory, and continue the work of their office,
and can continue it according to the circumstances arising out of the
war such as judges, administrative or police officers, officers of city
or communal governments - are paid from the public revenue of the
invaded territory, until the military government has reason wholly or
partially to discontinue it. Salaries or incomes connected with purely
honorary titles are alwaysstopped. 

NOTE: Under occupation, the judges, police, etc., can get paid for
committing treason by adhering to the occupying force and imposing
martiallawmeasures. 

Art. 42. Slavery, complicating and confounding the ideas of property
(that is of athing), andof personality (that is of humanity), exists
according to municipal or locallaw only. The law ofnature and nations
has never acknowledged it. The digest of the Roman law enacts the early
dictum of the pagan jurist, that "so far as the law of nature is
concerned, all men are equal." Fugitivesescaping from a country in
which they were slaves, villains, or serfs, into another country, have,
for centuries past, been held free and acknowledged free by judicial
decisions ofEuropeancountries, even though the municipal law of the
country in which the slave had taken refuge acknowledged slavery within
its own dominions. 

Art. 43. Therefore, in a war between the United States and a
belligerent which admits ofslavery, if a person held in bondage by that
belligerent be captured by or come as a fugitive under the protection
of the military forces of the United States, such person is immediately
entitled to the rights and privileges of a freeman. To return such
person into slavery would amount to enslaving a freeperson, and neither
the United States nor any officer under their authority can enslave any
humanbeing. Moreover, a person so made free by the law of war is under
the shield of the law ofnations, and the former owner orState can have,
by the law of postliminy, no belligerent lien or claim of service. 

NOTE: Now you know why Lincoln had to start the Civil-War. WITHOUT THE
MARTIAL LAW JURISDICTION, HE COULD NOT FREE THE-SLAVES! 
Articles 42 and 43, clearly serve as military grounds for
Lincoln'sEmancipationProclamation, and Congress's subsequent enactments
(withthe help of so-called State legislatures) of the Civil War
Amendments as additional militarymeasures. The Civil Rights Acts
enacted by Congress under the"PowerClauses" of these martial law
Amendments, are also military measures. Thisexplains why "the people"
were never asked to ratify the Civil War Amendments. They would be
imposed by irresistible military force and their consultation was
neither sought norallowed. All of these measures (governed by the rules
of war [martiallaw]) remain in effect in the United States. 

Art. 44. All wanton violence committed against persons in the invaded
country, all destruction of property not commanded by the authorized
officer, all robbery, allpillage or sacking, even after taking a place
by main force, all rape, wounding, maiming, or killing of such
inhabitants, are prohibited under the penalty of death, or such other
severe punishment as may seem adequate for the gravity of the offense. 

A soldier, officer or private, in the act of committing such violence,
and disobeying a superior ordering him to abstain from it, may be
lawfully killed on the spot by such superior. 

NOTE: Sounds good, but what if the commander forgets to tell the troops
to abstain from rape, killing, or maiming? 
This is the kind of military rule that administrative regulation is
made of. Ifthe Officer acts under Orders, he may act against the
populace under such Orders so long as he acts in the manner specified.
The only complaint that will be heard of a person affected,isaComplaint
that the Officer did not act according to his Orders
(administrativeregulations), but constitutional considerations are
treated as"irrelevant" under military rule of the occupyingforce. 

Art. 46. Neither officers nor soldiers are allowed to make use of their
position or power in the hostile country for private gain, not even for
commercial transactions otherwise legitimate. Offenses to the contrary
committed by commissioned officers will be punished with cashiering or
such other punishment as the nature of the offense mayrequire; if by
soldiers, they shall be punished according to the nature of the
offense. 

NOTE: Congress needs to read this. Are they not considered "Officers"
under martial-law jurisdiction? 

Art. 47. Crimes punishable by all penal codes, such as arson, murder,
maiming, assaults, highway robbery, theft, burglary, fraud, forgery,
and rape, if committed by anAmerican soldier in ahostile country
against its inhabitants, are not only punishable as at home, but in all
cases in which death is not inflicted, the severer punishment shall
bepreferred. 

NOTE: This rule confuses the occupied populace into believing they
still have control of their government under their own local law by
leaving it in effect so far as the occupying force allows it.
Consequently, a populace that has been governed bymartiallaw for
decades can loose sight of the fact that they are being governed
bymartial law. 

============================ 

SECTION III 

Deserters - Prisoners of war - Hostages - Booty on thebattlefield

Art. 49. A prisoner of war is a public enemy armed or attached to the
hostile army for activeaid, who has fallen into the hands of the
captor, either fighting or wounded, onthe field or in thehospital, by
individual surrender or by capitulation. 

All soldiers, of whatever species of arms; all men who belong to the
rising enmasse of the hostile country; all those who are attached to
the army for its efficiency and promote directly the object of the war,
except such as are hereinafter provided for; alldisabled men or
officers on the field or elsewhere, if captured; all enemies who have
thrown away their arms and ask for quarter, are prisoners of war, and
as such exposed to the inconveniences as well as entitled to the
privileges of aprisonerofwar. 

Art. 50. Moreover, citizens who accompany an army for whatever purpose,
suchas sutlers, editors, or reporters of journals, or contractors, if
captured, may be made prisoners of war, and be detained as such. 

The monarch and members of the hostile reigning family, male or female,
the chief, andchiefofficers of the hostile government, its diplomatic
agents, and all persons who are of particular and singular use and
benefit to the hostile army or its government, are, ifcaptured
onbelligerentground, and if unprovided with a safe conduct granted by
thecaptor's government, prisoners of war. 

NOTE: Are not the Americans in the several States being treated as
prisoners ofwar since the Civil War under an occupying force of the
federalgovernment? Andare not "licenses" and other privileges created
by statute a letter of safe conduct to such prisoners granted by the
captor'sgovernment? 

Art. 75. Prisoners of war are subject to confinement or imprisonment
such as may be deemed necessary on account of safety, but they are to
be subjected to no other intentional suffering orindignity. The
confinement and mode of treating a prisoner may be varied during his
captivity according to the demands of safety. 

NOTE: Sounds like statutory civil rights of prisoners defined under
theCivilWarAmendments and numerous Civil Rights Acts. 

============================== 

SECTION V
Safe-conduct - Spies - War-traitors - Captured messengers - Abuse of
the flag of truce

Art. 86. All intercourse between the territories occupied by
belligerent armies, whetherbytraffic, by letter, by travel, or in any
other way, ceases. This is the generalrule, tobeobserved without
special proclamation. 

Exceptions to this rule, whether by safe-conduct, or permission to
trade on a small orlargescale, or by exchanging mails, or by travel
from one territory into the other, cantake place only according to
agreement approved by the government, or by the highest military
authority. 

Contraventions of this rule are highly punishable. 

NOTE: Is this what regulation of interstate commerce has become?
Aregulation of commerce under a rule of war? Is this why "licenses" to
travel upon highways are purported to be required? Why "licenses" are
purported to be required to do business at all? 

============================= 

SECTION VIII 

Armistice - Capitulation 

Art. 135. An armistice is the cessation of active hostilities for a
period agreed betweenbelligerents. It must be agreed upon in writing,
and duly ratified by the highest authorities of the contending parties. 

Art. 136. If an armistice be declared, without conditions, it extends
no further than to require a total cessation of hostilities along the
front of both belligerents. 

If conditions be agreed upon, they should be clearly expressed, and
must be rigidly adhered to by both parties. If either party violates
any express condition, the armistice may be declared null and void by
the other. 

Art. 137. An armistice may be general, and valid for all points and
lines of thebelligerents, orspecial, that is, referring to certain
troops or certain localities only. 

An armistice may be concluded for a definite time; or for an indefinite
time, duringwhich either belligerent may resume hostilities on giving
the notice agreed upon to the other. 

Art. 138. The motives which induce the one or the other belligerent to
conclude an armistice, whether it be expected to be preliminary to a
treaty of peace, or to prepare during the armistice for a more vigorous
prosecution of the war, does in no way affect the character of the
armistice itself. 

Art. 139. An armistice is binding upon the belligerents from the day of
the agreed commencement; but the officers of the armies are responsible
from the day only when they receive official information of its
existence. 

Art. 140. Commanding officers have the right to conclude armistices
binding on the district over which their command extends, but such
armistice is subject to the ratification of the superiorauthority, and
ceases so soon as it is made known to the enemy that the armistice
isnotratified, even if a certain time for the elapsing between giving
notice of cessation and theresumption of hostilities should have been
stipulated for. 

Art. 141. It is incumbent upon the contracting parties of an armistice
to stipulate what intercourse of persons or traffic between the
inhabitants of the territories occupied by the hostile armies shall be
allowed, if any. 

If nothing is stipulated the intercourse remains suspended, as during
actualhostilities. 

Art. 142. An armistice is not a partial or a temporary peace; it is
only the suspension ofmilitary operations to the extent agreed upon by
the parties. 

Art. 143. When an armistice is concluded between a fortified place and
the army besieging it, it is agreed by all the authorities on this
subject that the besieger must cease all extension, perfection,
oradvance of his attacking works as much so as from attacks by main
force. 

But as there is a difference of opinion among martial jurists, whether
the besieged have the right to repair breaches or to erect new works of
defense within the place during an armistice, this point should be
determined by express agreement between the parties. 

Art. 144. So soon as a capitulation is signed, the capitulator has no
right to demolish, destroy, or injure the works, arms, stores, or
ammunition, in his possession, during the time which elapses between
the signing and the execution of the capitulation, unless otherwise
stipulated in the same. 

Art. 145. When an armistice is clearly broken by one of the parties,
the other party is released from all obligation to observe it. 

Art. 146. Prisoners taken in the act of breaking an armistice must be
treated as prisoners ofwar, the officer alone being responsible who
gives the order for such a violation of an armistice. Thehighest
authority of the belligerent aggrieved may demand redress for the
infraction of anarmistice. 

Art. 147. Belligerents sometimes conclude an armistice while their
plenipotentiaries are met to discuss the conditions of a treaty of
peace; butplenipotentiaries may meet without apreliminaryarmistice; in
the latter case, the war iscarried on without any abatement. 

NOTE: Read Articles 135 through 147 again. Is the BUCK ACT, / providing
for concurrent jurisdiction of (so-called) State officials and
federalofficers within the boundaries of State - an "Armistice"
providing forfederal control within aState? Areregional metropolitan
servicedistricts the result of a local Armistice between cities
and/orcounties and the federal government under Article 140 to govern
aspecificdistrict? Are not all the Statutes and Agreements between
Statelegislators and the federal government (to obtain federal funds
and to administer federalregulations) written in the form of an
Armistice that allow activities within theState subject to federal
restrictions not otherwise authorized by the Constitution? 
State legislators have no power to waive the sovereignty of the State
(neverhaving been vested with that power by the people of the State).
Buthave they capitulated to a captor in an Armistice of Peace
withouttelling the populace they remain under siege of a captor
(theFederalGovernment) save for the Armistice? Andwhen a State says
"no" to the 13th and later Amendments, and says "no" to the income tax,
and says"no" to the FederalReserve, and says "no" to federal Officials
entering theState to impose martiallaw measures, will the Congress or
the President (ascommander inchief) "Order" invasion of the State by
federal military forces for a breach of Armistice? Isthis why Sheriffs,
StateJudges, City and County Boards and Commissions and the
Statelegislature consistently refuse to tell the "feds" to take ahike,
and tell the people that they are required do what they are told to do
by thefeds? Do they fear military retaliation from the occupying
centralgovernment? Dothey fear personal retribution in the way of civil
and criminal charges (andimprisonment if they fail to impose the will
of their captor upon the populace within the State)? Even if they
refuse to take action, they could at least tell the truth and let the
people of the State know that they remain "occupied" by an invading
force imposing martiallaw. Or, would this justify a "deathpenalty" upon
them as a"wartraitor" for giving information to their government (the
enemy) whileinhabiting occupied belligerent territory under Articles90
/ &91,/ (being separated from their own government)? 
You need to study the full text of the Lieber codified rules of war.
Therein you will find the implementation of these rules for the
government of the UnitedStates in every aspect oflaw and of your life.

/ / / / / / 

Conclusion 

Under our form of government, every American (individually or
byrepresentation) is the high and supreme sovereign authority. The
authority of each of the three departments of government isdefined and
established. 

It is entirely fitting and proper to observe that in all instances
between the States and theUnitedStates, and the People, there is no
such thing as the idea of a compact between the People on one side and
the Government on the other. The compact is that of the people with
each other toproduce and constitute a government. 

To suggest that any government can be a party to a compact with the
whole people is supposing it to have an existence before it can have a
right to exist. 

The only instance in which a compact can take place between the people
and those who exercise the government, is that the people shall pay
while they choose to employthem. 

A Constitution is the property of the Nation and more specifically of
the Individual, and not those who exercise the government. All the
Constitutions of America are declared to be established in the
authority of the People. 

The authority of the Constitution is grounded upon the absolute,
God-given free agency of each Individual, and this is the basis of all
powers granted, reserved or withheld in the authorization of every
word, phrase, clause or paragraph of the Constitution. Anyattempt by
Congress, the President or the Courts to limit, change or enlarge even
the most claimed insignificant provision is therefore ultravires and
void abinitio. 

No one applying the Constitution to any situation has any business,
right or duty to look in any direction for sovereignty but toward the
people. Any attempt or inclination to do so is a violation ofone's Oath
and continuing duty to uphold, maintain and support the Constitution of
theUnitedStates of America. 

As the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the
UnitedStatesConstitution are found to have been brought into effect
outside the mandates of Article V of theUnitedStatesConstitution, these
three Amendments (as a franchise to the UnitedStates) must be forfeited
as a case ofperversion./ AnAmendment to the UnitedStates Constitution
is not brought into effect throughusage, by Acts of Congress, or by
Opinions of Courts. 

The federal Courts of the United States have found that questions of
ratification of anAmendment to the United States Constitution are
"political questions" to which theCourts will notaddress. According to
the federal Courts, either the Congress of the UnitedStates or the
States 

have the "textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
issues" to determine the validity of the ratification votes cast on an
Amendment. 

The authority to determine the validity of the votes cast in
ratification of an Amendment are with theStates and more specific, with
the Convention of the States, asthe U.S. Constitution atArticleV
declares that it shall be the power of thelegislatures of the States to
ratify proposed Amendments and to call for Constitutional Conventions.
The people have declared within Article IX of the Bill of Rights to the
Constitution for theUnited States that those powers not delegated to
theUnitedStates are reserved to theStates. 

As the federal Courts and the Congress of the United States have
refused to determine the legitimacy of the ratification votes cast on
the Civil War Amendments, itisproper and necessary for the legislatures
of the States to question theAmendments. It appears from case law, the
proper proceedure would be for the legislatures of the several States
to call for a "Constitutional Convention" for the purpose of making an
investigation into the Amendments to determine if they were proposed
and ratified in accordance to the provisions of the Constitution for
the UnitedStates of America. Itappears that only the"Convention" has
the authority and power to act on questions with respect to matters of
fraud, irregularity, or illegal practices in the conduct of Congress or
theLegislatures. / 

End of Expos�